Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fields sued two Illinois prosecutors, charging them with due process violations (42 U.S.C. 1983), malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. He claimed that they coerced witnesses to give testimony that the defendants knew to be false, resulting in Fields’ conviction of two murders and his imprisonment for 17 years until he was acquitted in a retrial. He later received a certificate of innocence. The Seventh Circuit first affirmed dismissal of the federal claims on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The state law claims remained and the district court reinstated one federal claim, which related to a prosecutor’s investigatory work and was not, therefore, subject to absolute immunity. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to one defendant and reversed as to the other. View "Fields v. Wharrie" on Justia Law

Foley was convicted of three counts of producing child pornography, one count of distributing child pornography, one count of taking a child across state lines for the purpose of a sex act, and one count of possessing child pornography. Foley appealed, arguing that government’s evidence failed to satisfy the commerce element of those charges (18 U.S.C. 2251(a)) and that the district court improperly admitted evidence of a prior sexual assault under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, causing unfair prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Foley’s storage devices (hard drives manufactured in China and in Thailand) could be considered by a jury as material used in “production” sufficient to satisfy the commerce element. The disputed testimony was relevant to Foley’s propensity to commit sexual crimes against children, and to his intent and motive; given the overwhelming evidence of the sexual assault, there was little risk of prejudice. View "United States v. Foley" on Justia Law

From 2002–2003, Cheek sold marijuana and crack cocaine to a drug dealer, Eason. While Cheek was in prison in 2004, his associate supplied the drugs. After his release, Cheek went back to selling drugs. He was incarcerated again in 2008, but informed Eason and others that he would resume selling drugs. Law enforcement persuaded Eason to perform controlled buys and record his interactions with Cheek. With court authorization, law enforcement intercepted more than 20,000 phone and text conversations from Cheek. Cheek was convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine and more than 100 kilograms of marijuana from 2001 to 2011; intending to distribute more than 28 grams of crack cocaine in August, 2010; intending to distribute marijuana on March 23, 2011; and using a telephone on February 11 and 23, 2011, to facilitate the drug conspiracy. Before trial, the government indicated, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851, intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on seven prior felony drug convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of 576 months, rejecting challenges to testimony about the meaning of drug code words. The court also rejected challenges to the sentence: that the court failed to comply with section 851(b); violated constitutional rights, by enhancing Cheek’s sentence beyond the 480-month statutory maximum, because the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cheek was convicted of the prior felonies supporting the enhancement; that the court erred in imposing the obstruction of justice enhancement and failed to meaningfully consider mitigation arguments. View "United States v. Cheek" on Justia Law

Nash pleaded no contest to sexual assault of a child. He and his attorney signed and filed a form, acknowledging the 20-day period for filing a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief, which allows a defendant to challenge trial counsel’s performance with new appointed counsel before pursing direct appeal. After several months, Nash sought relief pro se. The circuit court denied the motion, informing Nash of the procedure for reinstating post-conviction and appeal rights. Instead of following that procedure, Nash appealed, arguing ineffective assistance. The court of appeals declined to appoint counsel and affirmed denial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Nash sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance. The district court denied Nash’s petition, concluding that he had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to present it in state court. Nash did not appeal, but nine months later unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b). The Seventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Later, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel can excuse procedural default if counsel caused the default by abandoning the petitioner without notice. The district court denied a second motion, explaining that Nash caused his own procedural default by failing to adequately present his claims in his pro se attack. Before Nash appealed, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can also excuse procedural default if state law requires raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in collateral proceedings rather than by direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the state court advised Nash how he could correct counsel’s procedural error, but he did not do so.View "Nash v. Hepp" on Justia Law

