Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ten-year-old Amani, walking home, was grabbed by a man and pushed into a vehicle. The man hit her eye and lip, threatened to kill her, parked in an alley, pulled down her leggings, and touched her inside of her underwear. Amani escaped, ran away, and flagged down a passing car. The driver called 911. A week later, police arrested Protho, who was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (g)(1)). During a nine-day jury trial, 29 witnesses, including Amani and Protho, testified. The trial focused on the kidnapper’s identity.The jury found Protho guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 38 years’ imprisonment plus restitution, including $87,770 for Amani’s psychotherapy needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of testimony by three expert witnesses: an FBI photographic technologist who analyzed surveillance videos that were admitted at trial, an expert on fiber evidence, and a manager of Ford's Design Analysis Engineering Department, who identified the vehicle on the videos. The district court did not clearly err in handling either of Protho’s Batson challenges or in allowing Amani to testify via closed-circuit television, 18 U.S.C. 3509. The court rejected challenges based on the “interstate commerce” element of the statute and to the district court’s handling of an evidentiary question at trial. The court noted the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt. View "United States v. Protho" on Justia Law

Wilson rekindled a romantic relationship with Yegger, whose five children include FT, who was seven years old and had special needs. The Bureau of Child Welfare had received reports of physical abuse and unexplained injuries on Yegger’s children, who were eventually placed with foster families. Each child received a medical checkup. A pediatric nurse practitioner observed five genital lesions on FT. A pediatrician later observed genital and anal lesions; an antibody test later allowed her to diagnose them as herpes. In a recorded interview with a forensic interviewer, FT recounted eight times that she had been sexually assaulted by Wilson. Wilson was charged with Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child, which requires at least three qualifying acts “within a specified period of time.” The judge instructed the jury that it could find Wilson guilty of the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Sexual Assault of a Child, which requires only a single qualifying act. The jury found Wilson guilty of the greater offense. The judge referred to “overwhelming testimony that you committed these outrageous assaults” and sentenced Wilson to 37 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Wilson’s petition for habeas relief. Wisconsin courts reasonably rejected his arguments that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient. View "Wilson v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Olson arrived in Madison, Wisconsin during the second night of violent civil unrest following the death of George Floyd and armed himself with a gun. Three Madison Police officers observed Olson take the gun from the trunk of his car, then apprehended Olson, who was a felon, retrieved the gun, and placed him under arrest, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Olson attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. Given the unique circumstances of the night, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson “was eminently justifiable.” They saw Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants; saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated; and saw Olson carefully scrutinize his surroundings, which suggested avoiding detection. The officers reasonably suspected Olson was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity while the city was experiencing an almost complete collapse of civil order. Any omissions or inaccuracies in the officers’ contemporaneous reports are plausibly explained by their sleep deprivation and stress. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

Thurston was convicted of felony rape after his DNA was matched to cigarette butts found in the park that was the scene of the crime. Thurston claimed that his attorney did not object to the admission of a report summarizing the DNA analysis of the cigarettes because the defense attorney did not notice that the report also identified Thurston’s DNA as matching a “sperm fraction” collected in “case IP06051889”—another rape for which Thurston was charged. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, reasoning that the reference to the sperm fraction was “too vague” to “support the forbidden [propensity] inference.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, finding that the Indiana decision was not an “unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals was entitled to presume that the jury would not disobey its instructions and speculate about the reference to case ‐889. View "Thurston v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Officers patrolling an area known for drug activity, observed three men, with a Dodge Ram truck, acting strangely. The events that followed were recorded on a dashcam. Officer Harvath believed the truck rolled through a stop sign. The truck pulled into a parking lot. Officers approached. The truck’s driver was Zimdars; Taylor and Yang were passengers. Harvath asked Zimdars for identification and whether were any weapons in the vehicle. Zimdars said he was not “aware” of any weapons, which raised Harvath’s suspicions. After obtaining Zimdars’ identification, Harvath called for a canine unit. Officer Russell, speaking to the passengers, repeatedly told Yang to keep his hands visible. A canine unit arrived. Russell instructed the truck's occupants to exit. According to Russell, Yang became pale and his shoulders slumped. As Yang exited the truck, Russell again ordered him to keep his hands visible. Yang reached for his waist, which prompted Russell to press Yang against the side of the truck. Yang resisted. A handgun fell from Yang’s waistband, with a package containing methamphetamine and marijuana. Yang attempted to flee. Harvath subdued Yang with a taser. Officers found additional methamphetamine in the vehicle. The canine remained in the car throughout the stop. The period between Harvath’s first communication with the truck’s occupants to the start of the altercation was less than six minutes.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Yang’s motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation occurred and that the vehicle’s occupants were involved drug activity, and did not unlawfully prolong the stop. View "United States v. Yang" on Justia Law

