Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In Illinois, voters can cast their ballots by mail, and election officials can receive and count these ballots for up to two weeks after Election Day, provided they are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs, including Illinois voters and political candidates, challenged this procedure, arguing it unlawfully extends the voting period and dilutes their votes. They also claimed it forced them to spend additional resources on their campaigns beyond Election Day. The district court dismissed their claims, ruling that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and also rejected the claims on the merits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. The court found that Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury in fact, as their claims of vote dilution and additional campaign expenditures were deemed too speculative and generalized. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete and particularized injury. The court found that any potential vote dilution would affect all Illinois voters equally, making it a generalized grievance. Additionally, the court determined that the claimed campaign expenditures were speculative and not directly traceable to the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In 2004, Graham Stowe was charged with violent offenses against his former girlfriend and her family. He pleaded no contest, claiming insanity, which a state judge accepted, leading to his commitment for 39.5 years unless he recovered earlier. Released in 2007, Stowe was soon re-incarcerated for violating release conditions and later escaped in 2013, using drugs while free. After serving a sentence for escape, Stowe sought release in 2016 under Wisconsin law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of significant risk to deny release. Expert testimony indicated Stowe had a personality disorder and posed a risk of violence, leading the state circuit court to deny his release, a decision affirmed by the state court of appeals.Stowe then sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that the Wisconsin statute violated the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Foucha v. Louisiana, by allowing detention without a finding of mental illness. The district court found that Stowe had not preserved an as-applied challenge in state courts and limited the certificate of appealability to whether the statute was facially invalid. The district court upheld the statute, noting it allows consideration of mental history and condition, and thus often includes findings on mental illness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Stowe failed to show the Wisconsin statute was facially invalid under clearly established federal law, as the statute permits consideration of mental condition and does not inherently violate due process. The court also noted that Stowe's as-applied challenge was not preserved for federal review. Therefore, the court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not entitle Stowe to immediate release. View "Stowe v. Rybroek" on Justia Law

Cameron Johnson, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a firearm on September 15, 2019. He pleaded guilty to this charge. The Government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Johnson's three prior robbery convictions under Indiana law. Johnson argued that two of these robberies, committed on January 22, 2009, occurred on the same occasion and thus should not count as separate offenses under ACCA. He also contended that a jury should determine whether the robberies were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana rejected Johnson's argument, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that did not require a jury to decide the different-occasions question. The court concluded that the robberies were committed on different occasions and sentenced Johnson to fifteen years in prison, the minimum under ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Erlinger v. United States established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle defendants to have a jury decide whether prior offenses were committed on the same or different occasions. Given this precedent, the Seventh Circuit determined that the district court erred in not submitting the different-occasions question to a jury. The court also found that this error was not harmless, as it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the robberies to be committed on different occasions.The Seventh Circuit vacated Johnson's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Indiana's ballot access laws by the Indiana Green Party, the Libertarian Party of Indiana, and associated individuals. They argue that the requirements for candidates to collect signatures amounting to 2% of the votes cast in the last Secretary of State election, the process for submitting petitions, and the early deadline for submission are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They also challenge the law's indexing of party-level access to the results of the most recent Secretary of State election.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Indiana’s Secretary of State. The district court concluded that the 2% signature requirement and the June 30 deadline for submitting petitions were constitutionally permissible, relying on precedent from the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. The court did not address the burdens created by the county-level submission requirement or the challenge to the indexing of the full slate access option.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Indiana's ballot access requirements do not impose severe burdens on the plaintiffs' rights. The 2% signature requirement, the June 30 deadline, and the county-level submission process were deemed reasonable and justified by the state's interests in preventing voter confusion and ensuring orderly elections. The court also found that the requirement for parties to garner 2% of the vote in the Secretary of State election to maintain full slate access was reasonable, given the alternative petitioning route available to candidates. The court concluded that the state's regulatory interests were sufficient to justify the challenged restrictions. View "Indiana Green Party v. Morales" on Justia Law

