Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In December, 2005, Chicago police officers Malaniuk and Shields arrested then-14-year-old Barber. Barber claims that the arrest was without probable cause and that Malaniuk used excessive force in shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to strike his head on a hard surface. The officers deny those allegations and say that the head injury occurred because Barber was intoxicated and fell over his own feet. In Barber’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1982, a jury sided with the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding merit in Barber’s claims that the district court erred when it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine him about a subsequent arrest for underage drinking and about his intervening felony conviction. View "Terrence Barber v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Six-year-old D.B. and five-year-old twins C.C. and her brother W.C., were “playing doctor” in D.B.’s backyard when the twins’ mother arrived. She interpreted D.B.’s conduct as a sexual assault of her daughter and reported to the Department of Social Services. The Sheriff’s Department also responded. After an aggressive investigation, the District Attorney filed a petition alleging that D.B. had committed first-degree sexual assault and was in need of public protection or services. The petition was not adjudicated; the case was closed by consent decree. D.B.’s parents filed a civil-rights suit, alleging that county officials overzealously investigated and maliciously prosecuted D.B. They asserted a “class of one” equal-protection claim, noting that the twins engaged in the same behavior as D.B., but the twins’ father is a “high-ranking local political figure.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allegations of improper subjective motive are not enough to state a class-of-one equal-protection claim; a complaint must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated and that the discriminatory treatment was wholly arbitrary and irrational. Here, there was an objective rational basis for disparate treatment. The twins’ mother witnessed D.B.’s conduct and reported it; there was no adult witness to the twins’ behavior. View "Kurtis B. v. Kopp" on Justia Law

McGee was convicted of rape, home invasion, aggravated battery, and burglary, and was incarcerated in Illinois from 1980 until 2005, when, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, he was civilly detained and placed in the Rushville facility. In 2001, while serving his criminal sentence, McGee was diagnosed with liposarcoma cancer and underwent surgery to remove a tumor and adjacent muscle tissue in his right thigh. Since then he has undergone extensive treatment, biopsies, and other procedures to prevent or detect possible recurrence. McGee alleges that he suffers from edema and “neuropathic pain” in his legs as a result of the cancer treatments. Rushville has a policy, requiring detainees who are transported outside of the facility to wear metal leg irons. McGee complained several times to his treating physician about being required to wear restraints, but was never exempted. He was, on occasion, denied use of a wheelchair, and suffered cuts. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in McGee’s action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that 23 state officials, employees, and private medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "McGee v. Adams" on Justia Law

Weddington was convicted in two separate Indiana state trials of four counts of rape, two counts of criminal confinement, one count of criminal deviate conduct, and one count of robbery. He was sentenced to 133 years’ imprisonment. After unsuccessful appeals, Weddington filed a state petition for post-conviction relief in 2007, asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The state court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief. Weddington did not appeal. In 2011, Weddington filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop and ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintains that his wife would have testified and given him an alibi, but counsel failed to contact her or any other witness, although aware that she wanted to testify. Weddington asserts that prison administration confiscated his legal work, legal books, pens and pencils, and even legal mail, for more than a year. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal and remanded for assignment to another judge. The district judge, in her former capacity as a state judge, presided over Weddington’s conviction for state criminal charges related to charges underlying the federal habeas action. The record presents factual issues regarding equitable tolling and procedural default of certain issues. View "Weddington v. Finnan" on Justia Law

In 2007, Williams was pulled over for allegedly running a stop sign. Because he had no proof of insurance, he and his car were taken to a Chicago police station. The next day, officers approached Williams on the street and claimed that he had wrongfully taken his car from the station the previous night. Williams claimed that one of the officers said he could take the car and gave him the keys. The officers sought to tow his car; Williams resisted. According to Williams, the officers beat him repeatedly; after he was handcuffed and taken to the station, the physical abuse continued. Williams sued the officers for false arrest and excessive force, 42 U.S.C. 1983. . The trial was largely a credibility contest; defendants presented evidence that Williams had committed seven drug or gun felonies in the last 10 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of defendants, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing in evidence of his prior convictions under Federal Rule 609, because it did not articulate a probative-prejudice balancing analysis. Williams did not ask the court to perform the balancing test. View "Williams v. Dieball" on Justia Law

