Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Mexican citizen, Alfredo Viveros-Chavez, was found in the United States without lawful immigration status after previously being removed. He was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which prohibits noncitizens from reentering the U.S. without authorization. Viveros-Chavez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee due to its discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. The district court denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence of racial animus behind the statute’s enactment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the discriminatory-intent framework from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., rather than rational basis review. The court acknowledged that the predecessor to § 1326, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was motivated by racial animus but found little evidence that such animus influenced the enactment of § 1326 in 1952. The court also found the statistical evidence presented by Viveros-Chavez unpersuasive, noting the lack of evidence that the government disproportionately targeted Mexican and Latino individuals for illegal reentry prosecutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the 1952 Congress was not motivated by racial animus when enacting § 1326. The court also noted that the statistical evidence provided by Viveros-Chavez was insufficient to demonstrate a disparate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. View "USA v. Viveros-Chavez" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs, planning to participate in protests during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance listing prohibited items within security perimeters. The list includes items such as laptops, large bags, drones, bicycles, and pointed objects, among others. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, particularly concerning the prohibition of "pointed object(s)," which they feared could include everyday items like ballpoint pens and buttons.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiffs then appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ordinance has a core of ascertainable meaning, covering items that pose clear safety risks, such as weapons and explosives. The court noted that while the plaintiffs raised concerns about potential overreach, they had not demonstrated that a substantial number of the ordinance's applications were unconstitutional. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the ordinance lacked merit, as the potentially problematic applications were not substantial in relation to the valid ones. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the ordinance but ultimately ruled against them on the merits. View "Thayer v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church, sought to establish a permanent location in the Village of Hazel Crest but faced difficulties due to the village's zoning ordinance. The church claimed that the ordinance discriminated against religious assemblies by not listing churches as a permitted use in any zoning district and requiring a special use permit for churches in certain residential districts. The church argued that this process was burdensome and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the church's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the church had standing but was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village, concluding that the church did not have a property interest in Hazel Crest and had not shown that comparable secular organizations were treated more favorably. The court also rejected the church's vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance. The church did not appeal the summary judgment but instead filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court had evaluated the wrong version of the zoning ordinance. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. The court noted that the church's argument regarding the zoning ordinance amendments was not raised during the summary judgment proceedings and that the church had waived any challenge to the B-2 district, which was affected by the 2008 amendment. The appellate court concluded that the church's difficulties in finding a property were due to the lack of suitable parcels, not the zoning ordinance. View "Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

Brian Threlkeld, after serving a prison sentence for sexually assaulting a minor, was civilly committed by the State of Wisconsin as a sexually violent person in 2008. In 2020, the state agreed he was eligible for supervised release, contingent on finding suitable housing in Kenosha County. However, Kenosha County has not been able to identify compliant housing, leaving Threlkeld still committed. Frustrated, Threlkeld filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the state’s housing criteria violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the enforcement of these criteria.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin abstained from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, citing ongoing state proceedings to identify suitable housing for Threlkeld. The court emphasized that these proceedings were civil enforcement actions, making federal intervention inappropriate. Additionally, the court noted that Threlkeld could raise his constitutional claims in the state court proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Younger abstention was appropriate due to the ongoing state efforts to find compliant housing. Moreover, the court identified a fundamental flaw in Threlkeld’s federal lawsuit: he named the Wisconsin Secretary of Health Services as the defendant, who does not have the authority to provide the relief sought. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the housing criteria, making the lawsuit against her improper under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Peshek v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Joshua Campbell sought to suppress evidence of child pornography found during an unannounced parole check by his parole officers. He argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because his parole agreement and the officers' failure to issue Miranda warnings led to the incriminating statements. Campbell contended that the parole agreement compelled his responses under threat of penalty and that he was in custody during the interrogation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Campbell's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the parole agreement did not threaten to penalize Campbell for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights and that he was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the parole agreement did not impose a penalty for invoking the Fifth Amendment, as it only required Campbell to respond to communications from parole officers, which could include invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Campbell was not in custody during the parole check, as he was in a familiar environment, not physically restrained, and the officers did not display weapons or use force. Therefore, the court concluded that Campbell's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, and the evidence obtained during the parole check was admissible. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, GEFT Outdoor, LLC, challenged an Evansville, Indiana ordinance that distinguishes between on-premises and off-premises signs, arguing it violated the First Amendment. Initially, the district court agreed, but the Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC, led to a remand. GEFT then focused on the ordinance's permit and variance criteria, claiming the City might consider a sign's message. However, the City does not request message information for permits, and the ordinance's criteria do not involve the sign's message. GEFT's variance application was denied due to non-compliance with size and spacing rules, which GEFT argued was unconstitutional.The district court dismissed GEFT's complaint, finding the ordinance's size and placement rules valid and the variance criteria specific enough to avoid content discrimination. The court referenced Leibundguth Storage & Van Service, Inc. v. Downers Grove, which upheld a similar ordinance. GEFT appealed, but the Seventh Circuit's decision in GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County, which upheld similar variance criteria, further weakened GEFT's position. GEFT argued potential content discrimination, but the court found no substantial invalidity in the ordinance's application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that GEFT's facial challenge failed because it did not show that a substantial portion of the ordinance's applications were unconstitutional. GEFT had not contested the size and location rules, effectively conceding their validity. The court noted that GEFT's focus on a variance disqualified it from a facial challenge. The district court's decision was modified to clarify that GEFT lost on the merits, not for lack of standing, and the judgment was affirmed. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

