Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law

Devbrow, an Indiana prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that prison officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and destroying his legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit (concerning medical care) he filed. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Devbrow failed to show that prison officials actually destroyed his legal documents or took his papers for retaliatory reasons. The court noted testimony that Devbrow had created a fire hazard by stacking excess property by his bed, that prison officials had allowed him to keep some legal materials by his bed, that Devbrow stored the rest of them, and that the officials were unaware of Devbrow’s pending litigation. The court further reasoned that Devbrow did not suffer any actual injury from the alleged actions: Devbrow’s medical indifference suit had been terminated not on the merits, but on grounds of untimeliness and that Devbrow had not submitted any admissible evidence to discredit the officers’ explanation that they had removed his property from the dorm room because it was a fire hazard. View "Devbrow v. Gallego" on Justia Law

A 1980 fire in a Chicago apartment building killed 10 children. Kidd became a suspect following his arrest on unrelated charges. At his 1987 trial on charges of arson and 10 counts of murder, Strunck, a public defender, represented him. Kidd was convicted and sentenced to death. In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. At his new trial, Kidd waived assistance of counsel and represented himself, despite the judge’s repeated warnings and advice. Kidd expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender and requested that Dan Webb or Jenner & Block represent him. Kidd was unable to find private counsel. Strunck represented him at the penalty phase and presented evidence that Kidd was borderline mentally retarded. Kidd was convicted again and is serving a life sentence. In unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, before the same judge who presided over his trial, Kidd argued that the court should have ordered a formal competency hearing because Kidd was taking psychotropic drugs under medical direction and that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary. The state denied his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments. View "Kidd v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act, Ind. Code 32‐34‐1‐1, as authorizing confiscation of private property without compensation. The Act states that property is presumed abandoned if the apparent owner has not communicated in writing with the holder or otherwise indicated interest in the property within a specified period. When the presumption applied, the holder (here, a bank) is required to try to notify the owner and to submit, within 60-120 days after that, a report including the owner’s last known address to the state attorney general, and to simultaneously transfer the property to the attorney general. The following year, the attorney general must attempt notice by publication. Notice is also posted on an official website. The owner can reclaim the property from the state for 25 years after its delivery before it escheats to the state. An owner who files a valid claim is entitled only to principal, and not to any interest earned on it. Plaintiff’s ward had an interest‐bearing account. The presumption of abandonment applied in 2006, three years after the last communication. Because the statute does not require individualized notice if the value of the account is less than $50, plaintiff (guardian) did not learn about the account until 2011. The district court dismissed her challenge to the “taking” of interest on the account. The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Cerajeski v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

Woodboro has about 750 residents on 21,857 acres, within Oneida County. Woodboro’s 1998 Land Use Plan encourages low density single family residential development for waterfront properties and maintaining rural character. The 2009 Woodboro Comprehensive Plan incorporates that language. There are 177 parcels on Squash Lake, all but seven zoned for single-family uses. The seven parcels zoned for business were pre-existing uses under initial zoning in 1976. In 2001, Woodboro voluntarily subjected itself to the Oneida County Zoning and Shoreland Protection Ordinance, under which religious uses are permitted throughout the County and Woodboro. Year-round recreational and seasonal camps are permitted in 36 and 72 percent of the County; churches and religious schools are allowed on 60 percent of the land in the County. Churches and schools are permitted on 43 percent of Woodboro land; campgrounds (religious or secular) on about 57 percent. Eagle Cove sought to construct a Bible camp on 34 acres on Squash Lake in Woodboro, asserting that their religion mandates that the camp be on the subject property and operate year-round. The property is zoned Single Family Residential and Residential and Farming. Woodboro recommended denial. The County denied rezoning based on conflict with single-family usage. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and the Wisconsin Constitution. View "Eagle Cove Camp & Conference Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, WI" on Justia Law

