Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in a maximum-security tier of Chicago’s Cook County Jail, sued a guard, Anderson, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Anderson failed to protect him from an attack by other inmates. Plaintiff claimed that Anderson had released the inmates from their cells and allowed them to congregate in a dark corridor, where the attack occurred, and that Anderson left her post after doing so. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Anderson, refusing to allow plaintiff to testify that he overheard prisoners in the dayroom ask Anderson to let the prisoners in the other half of the tier out of their cells so that they could go to the dayroom too. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating a jury could draw an inference of deliberate indifference and that the proffered testimony was not inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff sought to testify to what he heard, not to the truth of anything said. The court also criticized the judge’s refusal to request assistance of counsel for the plaintiff. View "Junior v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Blake was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and retained attorney Fabbri, not knowing that Fabbri was under investigation. Trial was set for January 9, 2007, within the 70 days required by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161. Killian, prosecutor in the Blake case, had little knowledge of the Fabbri investigation, because he and others in his district had been “screened off” to avoid conflicts of interest. At a final pretrial conference, Blake objected to, and Fabbri withdrew, a motion for continuance. Killian then learned that an indictment of Fabbri was imminent and withdrew from Blake’s prosecution. Fabbri successfully moved to withdraw. Following a bond hearing, several discovery motions by the defense, notice of intent to seek a sentencing enhancement, a conflict of interest hearing, a superseding indictment adding two narcotics-related offenses (two days before trial), and other motions, Blake withdrew consent to a previously-requested continuance and waived the 30-day allotment of time to prepare for trial on the new charges. Trial commenced on March 27; Blake was convicted on all counts. Following unsuccessful appeal, Blake timely filed a habeas petition. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance View "Blake v. United States" on Justia Law

Mire’s business, the Indianapolis Somali House of Coffee, served as a place where people could get and use khat. Government agents received a tip, after which Mire and Rafle were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. Mire was also indicted for knowingly using or maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing and using cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) and possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). They were found guilty on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting defendants’ arguments that their due process rights were violated because they were not given fair warning that the possession of khat may be illegal and that the district court erred under Daubert in admitting prosecution expert witness testimony regarding khat plants that were seized at the coffee house and tested for cathinone. Mire’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute khat and for maintaining a place for the distribution or use of khat did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Mire" on Justia Law

Shaw and two others were charged with aggravated battery after King was beaten to death outside a Fort Wayne motel. Shaw denied participating in the beating, but the other defendants, in exchange for prison sentences of less than three years, agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and to testify against Shaw. The court allowed the prosecution to elevate the charge against Shaw to murder over Shaw’s objection that an Indiana statute limits the time for amending charging documents. Shaw was convicted and sentenced to 60 years. On direct appeal, Shaw’s new attorney abandoned the argument that the information was amended too late and argued, unsuccessfully, insufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. Appellate counsel dropped the case and did not file with the Supreme Court of Indiana. Shaw unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in state courts. The federal district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed that the lawyer’s decision to forgo challenging the amended information in favor of a frivolous challenge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Indiana appellate court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington (1984), and the 2000 elaboration in Smith v. Robbins. View "Shaw v. Mize" on Justia Law

