Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sanders pleaded guilty to possessing more than 50 grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute. The district judge found that he possessed more than 500 grams of cocaine or cocaine base and calculated an offense level of 26, producing a recommended range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Sanders to 120 months. Most of the cocaine that was included for the purpose of calculating the offense level had been seized from Sanders’s home, which the police searched with a warrant following his arrest. The district judge concluded that the warrant was invalid and ruled that the evidence seized from his home could not be used against Sanders at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have also prohibited use of that evidence at sentencing. All evidence is admissible at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3661. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Agent Lombardi received a tip from a confidential informant that he had seen “Cap” in possession of cocaine. The CI, who was familiar with cocaine distribution and had previously provided information that resulted in an arrest, provided the address at which he had seen “Cap.” Lombardi searched the name “Cap” in a law enforcement database. Todd Sutton was listed as a match for that alias. Lombardi obtained a booking photo of Sutton and showed it to the CI, who confirmed that “Cap” was Sutton. Lombardi drove the CI past the address. The CI confirmed the location and stated that the tenant was Foster, whom the CI believed to be Sutton’s girlfriend. A law enforcement database confirmed that Foster was the tenant; Lombardi later discovered that she was Sutton’s cousin. Lombardi took the CI before a judge; the CI signed a “John Doe” affidavit in support of a search warrant. During the ensuing search, agents found: 63 grams of crack cocaine in a bedroom closet; male clothing and shoes in the same closet; a digital scale with white powder residue and other items frequently used to cook crack cocaine in the kitchen; a handwritten letter on the kitchen table referring to “Cap”; and a computer, on which agents viewed a video showing Sutton in the apartment. Only Sutton and Foster had keys to the apartment; she rarely entered the bedroom where the cocaine was found. Sutton pleaded guilty, retaining the right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Officers arrived at Helman’s residence to execute warrants for his arrest. They hoped for a peaceful surrender. Helman exited the home and spoke with officers. In response to questions as to whether he was armed, Helman lifted his shirt to show a semi-automatic handgun. Helman handed the officers papers and returned to his house. The officers informed other members of the state police that Helman was carrying a loaded firearm. A six-hour stalemate followed, after which Helman walked into his yard carrying water and a cup. The Emergency Response Team moved in to prevent him from retreating back into his home and activated a flash bang device to distract Helmanhim. According to the officers, Helman turned, and, seeing the ERT, attempted to draw his handgun. Officers shot Helman multiple times. Helman claims that he did not reach for his weapon until after that device went off and shots were fired. Helman pled guilty in state court to resisting law enforcement with a deadly weapon. Helman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Helman’s version of the facts would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and, under the facts found in that conviction, the response of the officers was reasonable. View "Helman v. Smeltzley" on Justia Law

Wourms, age 16, was killed in a crash; he was driving erratically when an officer, warned by a 911 call from Wourms’ mother that her son was drunk and “going crazy,” turned on his emergency lights to signal him to pull over. Wourms increased his speed to about 80 mph in an area posted for 25 mph. His father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the crash was caused by the police car intentionally ramming Wourms’s car, resulting in an unconstitutional seizure of his person and property. The officer denied that his car touched Wourms’s car. The district court entered summary judgment, finding the evidence insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the cars had collided. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without a collision, Wourms was entirely responsible; the police officer had every legal right to signal Wourms to pull over. Even ramming a recklessly driven car to induce the driver to stop or cause the car to crash, need not be unreasonable. In this case, however, there were no marks on the police car that matched marks on Wourms’s car, no debris on the road where Wourms started to swerve, and no skid marks from the police car. Witness testimony indicated that the police could not have caught Wourms in time to hit his car before the crash.View "Wourms v. Fields" on Justia Law

In November, 2005, Rooni and others went hunting. They shot three deer, which they took to a DNR post in a gas station for registration. While DNR employees tagged the deer, Rooni went inside. DNR agent Biser arrived and asked Rooni how many deer he had. Rooni did not respond. Biser proclaimed, loudly, that Rooni did not like the DNR. Rooni said “no, just people like you.” Biser left the station and leaned against the trailer while speaking to DNR employees. Rooni came out and attempted to walk around Biser. He had to pass closely because of slush on the ground. Biser extended his leg to block Rooni’s way. Rooni stopped and said, “let me get through,” and “brushed” between Biser and the trailer. Biser allegedly spit food at Rooni. As the encounter escalated, Rooni told his son to call the police. Biser told Rooni he was under arrest. While handcuffing Rooni, Biser allegedly jerked him back and made the cuffs too tight. While in the jail, Rooni did not seek medical attention. He had discoloration under his skin, painful hands and swollen fingers. Charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing an officer were dismissed. In April 2006, Rooni was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the handcuffing claim, citing qualified immunity. The court remanded Rooni’s arrest claim; taking his reasonable allegations as true, neither probable cause nor “arguable” probable cause supported an arrest.View "Rooni v. Biser" on Justia Law