Green Bay Police Department officers arrested Tubby and transported him to jail for booking. In the jail’s secure entryway, Tubby became non-compliant, refusing to exit the squad car and concealing one hand under his shirt while threatening to “do it” if officers came any closer. The officers called for backup. Tubby was eventually forced out of the car with pepper spray. He kept one hand under his shirt in a manner that, to officers, indicated he had a weapon. Exiting the squad car, Tubby refused to surrender but instead rushed toward the exit in an apparent escape attempt. An officer heard a “pop” that he believed to be a gunshot coming from the weapon he presumed Tubby was hiding and discharged his firearm eight times, hitting Tubby with five shots. Tubby died. His estate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officer’s conduct did not violate Tubby’s constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures; qualified immunity shields the officer from liability. The officer’s conduct was reasonable, given that Tubby intentionally led the officers to believe he was armed and ready to “do it.” View "Doxtator v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in Cook County Jail, Thomas was assaulted by another inmate. Seventeen months later, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal statutes against Sheriff Dart, Cook County, and other Jail personnel, including corrections officers to whom he allegedly reported the inmate’s threat of violence. All of his claims were either dismissed or resolved against Thomas on summary judgment.Years after litigation began, Thomas sought to amend his complaint for a third time to name as defendants intake clerks who screened him at the Jail; he alleged they purposely omitted from intake forms that he suffered from mental health problems and that this omission led to his assault. The court denied the motion to amend. Thomas challenged the denial of that motion, asserting that the ruling demonstrated the court’s bias against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment Thomas sought would have been futile and no bias against Thomas can reasonably be inferred from the district court’s adverse rulings. Thomas did not state a viable claim. Without more, simply being housed in the Jail’s general population, even while suffering from PTSD, is not a particular enough risk in the failure-to-protect context. View "Thomas v. Dart" on Justia Law

In 2006, an ATF agent posed as a drug courier and recruited Blitch and others to steal cocaine from a fictional drug cartel stash house. On the night the robbery was planned to take place, an ATF team arrested the men. On retrial, a jury found them guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and being felons in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1). Blitch was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.In 2016, Blitch moved, pro see, to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement based on his prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. More than a year after the denial of that petition, Blitch moved to reopen judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The district court denied the motion, finding it to be in substance a successive 2255 petition, which could only be brought if the Court of Appeals certified that it rested on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even without the additional restrictions applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions, Blitch’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion, alleging mistake, was subject to a one-year time constraint. View "Blitch v. United States" on Justia Law

King, who was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to three heroin charges, sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), To establish the required “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” King cited intervening Seventh Circuit precedent (Ruth), which held that a conviction under an Illinois law does not count as a prior cocaine conviction for purposed of certain federal recidivist enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. There is nothing “extraordinary” about new statutes or caselaw, or a claim that the sentencing judge erred in applying the Guidelines; these ordinary legal issues should be addressed by direct appeal or collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements contemplate the release of prisoners afflicted by severe medical conditions or risks, experiencing a family emergency, or otherwise in unusual personal circumstances. They do not hint that the sort of legal developments routinely addressed by direct or collateral review qualify a person for compassionate release. That the First Step Act lowered sentences for some cocaine crimes, enabled prisoners to seek compassionate release on their own motions, and more, did not modify the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” threshold for eligibility. King’s effort to use “Ruth” as a door opener under the compassionate-release statute is foreclosed by other decisions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Westfield amended its ordinance governing signs within city limits. Out of a stated concern for public safety and aesthetics, the ordinance requires those wishing to install a sign or billboard to apply for a permit. The ordinance exempts directional signs, scoreboards, particular flags, and notices on gas pumps and vending machines. It prohibits signs on poles and those advertising ideas, products, or services not offered on the same premises (off-premises signs). Those seeking to install a non-compliant sign may appeal the denial of a permit or, if necessary, request a variance. GEFT applied for a permit to build a large digital billboard on private property along U.S. Highway 31 in Westfield. Because of the proposed sign’s off-premises location and use of a pole, Westfield denied GEFT’s application and subsequent variance request.GEFT sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit previously upheld a restraining order compelling GEFT to cease all actions to install its proposed billboard pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court later granted GEFT summary judgment and permanently enjoined Westfield from enforcing many aspects of its ordinance. The Seventh Circuit remanded for consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in “City of Austin v. Reagan National;” the fact that the city must read a sign to evaluate its conformity with regulations is not alone determinative of whether the regulation is content-based. View "GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield" on Justia Law