The case involves Michelle Gilbank, who lost custody of her daughter, T.E.H., in state court proceedings in Wisconsin. Gilbank alleged that various officials involved in those proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The events began when Gilbank, who had a history of drug use, moved into her ex-partner Ian Hoyle's apartment. Following an anonymous tip, police and social workers investigated and found evidence of Gilbank's drug use. On August 21, 2018, Gilbank was arrested for drug possession, and her daughter was temporarily placed with Hoyle. Subsequent state court hearings resulted in the continued placement of T.E.H. with Hoyle until Gilbank regained custody in March 2020.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that some of Gilbank’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court also ruled that the remaining claims failed on the merits, including claims of unreasonable search, denial of due process, and unlawful eviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims based on injuries caused by state court judgments. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the merits for claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including those related to the urinalysis, interrogation without an attorney, and the removal of T.E.H. The court found that Gilbank had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as her statements were not used in a criminal proceeding, and that there was no seizure of T.E.H. by government actors. The court also rejected the existence of a "fraud exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

In September 2020, Michael Karmo informed a friend that he was traveling to Kenosha, Wisconsin, with firearms during a period of civil unrest. The friend reported this to local police, who then notified the FBI. The FBI, believing Karmo intended to shoot people and loot, requested real-time cell site location information (CSLI) from AT&T under exigent circumstances. Law enforcement located Karmo in a hotel parking lot, where he consented to searches of his vehicle and hotel room, revealing multiple firearms. Later, it was clarified that Karmo did not explicitly state he intended to shoot people and loot.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin reviewed the case. Karmo moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the CSLI collection, arguing that the exigent circumstances form contained false information. He also requested a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of the form. The district court denied his motion, and Karmo subsequently pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that the CSLI collection constituted a Fourth Amendment search. It held that law enforcement reasonably believed probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, justifying the warrantless search. The court found that even without the misrepresentation in the exigency form, the totality of circumstances supported a reasonable belief of a public safety threat. The court also determined that a Franks hearing was inapplicable because no judge had made a probable cause determination based on the form. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Karmo" on Justia Law

Robert Decker, a federal inmate, requested electronic access to the full, daily editions of the Federal Register from his prison law library. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, prompting Decker to file a pro se lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act. He claimed that the denial violated his First Amendment rights to receive information and petition the government. The BOP argued that its policy was justified by the need to conserve limited resources.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the BOP. The court applied the framework from Turner v. Safley, concluding that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate penological interest in conserving resources. The district court also denied Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, finding that he was competent to litigate his case despite the challenges of incarceration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate interest in conserving resources. The court noted that the BOP provided access to documents pertaining to the Bureau and the U.S. Parole Commission and allowed inmates to receive print copies of the Federal Register through the mail. The court found that Decker had alternative means to exercise his First Amendment rights, although they were less convenient. The court also upheld the district court’s denial of Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.In summary, the Seventh Circuit held that the BOP’s policy of providing limited electronic access to the Federal Register was constitutionally valid under Turner v. Safley and that the district court did not err in denying Decker’s request for appointed counsel. View "Decker v. Sireveld" on Justia Law

Courtney Ealy, an inmate in the Illinois prison system, spent five consecutive months in segregation starting in 2019. During this period, he experienced cold temperatures, dirty cells, and faulty plumbing, which he claimed negatively affected his mental and physical health. Ealy sued several prison officials, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. He also filed multiple motions for recruitment of counsel during the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cameron Watson, David D. Frank, and Angela McKittrick, and denied Ealy's motions for recruitment of counsel. The court found that Ealy had received due process before being placed in disciplinary segregation and that the conditions of his confinement did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship. The court also determined that Ealy was competent to represent himself despite his claims to the contrary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Ealy received all the due process he was entitled to, including advance written notice of the charges, an opportunity to be heard, and a written statement of the evidence and reasons for the disciplinary action. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ealy's motions for recruitment of counsel, noting that Ealy's case was not complex and that he appeared competent to represent himself based on his filings. View "Ealy v. Watson" on Justia Law