The Indiana War Memorials Commission requires a permit for even small gatherings at the Soldiers and Sailors Monument at Monument Circle in Indianapolis and at several other monuments. Smith and his young son were expelled from Monument Circle for protesting, without a permit, a proposed United Nations arms treaty. Smith sought an injunction against the policy’s enforcement. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the U.S. has signed, but has not ratified the treaty and that the permit policy has changed since the district court denied the motion. The new policy retains the problematic features of the old, so Smith’s appeal is not moot. Smith seems likely to succeed in showing that the 14‐person limit on demonstrations without a permit, and a provision that, if a gathering has been advertised or the public has been invited, a permit is required even if the group ultimately is made up of fewer than 15 people, are not narrowly tailored. View "Smith v. Exec. Dir. of IN War Mem'ls Comm'n" on Justia Law

Executing an arrest warrant for Wilson, officers talked to people who had seen Wilson enter a particular house. The officers were invited inside to talk with the owner, Rawls, who gave them permission to look around to confirm that Wilson was not there. In the kitchen they smelled the burnt marijuana. Richards sat at the table. An officer saw what he thought was a rock of crack cocaine on a plate, and a marijuana cigarette, a small amount of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and plastic baggies on the table. An officer had to use pepper spray to subdue Richards. When officers handcuffed Richards and lifted him to his feet, a handgun fell from his waistband. A knife was sticking out of his pocket. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the house. In the unlocked bedroom that Richards used when visiting Rawls, an open briefcase on the bed appeared to contain cocaine. An officer read Rawls his Miranda rights. Rawls was never handcuffed or detained. Rawls told the officers that he understood his rights and willingly signed consent to search after one request. Although Rawls was 86 years old, neither officer observed signs of confusion. Richards was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a place for using and distributing controlled substances, U.S.C. 856(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied motions to suppress and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. Richards" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adkins of attempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 90 months. In a separate case, Adkins pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. In consolidated appeals, he challenged evidentiary decisions, jury instructions, allegedly improper statements by the government, and the sentence in the heroin-handgun case. The Seventh Circuit rejected those claims, but vacated his sentence for child pornography, finding a condition of supervised release unconstitutionally vague. The condition stated that “defendant shall not view or listen to any pornography or sexually stimulating material or sexually oriented material or patronize locations where such material is available.” Read literally, the condition might preclude Adkins from using a computer or entering a library, regardless of what he views, because both are “locations” where “sexually stimulating material … is available.” He might not be able to ride the bus, enter a grocery store, watch television, open a magazine or newspaper, read a classic book, or even go out in public, given the ubiquity of advertisements that use potentially sexually oriented or sexually stimulating images. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Indianapolis requires adult bookstores to remain closed between midnight and 10 a.m. every day and all day Sunday. Other retail businesses are not subject to the restrictions. Indianapolis contended that closure would curtail secondary effects, but the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim. The district court then held a trial and accepted the city’s claim of fewer armed robberies at or near adult bookstores. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of an injunction prohibiting enforcement. The city did not use a multivariate regression to control for other potentially important variables, such as the presence of late‑night taverns. The difference in the number of armed robberies is not statistically significant. The data did not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than at other late-night retail outlets, such as liquor stores and convenience stores, which are not subject to the hours imposed on bookstores. The secondary-effects approach endorsed by the Supreme Court permits governments to protect persons who want nothing to do with adult uses from harms created by adult businesses; the Supreme Court has not endorsed an approach under which governments can close adult bookstores to reduce crime directed against businesses that accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who voluntarily frequent their premises. View "Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Two convicted sex offenders challenged aspects of Wisconsin’s statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring as violating the constitutional prohibition against enacting ex post facto laws. The law was enacted after the plaintiffs committed and were convicted of sex offenses that made them subject to it, but before they’d finished serving their sentences. The district judge ruled that the $100 annual registration fee that the monitoring act imposes on convicted sex offenders is a fine, which is a form of punishment and cannot constitutionally be imposed on persons who committed their sex crimes before the fee provision was enacted, but upheld the other provisions of the act. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the annual registration fee but affirmed dismissal of other challenges to the statutory scheme on grounds of standing. View "Doe v. Raemisch" on Justia Law