Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and related charges after a shooting at the Luna Lounge in Appleton, Wisconsin. Video evidence showed several people fleeing the scene, including the petitioner’s brother. Police interviewed three eyewitnesses—Watou Lee, Mikey Thao, and Ryan Thao—shortly after the incident. These witnesses described the shooter but did not explicitly identify the petitioner. However, police later received statements from other witnesses implicating the petitioner. The State did not disclose the initial interviews with Watou, Mikey, and Ryan to the defense and eventually destroyed the recordings, citing the witnesses’ fears for their safety. The defense only learned of the destroyed interviews after the witnesses were reinterviewed and those statements were provided. The petitioner moved to dismiss the charges or, alternatively, to bar the witnesses’ testimony, arguing violations of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and the principles set forth in California v. Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood.The Wisconsin Circuit Court denied the Brady claim but agreed the destruction of evidence violated due process, barring the State from calling the three witnesses at trial, though permitting the defense to do so. The petitioner did not object to this remedy and ultimately did not call the witnesses. He was convicted by a jury, and his conviction and denial of post-conviction relief were affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, with the Wisconsin Supreme Court declining review.On federal habeas review, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied relief, holding that the state appellate court did not act contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court’s application of Brady, Trombetta, and Youngblood was not objectively unreasonable and that the selected remedy did not violate clearly established federal law. View "Lee v Mlodzik" on Justia Law

Marion Thomas was stopped by Chicago police officers after failing to signal a turn. During the stop, officers reported smelling marijuana coming from his vehicle. After Thomas partially rolled down his window and refused to comply with several commands, officers opened his door and removed him from the car. Thomas was handcuffed and his car was searched, revealing a marijuana cigarette and a tray. Thomas claimed the items did not belong to him and experienced a medical issue, after which he was taken to the hospital. He was cited for the traffic violation and marijuana possession.Following his arrest, Thomas filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the officers and the City of Chicago, alleging illegal search, illegal seizure, false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and malicious prosecution under state law. Some claims and defendants were dismissed at summary judgment. At trial, the jury found for the defendants. Thomas moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous, that an officer gave misleading testimony, and that a question about his criminal record was prejudicial. The district court denied his motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the challenged jury instructions accurately stated the law, including the principle that probable cause to arrest for any crime defeats a false arrest claim. The court found no abuse of discretion regarding the officer’s testimony about a marijuana “grinder,” as there was no evidence of fraud or prejudice. The court also determined that the question about Thomas’s criminal record did not prejudice the jury, since the objection was sustained and no answer was given. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Thomas v McAuliffe" on Justia Law

An Indiana prisoner, while serving a 65-year sentence for murder, attacked a correctional officer at the Miami Correctional Facility in 2022. The attack caused serious injuries requiring outside medical treatment. Following an administrative hearing, the prisoner was found guilty of battering staff and was sanctioned by losing nearly 19 years of accumulated good time credits. The hearing officer based the sanction on the severity of the attack and the resulting injury and checked factors including the seriousness of the offense and the disruption to facility security.The prisoner filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, raising due process and Eighth Amendment claims. He alleged procedural errors, hearing officer bias, and that there was no evidence of serious injury. He also argued that the sanction was grossly disproportionate. After counsel was appointed, he submitted a brief that referenced, but did not fully restate, these claims. The district court denied relief, holding that the due process claims lacked merit and that the Eighth Amendment claim was waived due to insufficient argument in the brief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the relevant constitutional claims were not waived, as the amended filing preserved the original petition’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the hearing officer’s finding of serious bodily injury was supported by sufficient evidence under the “some evidence” standard. The court also concluded that the loss of good time credits was not grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment, given the circumstances of the offense, the petitioner’s disciplinary record, and the nature of his underlying conviction. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Hawkins v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Dr. John Peterson, a pain-management physician employed at a Veterans Affairs healthcare facility in Illinois, was placed on summary suspension in 2020 due to concerns about his patient care, particularly relating to the management of opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions. He was notified of the suspension, informed of his right to respond, and told a comprehensive review would follow. After several extensions—largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic—a review concluded that Peterson should be removed for failing to provide appropriate medical care and for failing to follow instructions during his suspension. Peterson was given notice of the charges, access to the evidence against him, and the right to respond, but did not submit a timely reply. He was subsequently removed from his position.Peterson appealed his removal to the Veterans Administration Disciplinary Appeals Board, which held a hearing and allowed him multiple postponements to secure an expert witness. Ultimately, Peterson submitted a lengthy rebuttal the night before the hearing, which the Appeals Board excluded as untimely. After questioning Peterson directly, the Appeals Board sustained most charges and upheld his removal. The decision was reviewed and approved by the Deputy to the VA Undersecretary for Health. Peterson then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, challenging the procedures and alleging due process violations. The district court found the procedures adequate, the evidentiary exclusion justified, and the agency’s actions not arbitrary or capricious, granting summary judgment for the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and held that the procedures Peterson received were adequate under due process and agency law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding no basis to disturb the agency’s decision. View "Peterson v. Collins" on Justia Law

