Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Green Bay Police Department officers arrested Tubby and transported him to jail for booking. In the jail’s secure entryway, Tubby became non-compliant, refusing to exit the squad car and concealing one hand under his shirt while threatening to “do it” if officers came any closer. The officers called for backup. Tubby was eventually forced out of the car with pepper spray. He kept one hand under his shirt in a manner that, to officers, indicated he had a weapon. Exiting the squad car, Tubby refused to surrender but instead rushed toward the exit in an apparent escape attempt. An officer heard a “pop” that he believed to be a gunshot coming from the weapon he presumed Tubby was hiding and discharged his firearm eight times, hitting Tubby with five shots. Tubby died. His estate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officer’s conduct did not violate Tubby’s constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures; qualified immunity shields the officer from liability. The officer’s conduct was reasonable, given that Tubby intentionally led the officers to believe he was armed and ready to “do it.” View "Doxtator v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in Cook County Jail, Thomas was assaulted by another inmate. Seventeen months later, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal statutes against Sheriff Dart, Cook County, and other Jail personnel, including corrections officers to whom he allegedly reported the inmate’s threat of violence. All of his claims were either dismissed or resolved against Thomas on summary judgment.Years after litigation began, Thomas sought to amend his complaint for a third time to name as defendants intake clerks who screened him at the Jail; he alleged they purposely omitted from intake forms that he suffered from mental health problems and that this omission led to his assault. The court denied the motion to amend. Thomas challenged the denial of that motion, asserting that the ruling demonstrated the court’s bias against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment Thomas sought would have been futile and no bias against Thomas can reasonably be inferred from the district court’s adverse rulings. Thomas did not state a viable claim. Without more, simply being housed in the Jail’s general population, even while suffering from PTSD, is not a particular enough risk in the failure-to-protect context. View "Thomas v. Dart" on Justia Law

In 2006, an ATF agent posed as a drug courier and recruited Blitch and others to steal cocaine from a fictional drug cartel stash house. On the night the robbery was planned to take place, an ATF team arrested the men. On retrial, a jury found them guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and being felons in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1). Blitch was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.In 2016, Blitch moved, pro see, to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement based on his prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. More than a year after the denial of that petition, Blitch moved to reopen judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The district court denied the motion, finding it to be in substance a successive 2255 petition, which could only be brought if the Court of Appeals certified that it rested on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even without the additional restrictions applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions, Blitch’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion, alleging mistake, was subject to a one-year time constraint. View "Blitch v. United States" on Justia Law

King, who was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to three heroin charges, sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), To establish the required “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” King cited intervening Seventh Circuit precedent (Ruth), which held that a conviction under an Illinois law does not count as a prior cocaine conviction for purposed of certain federal recidivist enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. There is nothing “extraordinary” about new statutes or caselaw, or a claim that the sentencing judge erred in applying the Guidelines; these ordinary legal issues should be addressed by direct appeal or collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements contemplate the release of prisoners afflicted by severe medical conditions or risks, experiencing a family emergency, or otherwise in unusual personal circumstances. They do not hint that the sort of legal developments routinely addressed by direct or collateral review qualify a person for compassionate release. That the First Step Act lowered sentences for some cocaine crimes, enabled prisoners to seek compassionate release on their own motions, and more, did not modify the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” threshold for eligibility. King’s effort to use “Ruth” as a door opener under the compassionate-release statute is foreclosed by other decisions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Westfield amended its ordinance governing signs within city limits. Out of a stated concern for public safety and aesthetics, the ordinance requires those wishing to install a sign or billboard to apply for a permit. The ordinance exempts directional signs, scoreboards, particular flags, and notices on gas pumps and vending machines. It prohibits signs on poles and those advertising ideas, products, or services not offered on the same premises (off-premises signs). Those seeking to install a non-compliant sign may appeal the denial of a permit or, if necessary, request a variance. GEFT applied for a permit to build a large digital billboard on private property along U.S. Highway 31 in Westfield. Because of the proposed sign’s off-premises location and use of a pole, Westfield denied GEFT’s application and subsequent variance request.GEFT sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit previously upheld a restraining order compelling GEFT to cease all actions to install its proposed billboard pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court later granted GEFT summary judgment and permanently enjoined Westfield from enforcing many aspects of its ordinance. The Seventh Circuit remanded for consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in “City of Austin v. Reagan National;” the fact that the city must read a sign to evaluate its conformity with regulations is not alone determinative of whether the regulation is content-based. View "GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield" on Justia Law