In 1981, a drug dealer (TJ) was shot to death in his Chicago home; the gunmen stole a necklace and ring with the initials “TJ” written in diamonds. Witnesses did not know the gunmen and provided general descriptions. On the day of the crime, they viewed mug shots but did not identify TJ’s murderer. During police interviews, Wright stated that on the day of the murder he was trying to coordinate a drug deal with TJ, that he took two men (one was Coleman) to TJ’s house on the night of the murder and that Coleman had tried to sell him TJ’s jewelry. About two weeks after the murder, witnesses separately viewed a lineup that included Coleman and six others. Two identified Coleman. A third witness did not make any identification. The witnesses later viewed another lineup and identified Barnes as the other perpetrator. Coleman and Barnes were tried together, with separate counsel. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Coleman’s first habeas petition, stating that the facts could potentially demonstrate actual innocence. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Coleman had not satisfied the actual innocence standard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Coleman’s evidence that two eyewitnesses were unable to place him at the scene of the crime was not enough to overcome the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified Coleman as the perpetrator and another who implicated Coleman in the murder. View "Coleman v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Woodridge enacted an ordinance that imposes a $30.00 booking fee on any person subject to a custodial arrest and collects the fee without any hearing. It does not offer an opportunity to challenge the deprivation or seek reimbursement. Markadonatos was charged with retail theft. He was booked and Woodridge collected its fee. A court sentenced Markadonatos to supervision, which he successfully completed. He therefore received an adjudication of “not guilty” on his record. He sued, on behalf of himself and all arrestees who have been charged the fee, arguing that the lack of a procedure to challenge the fee violated their procedural and substantive due process rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the procedural due process argument failed based on balancing the private interest in the $30; the risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards; and the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Markadonatos lacked standing under a substantive due process claim; he was arrested for cause and was adjudicated not guilty only after completing a term of supervision after admitting the factual basis for the charges. View "Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge" on Justia Law

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.” View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

Manitowoc police brought in a man suspected of stabbing a police officer. The suspect apparently refused to eat, and officers believed he was mentally unstable. Police Chief Kingsbury arranged for the suspect’s mother to bring him a home-cooked meal, but the chief’s wishes were not communicated until after officers, including Swetlik, had already taken the suspect to the county jail for booking. Kingsbury called the jail and spoke with Swetlik. Swetlik told other police officers that Kingsbury had told him to lie to the jailers and had threatened him and reported the same to a deputy chief. The police union later took a vote of no confidence in Kingsbury and compiled a list of grievances, including Swetlik’s complaint. A private firm was engaged to investigate and ultimately recommended that both Swetlik and Kingsbury be terminated, concluding, based on a recording of the call, that Swetlik lied about the incident. The city council voted to bring termination charges against both. Swetlik was placed on paid leave until a hearing officer recommended dismissal of the charge. Swetlik was reinstated, but sued, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by bringing charges against him for his complaints about Kingsbury. The district court rejected the claim, finding that Swetlik’s statements were not protected speech because they did not address a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants were justified in bringing the charge based on the investigation.View "Swetlik v. Crawford" on Justia Law

After receiving complaints of drug trafficking, police arranged an undercover controlled purchase of crack cocaine from a lower level apartment in Rockford. Days later, they obtained a warrant to search the “lower apartment.” The police knew that hours earlier, a shooting occurred at the residence and that aggressive pit bulls lived on the premises. After knocking and receiving no response, investigators forced their way into a foyer with two open doors: one led to the first floor apartment, the other led to ascending stairs. A dog ran from officers and up a few steps, before turning and charging the officer, who shot and killed the dog and proceeded up the stairs to perform a protective sweep. As he ran through the upper kitchen, he saw large chunks of an off-white substance on the counter with scales. In the bedroom he discovered Starnes. The officer detained and escorted him downstairs. While other officers were seeking a warrant for the upper apartment, other detectives searched the lower apartment and seized semi-automatic rifles, ammunition magazines, a loaded hand gun, and drug paraphernalia. After executing a warrant on the second floor, they seized Starnes’ photo identification cards, 290 grams of cocaine, 72.5 grams of cocaine base, $36,186 in cash, and more drug paraphernalia. The court declined to suppress evidence from the second floor; Starnes entered a conditional plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Starnes" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a statute that prohibits a doctor, under threat of heavy penalties, from performing an abortion unless he has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Wis. Stat. 253.095(2). Planned Parenthood and others challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the seven doctors affected by the law had applied for, but after five months, had not been granted, admitting privileges; that all Wisconsin abortion clinics already have transfer agreements with local hospitals to facilitate transfer of clinic patients to the hospital emergency room. A hospital emergency room is obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even if the patient is uninsured, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1). Had enforcement of the law, with its one-weekend deadline for compliance, not been stayed, two of the state’s four abortion clinics would have had to shut down and a third clinic would have lost the services of half its doctors. View "Planned Parenthood of WI v. Van Hollen" on Justia Law