Police officers in Calumet City, Illinois, responded to a 911 call in May 2015 reporting a man allegedly throwing a knife near a home. Upon arrival, officers spoke with the caller, who identified the suspect entering a residence. The officers knocked on the door, exchanged words with someone inside who told them to leave, and later decided to enter through an unlocked back door without a warrant, citing concerns for the safety of occupants due to a recent domestic violence report involving the address. Inside, officers found a woman who appeared unhurt and ultimately located Elias Villalobos hiding upstairs. The parties dispute whether Villalobos resisted or threatened the officers before he was tased and shot.Villalobos sued four officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging excessive force and unlawful entry under the Fourth Amendment. At summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity for most excessive force claims, finding factual disputes for trial. On the unlawful entry claim, however, the court granted partial summary judgment for Villalobos, concluding as a matter of law that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering without a warrant and rejecting the officers’ exigent circumstances argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the denial of qualified immunity on the unlawful entry issue. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order, finding that the lower court did not address whether clearly established law put the officers on notice that their conduct was unlawful, as required for denying qualified immunity. The appellate court also noted unresolved factual disputes relevant to the exigent circumstances analysis. The case was remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to clarify the facts and address both prongs of the qualified immunity test. View "Villalobos v. Picicco" on Justia Law

Jerron Williams was involved in an altercation with a United States Postal Service letter carrier in Gary, Indiana. After a brief dispute, Williams fired several shots into the carrier's vehicle as she attempted to leave, causing her physical injuries. A grand jury indicted Williams on three counts: assaulting a federal employee with a deadly weapon causing bodily injury, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Williams entered into a plea agreement, admitting guilt to the first two counts and waiving his right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, held a change of plea hearing where the magistrate judge explained the charges and their elements. Williams, with his attorney’s agreement, confirmed his understanding and acceptance of the facts and the charges. Prior to sentencing, Williams changed attorneys and sought to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced Williams to 153 months in prison.On appeal, Williams argued for the first time that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was invalid because the predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) was not a “crime of violence.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case for plain error and determined that Williams had waived this argument multiple times: by pleading guilty, by waiving his right to appeal, and by not raising the argument in his motion to withdraw the plea. The court also found that the magistrate judge properly explained the charges and ensured Williams’s understanding. As a result, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "USA v JWilliams" on Justia Law

Michael Connor was convicted in 2013 after a bench trial in Livingston County, Illinois, of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The offenses involved his daughter and stepdaughter, occurring when they were between five and seven years old. The statutory penalty was six to sixty years per count, to be served consecutively, but if convicted of assaulting multiple victims, the law required a mandatory life sentence. After his conviction, Connor received the mandatory life term.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, Connor pursued postconviction relief in Illinois state court, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during plea negotiations by failing to inform him that he faced a mandatory life sentence. He claimed this omission led him to reject an 18-year plea offer. At an evidentiary hearing, Connor testified that he would have accepted the plea had he known about the life sentence. The trial judge, however, found this testimony not credible, noting that Connor had repeatedly asserted his innocence and had unequivocally stated at sentencing that he would not have pleaded guilty even if aware of the outcome. The trial court denied postconviction relief, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding no reasonable probability that Connor would have accepted the plea but for counsel’s alleged errors.Connor then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, which was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial. The Seventh Circuit held that federal habeas relief was not warranted because Connor failed to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the state court's credibility finding that he would not have accepted the plea. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Connor v. Greene" on Justia Law

