Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Charleston began his fourth year at the College of Medicine in 2010, having finished his Obstetrics and Gynecology clinical rotation in June. In September, Charleston’s preceptors submitted a complaint, asking that Charleston be required to repeat the rotation, alleging that Charleston had committed errors in written work (including plagiarism), did not complete quizzes until after the rotation’s conclusion, did not have required signatures in his case log, spent four weeks without a preceptor, and he did not perform well enough to pass. The Student Progress Committee held a meeting; Charleston was not permitted to attend, but submitted a letter. The Committee recommended that Charleston be assigned a mentor in the future. Without notice to Charleston, the complaint and Charleston’s letter were forwarded to the Executive Committee with a new letter from Hall, Associate Dean for Student Affairs for the College of Medicine, alleging that in 2008, Charleston had acted “unprofessionally” while serving as a teaching assistant. Charleston had no opportunity to address Hall’s allegation, which, he claims, was false. The Executive Committee decided that Charleston should be dismissed. Internal appeals failed. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection violations, was dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts to establish a protected property interest in his continued education, nor to demonstrate that the university singled him out for unfavorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Diadenko began working at Schurz High School in 2009 and became aware of practices relating to Individualized Education Plans for the school’s special education department that, in her opinion, were problematic. After voicing her concerns to school administrators, Diadenko wrote Chicago Mayor Daley His office forwarded her letter to the Board of Education. A Chicago Public School investigator looked into Diadenko’s allegations, but in the interim Diadenko was suspended twice for violating school policies. Diadenko and three others filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under Illinois law by retaliation for speaking out and for refusing to engage in illegal activity occurring within the school. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Diadenko failed to present evidence that the principal was aware of her letter to the Mayor before taking disciplinary action against her. View "Diadenko v. Folino" on Justia Law

Inmate Verser began a hunger strike in response to perceived unwarranted prison discipline against him. Prison protocols involve moving a hunger striker to a separate cell after he misses three meals. Verser alleges that two prison officials deposited him in an isolated cell and held him down while two others punched him in the stomach in retaliation for his hunger strike and his previous grievance against another officer. The defendants deny that any assault occurred. Verser filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The judge sent Verser back to the prison rather than keep him in the courthouse to await the verdict. When the jury then announced its verdict in favor of the defendants, no immediate effort was made to notify Verser. After the verdict, a juror made a statement: This was very hard for us. Many of us—the majority feel that the defendants all had a part to play in what happened to Mr. Verser, but, because there was a lack of evidence, we could not find the defendants guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Verser‘s total exclusion from the proceedings prevented him from exercising his right to poll the jury (FRCP 48(c)) and a poll might have made a difference.View "Verser v. Corr. Officer Robinson" on Justia Law

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Hanson v. Beth" on Justia Law

At 2:15 a.m., Officer Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle traveling faster than the posted 35 mph limit, and confirmed by radar that Jones was traveling at 53 mph. Snyder observed Jones swerving in his lane. He turned on his emergency lights. When Jones stopped his car, Snyder approached and observed that Jones had alcohol on his breath, red, watery eyes, and slurred speech. Jones stated that he had consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m. Officers used a portable breath test to determine Jones’s blood alcohol content was 0.096%. During a field sobriety test, Jones could not keep his hands at his sides and swayed. Snyder read the Indiana Implied Consent Notice, explaining that he had probable cause to believe that Jones had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and, that while Jones had a choice to submit to the chemical test, there would be consequences to refusing to consent to the chemical test. Ultimately Jones sued, claiming that officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the claims as vague, listing “a series of irrelevant facts untethered to any legal claims.” The only critical fact was that the officers had probable cause .View "Jones v. City of Elkhart" on Justia Law

In 1996, Martha Castro saw a man dressed in black leaning over her husband on the ground outside their home. Martha’s nephew, Varela, ran outside. Varela struck the man, who fired a gun before running into the alley. Castro died from a gunshot wound. Castros’ neighbor, Medina, looked outside when he heard gunfire and saw what happened. Nearby, Santana turned into the alley, where the man in black approached her, gun drawn, and took her car and purse. Police looked for a black male in his early twenties, about five foot seven. Seven months later, Medina identified a picture in a police book as “looking like” the man in black, but asked for a more recent photo. An officer returned with an array of five black-and-white photographs. Medina picked McDowell, as the man he saw standing over Castro. Within days, Santana and Varela identified McDowell’s picture. The three viewed a lineup and identified McDowell. There was no physical evidence connecting McDowell to the crime; McDowell’s close friend testified as an alibi. Convicted and sentenced to 103 years, McDowell exhausted direct appeals and state post-trial remedies, and sought a federal writ of habeas corpus arguing that the processes used to identify him were flawed. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, finding that he procedurally defaulted the claims by failing to adequately present them before each level of the Illinois courts. View "McDowell v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Washington was arrested as a suspect in a double homicide. While charges were pending, he filed a civil suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against Officer Parkinson, alleging that she kicked him in the face and hit him with a flashlight while he was transported. The district court judge conducted voir dire. Juror Evans answered questions concerning his family background without incident. Asked whether he had ever been involved with the civil or criminal justice system, Evans responded, “Not that I know of.” Upon examination, Evans said he did not understand the question. The judge broke the question down and Evans admitted he had been arrested and requested a sidebar. He explained that he had a DUI pending and had suffered head injuries in the accident, but did not have difficulty sitting and listening or any lasting cognitive problems. Evans spoke slowly and frequently closed his eyes. Washington unsuccessfully challenged Evans for cause. At trial, Washington interrupted several times. He fired his appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. The judge asked Washington whether he wanted to continue with jurors who had seen him argue with his attorney. Washington consented to continue with the original jury. He later returned to allowing representation by counsel, who had not left. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parkinson. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington waived his challenge to Juror Evans. View "Washington v. Parkinson" on Justia Law

Chicago police obtained a warrant and searched a two-bedroom apartment leased by Tucker’s mother. Tucker's mother and his niece were present. Officer Edwards found a rifle and documents bearing Tucker’s name under a mattress in a bedroom. Officers found eight clear baggies of heroin inside a potato chip bag and ammunition. Another officer apprehended Tucker a few blocks away and stated that officers had found the gun. Tucker responded that the rifle was not his and that he was holding it for someone. His mother testified that Tucker did not have keys to the apartment, was not listed on the lease, and did not keep possessions there, but only visited. His niece corroborated the testimony, adding that a neighbor brought Tucker’s mail to the apartment. Edwards testified that an officer asked Tucker’s mother which bedroom was Tucker’s, and that she pointed to the bedroom where the rifle was found. Tucker was convicted of possessing a firearm after conviction of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment longer than a year, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession and that Tucker was denied a fair trial because the court indicated it would admit evidence of six prior felonies if he testified. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) investigated Burkhardt, a correctional officer at LCC and determined that Burkhardt had taken his cell phone inside and used it to make 30 calls from inside the facility, in violation of IDOC policies and of Illinois law. State’s Attorney Hahn filed felony charges against Burkhardt. A few days later, another correctional officer told other employees that Burkhardt was being prosecuted for accidentally bringing a cell phone into LCC. In response, Volkman, a casework supervisor, called Hahn and left a message that “as a citizen” he did not believe that incarceration should be pursued in Burkhardt’s case, and that Hahn should consider allowing the matter to be handled through the IDOC disciplinary process. Hahn called Volkman back. News of the conversation reached the internal affairs investigator at LCC, who investigated. Volkman received a written reprimand and was suspended for five days. Volkman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, even if they were not, Volkman had not proven his case as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Volkman v. Ryker" on Justia Law