Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Salazar, at a Peoria bar, posted a video of himself online, which Peoria police officers saw. Salazar had an active arrest warrant for traffic violations. Officers went to the bar. Security cameras and body-worn cameras captured the subsequent events. Salazar was sitting at the bar with a black jacket on his chair. Draped over an empty chair to his left was another jacket with a Purple Heart insignia. As Salazar stood between the chairs, an officer cuffed his hands behind his back. Salazar claimed that the black jacket was not his but that the Purple Heart jacket was his. Police found a gun and a wallet containing Salazar’s identification in the black jacket on Salazar’s chair.Salazar was charged with possessing a firearm illegally. Salazar unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The district court ruled that the police had conducted a valid search incident to arrest because Salazar could reach the jacket (and gun) and, in any event, had abandoned the jacket. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search was a lawful search incident to Salazar’s arrest. The court declined to address whether it matters that an arrestee is secured. View "United States v. Salazar" on Justia Law

In 2018, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) hired Bronson as a treatment center teacher. Bronson was assigned to Lurie Hospital. Bronson and another teacher assigned to Lurie (Cooper), are Black; the third teacher, Lee, is White. Lurie’s family services director, Ruohonen, was the teachers’ “representative supervisor” at Lurie. Ruohonen is White. Bronson alleges that Lurie and Ruohonen treated Bronson and Cooper, the first Black teachers assigned to Lurie, in a discriminatory manner. In a departure from consistent past practice, Lurie denied Bronson and Cooper access to Lurie's electronic medical records system, EPIC, for a year. Identification badges issued to Bronson and Cooper bore a different color than those issued to others: Lee’s badge granted her “regular employee access” to EPIC. In 2019, Ruohonen sent an email to their CPS supervisor, complaining about Bronson and Cooper. Bronson contacted the Chicago Teachers Union, which responded that the complaint was inconsistent with the union contract, Bronson also alleges that she and Cooper were denied adequate office and desk space.In December 2019, Bronson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, then filed suit, asserting violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Because the allegations in Bronson’s complaint establish that Lurie is not her de facto employer, she cannot sue Lurie under Title VII. View "Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of Chicago" on Justia Law

Police found Miller lying on the sidewalk, bleeding from an apparent gunshot wound. An officer rendering aid removed a vehicle key fob from Miller’s hand, dropping it on the ground. A car, parked 15-20 feet from Miller, had bullet holes in the rear driver’s side door. Officers checked whether there was anyone in the car. One officer shined his flashlight through the windshield and saw what he thought was blood on the front passenger seat. An officer picked up the key fob and clicked a button. The car’s horn honked. Minutes later, an officer stated that he could see the barrel of a gun sticking out from under a hat on the front passenger seat. The car was towed to the police station. At the hospital, Miller said that he was using his girlfriend’s car. A database check showed that the impounded car was registered to Miller. The police obtained a warrant to search the car without mentioning the key fob. Police recovered the gun. DNA on the gun matched Miller’s. He was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Miller’s motion to suppress. Miller argued that clicking the key fob qualified as a search. The district judge reasoned that the fob was used only to identify the car, not to gain entry, and that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the evidence was also admissible under the independent source doctrine. The car would have been searched regardless of the identity of its owner. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2007, Njos pleaded guilty to six federal crimes arising from robberies, and for attempted escape and assault of an FBI agent after his arrest. During his term of supervised release, he tested positive for illegal substances and failed to report. Njos then pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to eight new robberies. The state courts sentenced him to 25 years.The federal government petitioned to revoke Njos’s federal supervised release. Njos, proceeding pro se, repeatedly asked to be returned to the Illinois Department of Corrections and requested a 24-month sentence, concurrent with his state sentences. He argued that his underlying federal convictions were class C and D felonies and cited his history of mental illness. Noting Njos's wish to expedite the proceedings, the court said: “You don’t need to be in court for this,” proposing to enter a written order imposing his sentence. Njos thanked the judge, Neither Njos nor the government objected. The court later imposed a total of 82 months in prison for the six revocations.The only issue that appointed counsel deemed strong enough to raise on appeal was the imposition of a sentence in a written order rather than with the defendant present in person. When counsel decline to raise other issues that Njos wished to argue, Njos moved to dismiss counsel, submitting a brief of his preferred arguments. The Seventh Circuit denied Njos’s motion to dismiss counsel but allowed him to file the supplemental brief. On reconsideration, the court dismissed counsel and rejected Njos’s arguments about the calculation and reasonable of his sentence. View "United States v. Njos" on Justia Law