David Bernardo-De La Cruz, a Mexican national, has lived in the U.S. without legal authorization for nineteen years. He was pulled over for speeding in 2014, which led to his immigration status being questioned. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, citing his long-term residence, good moral character, and the potential hardship his removal would cause his U.S. citizen daughters. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, finding that his removal would not cause an "exceptionally high level of hardship" for his daughters. However, the IJ granted him voluntary departure. Bernardo-De La Cruz appealed the denial of cancellation of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge (TAIJ) Gabriel Gonzalez upheld the IJ's findings, including the determination that Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters would remain in the U.S. after his removal. The TAIJ acknowledged evidence suggesting that one daughter required special educational services but did not find it sufficient to warrant a different outcome. Bernardo-De La Cruz then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency exceeded its authority in promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), the appointment of the TAIJ was unconstitutional, and the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), which limits voluntary departure for noncitizens contesting a removal order, was within the agency's statutory authority. The court also found that TAIJ Gonzalez was lawfully appointed by the Acting Attorney General, not the EOIR Director, thus complying with the Appointments Clause. Finally, the court determined that the IJ and BIA had adequately considered the evidence regarding the hardship to Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters. The petition for review was denied. View "Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, Alfredo Viveros-Chavez, was found in the United States without lawful immigration status after previously being removed. He was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which prohibits noncitizens from reentering the U.S. without authorization. Viveros-Chavez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee due to its discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. The district court denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence of racial animus behind the statute’s enactment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the discriminatory-intent framework from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., rather than rational basis review. The court acknowledged that the predecessor to § 1326, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was motivated by racial animus but found little evidence that such animus influenced the enactment of § 1326 in 1952. The court also found the statistical evidence presented by Viveros-Chavez unpersuasive, noting the lack of evidence that the government disproportionately targeted Mexican and Latino individuals for illegal reentry prosecutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the 1952 Congress was not motivated by racial animus when enacting § 1326. The court also noted that the statistical evidence provided by Viveros-Chavez was insufficient to demonstrate a disparate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. View "USA v. Viveros-Chavez" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs, planning to participate in protests during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance listing prohibited items within security perimeters. The list includes items such as laptops, large bags, drones, bicycles, and pointed objects, among others. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, particularly concerning the prohibition of "pointed object(s)," which they feared could include everyday items like ballpoint pens and buttons.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiffs then appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ordinance has a core of ascertainable meaning, covering items that pose clear safety risks, such as weapons and explosives. The court noted that while the plaintiffs raised concerns about potential overreach, they had not demonstrated that a substantial number of the ordinance's applications were unconstitutional. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the ordinance lacked merit, as the potentially problematic applications were not substantial in relation to the valid ones. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the ordinance but ultimately ruled against them on the merits. View "Thayer v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church, sought to establish a permanent location in the Village of Hazel Crest but faced difficulties due to the village's zoning ordinance. The church claimed that the ordinance discriminated against religious assemblies by not listing churches as a permitted use in any zoning district and requiring a special use permit for churches in certain residential districts. The church argued that this process was burdensome and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the church's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the church had standing but was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village, concluding that the church did not have a property interest in Hazel Crest and had not shown that comparable secular organizations were treated more favorably. The court also rejected the church's vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance. The church did not appeal the summary judgment but instead filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court had evaluated the wrong version of the zoning ordinance. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. The court noted that the church's argument regarding the zoning ordinance amendments was not raised during the summary judgment proceedings and that the church had waived any challenge to the B-2 district, which was affected by the 2008 amendment. The appellate court concluded that the church's difficulties in finding a property were due to the lack of suitable parcels, not the zoning ordinance. View "Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

Brian Threlkeld, after serving a prison sentence for sexually assaulting a minor, was civilly committed by the State of Wisconsin as a sexually violent person in 2008. In 2020, the state agreed he was eligible for supervised release, contingent on finding suitable housing in Kenosha County. However, Kenosha County has not been able to identify compliant housing, leaving Threlkeld still committed. Frustrated, Threlkeld filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the state’s housing criteria violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the enforcement of these criteria.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin abstained from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, citing ongoing state proceedings to identify suitable housing for Threlkeld. The court emphasized that these proceedings were civil enforcement actions, making federal intervention inappropriate. Additionally, the court noted that Threlkeld could raise his constitutional claims in the state court proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Younger abstention was appropriate due to the ongoing state efforts to find compliant housing. Moreover, the court identified a fundamental flaw in Threlkeld’s federal lawsuit: he named the Wisconsin Secretary of Health Services as the defendant, who does not have the authority to provide the relief sought. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the housing criteria, making the lawsuit against her improper under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Peshek v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Joshua Campbell sought to suppress evidence of child pornography found during an unannounced parole check by his parole officers. He argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because his parole agreement and the officers' failure to issue Miranda warnings led to the incriminating statements. Campbell contended that the parole agreement compelled his responses under threat of penalty and that he was in custody during the interrogation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Campbell's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the parole agreement did not threaten to penalize Campbell for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights and that he was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the parole agreement did not impose a penalty for invoking the Fifth Amendment, as it only required Campbell to respond to communications from parole officers, which could include invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Campbell was not in custody during the parole check, as he was in a familiar environment, not physically restrained, and the officers did not display weapons or use force. Therefore, the court concluded that Campbell's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, and the evidence obtained during the parole check was admissible. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law