An inmate at an Illinois women’s prison was repeatedly sexually assaulted by her assigned counselor, who used his authority over her access to her daughter as leverage. After the inmate’s cellmate reported the abuse to a prison investigator, the investigator and the prison warden, instead of moving to protect the victim, devised a plan to use her as unwitting “bait” to catch the counselor in the act. This plan failed, and the abuse continued. The prison’s toxic culture, where staff-on-inmate sexual abuse was widespread and often ignored, provided the backdrop for these events.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the inmate filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the counselor (who defaulted), the investigator, and the warden, alleging Eighth Amendment violations for cruel and unusual punishment. The district court denied summary judgment for the investigator and warden on qualified immunity and liability, and a jury found all three defendants liable, awarding the plaintiff $19.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The district court also excluded evidence suggesting the plaintiff might have consented to the abuse, and denied the investigator and warden’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and denial of qualified immunity for the investigator and warden, holding that no reasonable official could have thought their response was appropriate. However, the appellate court reversed in part, ordering a new trial on compensatory and punitive damages (but not liability) against the investigator and warden, due to insufficient evidence supporting liability before they learned of the abuse, exclusion of relevant evidence affecting punitive damages, and failure to use a special verdict form to distinguish between theories of liability. The attorney fee award was also vacated and remanded for reconsideration. View "Doe v Macleod" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to an assault complaint at an apartment building in Racine, Wisconsin, where they found a stabbing victim, Cannon, who identified Johnnie Russell as his assailant. Both the victim and Russell lived in the building, but Russell’s whereabouts were unknown. Building staff informed the officers that Russell might have returned to his apartment. Before obtaining a warrant, officers, with the help of the property manager, entered Russell’s apartment and conducted a brief 37-second sweep to check for injured persons or threats. No one was found. Later, officers secured a search warrant and conducted a thorough search. Russell challenged only the initial sweep, claiming it violated his Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Colin Powell, holding that the warrantless entry constituted a reasonable protective sweep under the Fourth Amendment, given the violent nature of the offense, uncertainty about Russell’s location, lack of information about possible other victims, and the brief, limited nature of the search.Russell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, contesting the district court’s ruling and arguing that Powell was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court decided to resolve the case on qualified immunity grounds without reaching the constitutional question. It held that, based on existing precedent, it was not clearly established that the brief warrantless sweep under these circumstances was unconstitutional. Therefore, Powell was entitled to qualified immunity.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Powell. View "Russell v. Comstock" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after being indicted on multiple charges related to mail fraud, theft from an employee benefit plan, and filing false tax returns, repeatedly chose to represent herself rather than accept legal counsel. The charges stemmed from her actions following her grandmother’s death: she continued to receive and conceal pension payments that should have stopped, and she prepared fraudulent tax filings for herself and others, keeping a portion of the illicit refunds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial. Throughout the proceedings, the district court made extensive efforts to inform the defendant of her constitutional right to counsel, the risks and disadvantages of self-representation, and the complexity of the charges. The court appointed standby counsel, but the defendant persisted in her wish to proceed without representation and consistently rejected the assistance of counsel, including private and standby counsel. Despite her refusal to participate actively in her trial—declining to make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence—the jury convicted her on all counts.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court should have forced her to accept counsel and that her waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing or voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the record as a whole and determined that, despite the absence of a formal Faretta hearing, the totality of circumstances demonstrated that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court carefully examined whether she understood her options and the consequences of self-representation. Concluding that the district court had not erred, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. The holding is that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid if the record as a whole shows the waiver was knowing and voluntary, even without a formal hearing. View "USA v Salley" on Justia Law