Kingman, Rhinelander Wisconsin’s Director of Public Works, spoke at a City Council meeting with a declaration of no confidence in a colleague. Rhinelander investigated Kingman’s contentions and found them without merit. In the process, however, third-party investigators discovered that Kingman himself had not only mistreated his employees but also had gone so far as to retaliate against those who had complained about the toxic work environment he created in his department.Kingman was fired and filed a lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination reflected retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights at the City Council meeting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Rhinelander and individual defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Council’s vote to fire Kingman reflected unlawful retaliation. Regardless of whether Kingman spoke to the council as a private citizen or in connection with his employment, Kingman’s behavior toward his subordinates is just the type of “significant intervening event” and seriously “inappropriate workplace behavior” that separates an employee’s protected activity “from the adverse employment action he receives.” View "Kingman v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

Seven years into his 15-year sentence for heroin dealing, Brock sought early discharge under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Receiving that relief depended on Brock first identifying a legally cognizable “extraordinary and compelling” reason for ending his sentence early and then convincing the district court the outcome was further justified by an application of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Brock argued, as “an extraordinary and compelling ground to consider a lower sentence,” that his 2005 cocaine conviction was no longer a proper predicate for his 21 U.S.C. 851 sentencing enhancement because the Illinois statute under which he was convicted covers isomers of cocaine omitted from the federal definition of cocaine.The district court denied relief, finding that the compassionate release statute could not be used as a path to a sentence reduction based on a position available to defendants during plea negotiations or trial, direct appeal, or in a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenging a sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Intervening Circuit precedent, even if viewed as announcing new law or a new interpretation of an existing statutory provision, cannot alone constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason authorizing a reduced sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Brock" on Justia Law

Mangine, serving a 35- year sentence for federal drug and firearm offenses, sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that the sentencing court mischaracterized him as a career offender and that the error resulted in his ineligibility for a discretionary sentence reduction he would like to pursue under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). His previous post-conviction motions under sections 2266 and 2241 had been unsuccessful. He had previously been denied a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2); Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two levels the offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes. did not change his Guidelines range as originally calculated.The district court denied relief, concluding that such ineligibility does not amount to a miscarriage of justice—thereby precluding Mangine from satisfying the conditions for pursuing post-conviction relief under section 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mangine could no longer be designated as a career offender in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions but that is not what drove his sentence. Even without the designation, his Guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. Mangine did not receive “far greater punishment than that usually meted out for an otherwise similarly situated individual who had committed the same offense.” He did not suffer a miscarriage of justice. View "Mangine v. Withers" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of Paul Reina on his claim that Walmart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b) and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Reina, who was deaf and legally blind, worked as a cart attendant for Walmart for almost twenty years. After providing Reina with a job coach, Walmart eventually ended Reina's employment. Reina filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which sued Walmart for violating the ADA. The jury concluded that Walmart violated the ADA by refusing Reina a reasonable accommodation in the form of a full-time job coach and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights. The jury awarded Reina $200,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Walmart's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to issue an injunction against Walmart as proposed by the EEOC. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, six men robbed a marijuana dealer, Thomas, at gunpoint in his home. Two of the robbers shot Thomas, who died. One of those shooters also shot Landon, Thomas’s business partner. Landon survived. Reyes was convicted of Thomas’s murder, Landon’s attempted murder, and home invasion. The state’s evidence against Reyes included Landon’s identification of Reyes as the shooter after viewing a photo array. It took the police five attempts to extract that identification from Landon; several times, he seemed to confuse Reyes with another man who was not a suspect in the robbery. Reyes moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress the identification.After Reyes exhausted state-court review, he sought federal collateral relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and that Landon’s identification was too unreliable to pass constitutional muster. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. While the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, as noted by the state court, it did not taint the conviction. Error alone is not enough to entitle Reyes to relief. A section 2254 petitioner must also show prejudice. Reyes cannot because the jury that convicted him heard significant evidence of his guilt beyond the identification and had the opportunity to evaluate most of the evidence bearing on the reliability of the identification. View "Reyes v. Nurse" on Justia Law