In 1999, Quintana and his friends lured a woman into a van. Quintana restrained the woman, while his friend sexually assaulted her. The victim escaped by jumping nude out of the moving van. Quintana was arrested and charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. After a year in prison awaiting trial, the state offered Quintana a plea deal of a four-year sentence on the kidnapping charge and a four-year sentence on the sexual assault charge to run concurrently at 50% good time, so that Quintana could plead guilty and serve one more year in prison. Quintana declined the deal, opting to go to trial and face a minimum of two six-year consecutive sentences. He was convicted and the district court sentenced Quintana to a term of six years and a consecutive term of 21 years. After 13 years, Quintana sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea under the Illinois “accountability law,” under which his sentence had to be served at 85%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that Quintana did not establish deficient performance or prejudice. View "Quintana v. Chandler" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials retaliated against him for speaking up about two guards allegedly assaulting him. He was placed in segregation and forbidden to discuss the alleged assault. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, by not filing a grievance that conformed to prison rules. He responded that he interpreted the prohibition against speaking about the alleged assault to extend to filing a grievance and was afraid to file it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. While the duty to exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to suing under section 1983 is limited to those remedies that are “available,” and a remedy is not available to a prisoner prevented by threats or other intimidation from seeking an administrative remedy, Wisconsin regulations limit the offense of making false statements to prison staff to statements made “outside the complaint review system.” The inmate had no reason to fear filing a grievance about alleged retaliation. View "Schultz v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Maxwell was arrested after selling 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 2.8 grams of powder cocaine, and five ecstasy pills to a confidential informant. The arresting officer searched Maxwell and found two straws and a bag hidden in his underwear. The bag contained an off-white substance, which the officer weighed, “field-tested,” and concluded was crack cocaine. The Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory analyst who originally tested the substance seized from Maxwell retired before trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of his co-worker, who did not personally analyze the substance, but concluded that it contained crack cocaine after reviewing data generated by the original analyst. Maxwell did not object to this testimony and was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Maxwell failed to show plain error, given that the testimony was subject to cross-examination at trial. The court issued a limited remand for consideration under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Smego agreed to civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. During intake, he was seen by Mitchell, a dentist who found that 12 of his teeth had cavities. Throughout 2006, Smego’s cavities worsened and became painful, but he was not given a follow-up appointment. He made healthcare requests for unrelated medical issues, but not for his teeth. He claims that he believed requests were not necessary for problems already known to medical staff. During a chance encounter in 2007, Smego asked a dental hygienist who worked with Mitchell why he had never been called for the follow-up appointment. Smego, claims that she responded that the suction machine was inoperable and that Mitchell could not work on his teeth without it and warned that being a “pest” would not help him get an appointment. Smego saw Mitchell again 18 months after she told him about his cavities, but Mitchell repeatedly delayed treatment until 30 months after the first appointment. In Smego’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, stating that Smego offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that some of the defendants violated his constitutional rights. View "Smego v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Blackout performs asphalt paving work and other construction services and had contracts with the Chicago Transit Authority that were terminable at will. The CTA informed Blackout that it would not do business with the firm for the next year (debarment) and did not give a reason. Illinois law allows judicial review of debarment by public bodies, but Blackout did not avail itself of that process, nor did it sue for libel, although it insists that public announcement of debarment is defamatory, but filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deprivation of “occupational liberty” without due process. The district court dismissed, noting that that inability to work for a single employer is not deprivation of occupational liberty and that there was no allegation of inability to work for public or private entities other than the CTA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Blackout won a school district contract after the CTA debarment. View "Blackout Sealcoating, Inc. v. Peterson" on Justia Law

McDonough is an engineering firm that frequently does design jobs for the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). The Illinois Procurement Code provides that, absent required signatures, a contract of the type in dispute is not valid and not an enforceable debt, 30 ILCS 500/20-80(d). McDonough claimed that IDOT owed it $2 million for additional work on three projects, none of which had a supplemental agreement that was fully executed. McDonough claimed that it continued working without the agreements because it was IDOT’s normal business practice always to sign an agreement after a prior approval letter was sent. Based on findings that McDonough had made accounting errors that called its business integrity into question, the chief procurement officer suspended McDonough’s status as a “prequalified vendor” automatically eligible to bid on IDOT projects. McDonough claimed that refusal to sign the agreements deprived it of property interests in the debts without due process of law. Faced with threats, of bankruptcy, the district court entered a temporary restraining order, effectively ordering state officials to pay. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the suit is, in substance, an effort to have a federal court order state officials to make payments from the state treasury to remedy alleged breaches of contract and is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. View "McDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Schneider" on Justia Law