Foster was charged with distributing crack cocaine and a separate conspiracy-to-distribute charge. Against the advice of appointed counsel, Kupsis, Foster rejected two proposed plea agreements, each of which would have resulted in a sentence of about 20 years imprisonment. Foster faced a possibility of a life sentence, if convicted of the conspiracy charge. The government filed an information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 851, 10 days before trial, stating that Foster had a prior felony drug conviction, which increased the mandatory minimum penalty on each count from 10 to 20 years. Kupsis had not anticipated the information and had not advised Foster that it was a possibility. After receiving notice of the information, Kupsis suggested to Foster that they attempt to revive one of the earlier proposed plea agreements. Foster refused. Kupsis successfully defended Foster against the conspiracy charge, but he was convicted on the distribution count and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Foster filed a Section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held that Foster could not establish that he was prejudiced by Kupsis’ representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Foster v. United States" on Justia Law

Patrolling officers spotted a car driven White, with Lyons as a passenger. Officer Dodd recognized White from previous encounters, some of which involved attempts to flee arrest; Dodd knew that White’s license had been suspended and activated the squad’s emergency lights. White accelerated, drove two blocks, and ran a red light before pulling over. Officers Dodd and Burns suspected an attempt to conceal contraband, retrieve a weapon, or get a head start in a foot chase. While others frisked White, Officer Burns observed Lyons, whose hands were shaking and who avoided eye contact. Lyons stated that he did not have any weapons; Burns announced that he intended to frisk Lyons, who then said, “I have a gun.” Burns handcuffed Lyons; Dodd lifted Lyons’s shirt, revealing a loaded firearm in his waistband. Lyons was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. Denying a motion to suppress, the district court found reasonable suspicion that Lyons illegally possessed a firearm or other dangerous item, triggered by his appearing nervous, his being in a car driven by someone with a suspended license, who attempted to flee, and his association with White. Lyons was sentenced to 210 months, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing because the court failed to state the reasons supporting its sentence, and incorrectly believed it was required to impose five years of supervised release.View "Unted States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Williams was returning home from work late at night. He smelled smoke, saw that his neighbor’s house was on fire, and went to the porch of the burning home to rouse anyone who might be inside. Chicago police officers O’Brien and Byrne also spotted the smoke and found Williams on the porch. They arrested him on suspicion of arson. A prosecutor declined to file arson charges that night. Officers O’Brien and Byrne then charged Williams with criminal trespass, but that charge was dismissed. Williams brought suit against O’Brien and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and against the officers and the City of Chicago under state law for malicious prosecution on the trespass charge. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Whether there was even arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Williams depends on disputed issues of fact. View "Williams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Officers responded to reports of gunfire in a Chicago public housing complex. Two people stated that “gangbangers” were running guns and drugs into the building and pointed to apartment 501. No one answered when they knocked, so the officers entered the apartment with guns drawn. They found Perry and ordered him to get down against the wall, then searched the apartment, finding chunks of crack cocaine, clear Ziploc bags, and razor blades in a bedroom. Perry ran for the door, knocking an officer down. Perry claimed that he fled because the officers started punching him. Perry ran down to the third floor. Officer Keithley followed him, gun drawn, while Watts secured the apartment. Keithley testified that Perry popped out and rushed him, grabbed him, and tried to grab his gun. Keithley said he tried to punch Perry and his gun went off, striking Keithley in the arm. Perry again attempted to escape, knocking Keithley off-balance. Keithley shot at Perry while falling; one bullet struck Perry in the thigh, and another struck him in the back. Perry denied reaching for Keithley’s gun. Perry was acquitted of attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and disarming a peace officer. Perry filed civil rights claims against the officers and the city. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors. View "Perry v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2001 a burglar set fire to Frankton High School, causing millions of dollars in damages. According to the plaintiff, an officer coerced one of the suspects and others to accuse the plaintiff. The plaintiff was convicted of arson, burglary, and theft. He obtained post-conviction relief and was released from prison in 2006, after proving that a key witness had lied. In 2007 a retrial was scheduled. On advice of counsel, plaintiff deferred filing a civil rights suit pending retrial, but the trial kept getting rescheduled until charges were dismissed in 2010. In 2011, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming malicious prosecution, due process, violations, and other torts, by Indiana police officers, the town that employed them, and the sheriff. The district judge dismissed the claim as untimely and held that Indiana law provides an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution, barring recourse to section 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Indiana law does not provide an adequate remedy. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants intimidated him into delaying filing a civil suit until the criminal proceeding ended. If that is true, the limitations period did not start to run until then, so that his November 2011 filing was within the limitations period. View "Julian v. Hanna" on Justia Law