Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kingsley was a pretrial detaineel. A deputy noticed a sheet of yellow paper covering the light above Kingsley’s bed and ordered him to take it down. Kingsley refused, stating that he had not put the paper there. When the deputy later returned, he again ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. During morning rounds, another officer ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. Kingsley did not comply. Minutes later, an officer delivering Kingsley’s medication ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. After several requests, Kingsley still refused. Kingsley refused an order from the administrator, who said jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived, ordered Kingsley to stand up and to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie facedown on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five second. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Months later, Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants; a claim of excessive force against two officers proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court conflated the standards for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and wrongly instructed the jury to consider the defendants’ subjective intent. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Bryant, riding his bike on a Chicago street, was stopped by police officers, searched without a warrant, and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned in September, 2010. He was released after the evidence was suppressed and the case dismissed. He is now in custody for a different crime. In 2012, Bryant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and state law claims. He sought to compel disclosure of the identities of the police officers. The district court screened Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915A) noting that the section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. Bryant had until August 20, 2012, to file his false-arrest claim, September 23 for the false-imprisonment claim and December 13 for the malicious-prosecution claim. The filing date of the complaint was unclear. The court deemed it filed on September 18, the earliest date that Bryant could have given it to jail officials for mailing. The court observed that. Bryant’s malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, but was not actionable in federal court, and that his remaining federal claims were time-barred. The court expressed doubt that Bryant could identify the arresting officers within the limitations period. The court ultimately dismissed, stating that incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the limitations period, that Bryant’s “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as Doe and Roe was insufficient. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Bryant exercised reasonable diligence and that the court erred in disregarding his discovery request. View "Larry Bryant v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Peters was a passenger in a Scion on I-70 in Indiana, traveling behind a Denali. Both cars displayed Ohio license plates. The cars aroused the suspicion of Officer Borgman, who followed the Denali and enlisted Deputy Ernstes to watch the Scion. Borgman stopped the Denali, which was found to contain heroin and other evidence of drug trafficking. Ernstes believed that the driver of the Scion, Adams, was following too closely and activated his emergency lights, Adams pulled over, denied that he was traveling with another vehicle, and stated that he had left his license at home. When his passenger, Peters, lowered his window, Ernstes smelled burnt marijuana and saw small green particles that he believed to be marijuana. Peters told the deputy that they were traveling with the Denali and that he had previously been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. During a pat-down, the deputy recovered $2500 cash from Peters’ pocket. He found a marijuana stem in the front passenger area and encountered a marijuana odor in a storage compartment that had a cracked lid and screws that appeared not to be original equipment. The deputy also found a cordless drill that contained a sticky substance, later found to match a substance found on the screws of a panel concealing a kilogram of heroin in the Denali. Peters and the Denali passenger were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court concluded that probable cause existed and denied a motion to suppress. Peters entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Peters" on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

The Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), requires health insurance providers (including third party administrators) to cover certain preventive services without cost to the insured, including, “with respect to women … preventive care and screenings,” including all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization, and patient education for women with reproductive capacity. The University of Notre Dame self‐insures employees’ medical expenses; Meritain administers the employee health plan. For students’ medical needs, Notre Dame has a contract with Aetna. Because Catholic doctrine forbids the use of contraceptives, Notre Dame has never paid for contraceptives for employees or permitted Aetna to insure the expense of contraceptives. Because of those religious objections and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb‐1(a), the government created a religious exemption, 45 C.F.R. 147.130(a)(1)(iv)). New regulations enlarged the exemption, so that Notre Dame came within its scope. To exercise its right to opt out of paying for coverage for contraceptives, the university completed a form that alerts insurers that Notre Dame is not going to pay, so they will have to pay. The government will reimburse at least 110 percent of the third‐party administrator’s costs and Aetna can expect to recoup its costs from savings on pregnancy medical care. Several months after the regulations were promulgated, the University unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the University had not indicated exactly what it wanted enjoined at this stage. The insurance companies were not parties, and, therefore, could not be enjoined from providing the required coverage. A religious institution has no right to prevent other institutions from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution and the University has complied by completing the required form. View "Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Ruhl and Serio were convicted of the first-degree murder of Neubauer in separate trials in Illinois. After exhausting his state court remedies, Ruhl sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his conviction was the result of violations of various constitutional rights. The district court denied his petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate as to Ruhl’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the attorney’s failure to present testimony from two detectives who had voiced concerns about the credibility of a witness; interview and present testimony of several witnesses who would have impeached that witness; investigate telephone records to show that the witness had not called Neubauer’s cell phone; investigate facts surrounding a traffic stop on the morning of the murder; present expert testimony, which counsel had referenced in his opening statement, that would have undermined the state’s case; object to hearsay testimony inculpating Ruhl; and present corroborating witnesses at the pretrial hearing on the state’s motion to exclude testimony that another admitted to shooting Neubauer. View "Ruhl v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Before 1992, Chicago police officers received pension credit for time worked for the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. In 1992, the Retirement Board began denying pension credit to retiring officers for prior service with the Sheriff’s Department. In 2008, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that this practice was improper under the Illinois Pension Code. Officers who had been denied pension credit sought reconsideration. The Board concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the final rulings after the statutory 35‐day limit. The officers did not seek review in state court, but filed a federal suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated officers, alleging violations of procedural due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. and state constitutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the officers’ complaint is, essentially, that Illinois law provides no procedure for making the appellate decision retroactive Their sole remedy lies with the political branches of Illinois government. View "Rasario v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemens' Annuity & Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

Carter, a police officer for 13 years, was with other officers outside a residence while a Tactical Enforcement Unit went inside to check for threats to the officers who would perform a search. Carter was taking Colonix, a nonprescription supplement to clean his colon, in an effort to lose weight. Carter went to his car after the tactical unit gave the all clear and drank Colonix, knowing that it made him need to frequently use the restroom. During the search, the resident complained that cash was missing. A supervisor ordered the officers to “freeze everything” until the Professional Performance Division arrived. Officers were not to leave. About 30-45 minutes later, Sergeant Eccher arrived. Feeling the Colonix and sweating profusely, Carter told Eccher that he needed to use the bathroom and did not want to use the residence bathroom because of its filthy condition. Eccher put his palm straight out, and said, “You can’t leave until I search you.” Eccher patted Carter down; he did not pat down Carter’s genital area and did not take Carter’s badge or police identification. Officer, Lopez, also needing to leave, was searched, but was allowed to keep his boots on. The searches were in plain view of the residents. The officers left. After PPD arrived, another officer was allowed to leave without being searched. The district court rejected a suit by Carter and Lopez under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging illegal search and seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable officer in Carter’s position would have feared arrest or detention if he did not comply with the search request.View "Carter v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

When basketball legend Michael Jordan was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative issue devoted exclusively to Jordan’s remarkable career. Jewel Foods was offered free advertising space in the issue for agreeing to stock the magazine in its 175 stores. Jewel submitted a full-page ad congratulating Jordan, which ran on the inside back cover of the commemorative issue. To Jordan the ad constituted a misappropriation of his identity for the supermarket chain’s commercial benefit. He sought $5 million in damages, alleging violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Illinois deceptive-practices statute, and the common law of unfair competition. The district court accepted Jewel’s First Amendment defense, that its ad was “noncommercial” speech with full First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Jewel’s ad prominently featured the “Jewel-Osco” logo and marketing slogan, which were creatively and conspicuously linked to Jordan in the text of the ad’s congratulatory message. The ad was a form of image advertising aimed at promoting the Jewel-Osco brand; it was commercial speech and subject to the laws cited by Jordan.View "Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc," on Justia Law

Pineda was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his right to a fair jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when it struck the sole Hispanic member of the jury for cause and replaced him with an alternate during trial and committed procedural error by failing to adequately consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) at sentencing. View "United States v. Pineda" on Justia Law