Hawkins has a long history of violent crimes, gun offenses, escapes, drug use, and violations of supervised release. In 2003 he assaulted U.S. marshals and pleaded guilty to violent assault with a weapon that inflicted bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b), 1114. The guidelines range would have been under 30 months, but with two prior felony convictions for “walkaway” escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), the range was 151 to 188 months. At the time, the guidelines were mandatory; two years later the Supreme Court declared them advisory. On remand the judge reimposed the 151-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Three years later the Supreme Court held that walkaway “escape” is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The district court denied a motion to set aside the sentence reasoning that the legal error committed in deeming such an escape a violent felony was not the kind of error that can be corrected after a criminal judgment has become final. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Hawkins’ history would justify reimposing the sentence again. The court found that rehearing was not warranted by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Peugh v. United States, (2013), reasoning that, unlike this case, Peugh involved constitutional error: violation of the ex post facto clause. View "Hawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Robinson, the subject of an anonymous tip to Chicago police, was asleep on his grandmother’s living room sofa when officers conducted an early-morning search of her apartment, looking for evidence that Robinson was selling marijuana from the premises. The officers found less than two grams of marijuana, but recovered a loaded revolver from a laundry basket by the front door. According to officers, Robinson admitted, at the time of its discovery and during a later station house interrogation, that the revolver was his; Robinson denies making such statements. Robinson was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated after rejecting arguments that the revolver should have been suppressed because the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the district court should have conducted a Franks hearing to assess whether police officers knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in support of the warrant application. The court committed reversible error by refusing to give a requested limiting instruction about his prior felony conviction and that error was not harmless. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals knocked on Sabo’s trailer door attempting to locate a fugitive, Sabo’s stepson. When Sabo opened the door, they noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Sabo denied that his stepson was there. Asked whether he was smoking dope with his children in the trailer, Sabo responded, “Get the fuck out of here” and slammed the door. The deputies called the Sheriff’s office for assistance. Detective McCune, who knew Sabo, arrived and knocked. Sabo opened the door and physically blocked entry. McCune asked, “Terry, do you mind if I step inside and talk with you?” Sabo said nothing, but stepped back and let the door open. McCune did not force his way in, but entered and noticed the odor of marijuana and guns leaning against a wall. Sabo was a convicted felon. While the guns were secured, officers swept the trailer looking for the fugitive. McCune obtained a search warrant and seized marijuana in the subsequent search. The district court denied a motion to suppress and Sabo conditionally pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the search consensual. View "United States v. Sabo" on Justia Law

Estremera was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine plus possessing a firearm despite an earlier felony conviction and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2007. Estremera sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had misstated the terms of a plea bargain proposal. The district court denied the petition in 2012 without holding a hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was insufficient evidence to determine whether the petition was timely, given Estremera’s assertions of his own diligence and of abandonment by counsel. With respect to Estremera’s request that the prosecution be required to offer the original deal again, the court noted that it no longer possible for the defendant to fulfill promises that would have been valuable to the prosecutor, had a deal been struck before trial and that, assuming that it proceeds to the merits, the district court may think it prudent to await the Supreme Court’s opinion in Titlow before crafting a remedy. View "Estremera v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2002, Taylor was convicted on eight counts for initiating inappropriate relationships with children. After trial, Taylor’s retained attorney withdrew. With new counsel, Taylor moved for a new trial, alleging a variety of errors including ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court agreed and vacated four counts, noting counsel’s failure to impeach or even cross-examine some witnesses. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the remaining convictions and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a Petition for Leave to Appeal in 2004. Seeking state post-conviction relief, Taylor argued that trial counsel represented him while simultaneously under indictment for bribery Illinois, on four felony bribery charges. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of the petition. Continuing to have trouble with attorneys he hired, Taylor turned to an online group, ACDG, which found attorneys to represent him in continuing appeals. Taylor claims that one of those attorneys gave him incorrect information about the deadline for filing a petition of habeas corpus in federal court. When ACDG confirmed to Taylor that it would not represent him in federal post-conviction review, Taylor filed a pro se petition, which was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Taylor does not meet the standard for equitable tolling.View "Taylor v. Dexhiemer" on Justia Law