Beechler and Turner, both serving home confinement through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC), reported separate residences. An FBI Task Force was conducting a wiretap investigation involving individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. They discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence. Watching the house, agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking. An MCCC employee, with Indianapolis officers, went to Turner’s address to check compliance with the home detention contract. They encountered Turner and Beechler and discovered methamphetamine in the bedroom. Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, heroin, and $1,508 in cash. After receiving his Miranda rights, Beechler acknowledged the drugs and guns, admitting that they were there to protect the drugs.Beechler unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that although police labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, they actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes so that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Convicted of multiple counts, Beechler was sentenced to 360 months in prison—below the bottom of the 420-month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s expectation of privacy was minimal; the government’s legitimate needs were significant. The search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Beechler" on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Howard was charged as a felon in possession of a weapon. Before his trial, the government struck the only three Black jurors on the 39-person venire panel. The judge had admonished the jurors that they could not use the internet for any purpose related to or surrounding the case and asked the jurors to “[r]aise your number if you don’t use the internet.” Jurors 9, 13, and 24 each raised their numbers. Jurors 9 and 24 were two of the three Blacks. The prosecutor struck each of them, explaining: “I do not believe people when they say they don’t use the Internet.” In response to the defendant’s subsequent Batson challenge, the court applied the three steps of the Batson inquiry. At the third step—that the defendant established purposeful discrimination by the government—the court summarized Howard’s counsel’s argument, stating: “Your sole justification and your persuasiveness is that the government attorney, who does happen to be African-American, has struck every single African-American on the panel.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed Howard’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by injecting the prosecutor’s race into the Batson inquiry, improperly evaluating the peremptory strike, and failing to make required demeanor findings. The prosecutor’s theory was not so “implausible or fantastic” as to require a conclusion that the justification was “pretext[] for purposeful discrimination.” View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Ingram contends that, while confined in the Terre Haute Penitentiary, he was attacked and beaten by guards, after which the medical staff denied him necessary care. A magistrate concluded that Ingram failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C.1997e(a), and granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ingram filed three substantive grievances. Two he did not pursue to a conclusion; one. asserting that members of the staff failed to protect him from harm, was rejected because it lacked required attachments and Ingram did not resubmit a grievance or appeal. A second grievance asserted that staff retaliated against him by withholding necessary medical care. The prison rejected this grievance because Ingram had not attempted an informal resolution. An inmate cannot short-circuit the grievance process by filing in court while that process is ongoing.The court remanded in part. Ingram alleged that he never got a written decision on his remaining substantive grievance, complaining about the attack itself. If an appeal was blocked by the need to attach a document that the prisoner did not have, then that appeal is not “available” to the prisoner, and the statute allows the prisoner to turn to court. The district court should have held a hearing and taken testimony on subjects such as whether the Warden refused to provide the statement to Ingram or whether there was just a bureaucratic delay in handing it over. View "Ingram v. Watson" on Justia Law

Kitterman is a frequent litigator in Illinois federal and state courts, in response to Illinois authorities' insistence that he is required to register as a sex offender. Kitterman believes that this obligation has expired. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against defendants from the Belleville Police Department, the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Department, and the Illinois State Police, alleging that the authorities’ continued enforcement of registration duties violated his constitutional rights.The district court dismissed Kitterman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nothing in federal law calls into question Kitterman’s obligation to register as a sex offender under Illinois law. Even accepting as true that Kitterman’s 1996 conviction was subject to a former Illinois registration law, Kitterman’s current registration duties were triggered in 2011 when he committed additional crimes. The court expressed doubt that a state prosecutor has the power to make the promises that Kitterman described concerning his registration obligations. Kitterman has been under a lawful duty to register ever since his 1996 guilty plea. Kitterman’s federal lawsuit failed because federal constitutional violations cannot be established by showing only that the state officials misapplied state law. View "Kitterman v. City of Belleville" on Justia Law