Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petty was arrested on the suspicion that he, along with another person, shot and killed Counsel and wounded two others. Petty was identified as the shooter and was indicted for murder, but was found not guilty. After his acquittal, Petty filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city and individual Chicago Police Department officers arguing that the officers violated his due process rights by intentionally mishandling the shooting investigation and prosecuting him for murder based on falsified evidence. Petty alleged that officers held a witness, Tarver, in a room for more than 13 hours without food, water, or access to a bathroom until he implicated him. He also alleged that they concealed evidence and failed to disclose their misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Petty was aware of the alleged misconduct before trial and had ample opportunity to make use of the information at trial. Petty’s “coerced evidence” claim was not cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Petty did not suffer a constitutional injury sufficient to support his claim that the city was liable for the officers’ conduct because it had a policy of detaining people believed to be witnesses for extended periods against their will. View "Petty v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1971 Cannon was convicted of murder. He was paroled and was a general in the El Rukn street gang when he became involved in a second murder and was arrested by the Chicago Police Department’s Violent Crimes division. He was threatened and tortured until he confessed that he was driving the car in which the murder occurred. Immediately after leaving police custody, Cannon recanted his confession and complained to the Office of Professional Standards. The complaint was dismissed. Cannon's confession was used at his 1984 trial; he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In 1986, Cannon filed a federal complaint, asserting torture. By this time, there had been news reports of other incidents but it was not known that the abuse against African American men was pervasive and occurred with the complicity of then-commander Burge. In 1988, on his attorney’s advice, Cannon settled for the $3000 nuisance value offered by the defendants and signed a broad release of his claims. Cannon also appealed his conviction. By the time of a second remand, the judge who originally ruled on Cannon’s motion to suppress was caught accepting bribes and there was evidence that the officers who procured his confession regularly used torture. In 2001, Cannon agreed to plead guilty, without admitting guilt, to armed violence and conspiracy to commit murder, in exchange for a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the state dismissed the 1983 murder charges solely because neither side anticipated the effect of the plea agreement on Cannon’s parole status for the 1971 conviction. By the time a court ordered a new hearing on that issue, Cannon had been in prison for 23 years for the 1983 murder. Cannon filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, based on the release in the 1986 case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the case “casts a pall of shame” over the city, the officers, and the trial judge, but also on Cannon. Cannon settled knowing that the defendants were lying. There was no evidence that, at the time he settled, the purposefully concealed a broader scandal. View "Cannon v. Burge" on Justia Law

Defendant sold crack cocaine to his nephew, who was a paid DEA informant and who recorded the transaction and turned over 22 grams of crack purchased with $1250 of DEA money. Based on the recording, agents obtained a warrant, had the nephew execute another controlled buy, then search the house and found large quantities of drugs. Defendant acknowledged ownership of the drugs. The nephew later signed an affidavit and recorded a video, swearing that he had obtained the crack on the night of the search not from defendant, but from someone outside the house, and that he had lied in stating that defendant was a drug dealer. The nephew left the state and refused to cooperate. No party sought a material witness warrant. The judge rejected the recantation as hearsay. Convicted of possession of at least 280 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, defendant was sentenced to 288 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that defendant’s statement about ownership should have been excluded because he had not received his Miranda warnings; that showing the videotape of the second buy to the jury, in the absence of the nephew, violated defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him; and of ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

DEA task force members went to Beltran’s two-unit residence. Ramirez came to the front porch. He did not speak English well but had the building owner (Beltran) on the phone; he gave the phone to an agent. Beltran indicated that it would take him an hour to get home. Beltran and Ramirez agreed to a search if the officers waited until Beltran arrived. Ramirez remained on the porch with the officers. Ramirez placed several calls (speaking in Spanish). He appeared nervous. Ramirez said that there was no one in the building, but officers heard sounds of human movement. In garbage cans, outside of a fence and marked for Beltran’s building, an officer discovered packaging that looked like it had been used to wrap “bricks” of narcotics. Posted behind the residence, an officer saw Beltran emerge through the back door, stopped and frisked him, felt something in Beltran’s pocket, and confirmed that it was substantial cash. Beltran withdrew his consent for a search. A Spanish-speaking agent obtained Ramirez's consent to search. In the Ramirez apartment they found bins containing more than a million dollars, packaging material like in the garbage cans, nine kilograms of heroin, a loaded gun, and other items consistent with narcotics trafficking. Beltran stated that he would cooperate and agreed to a search, which produced a shotgun, scales, a heat sealer, drug-cutting agents, packaging material, and baggies. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the baggies. A dryer on the second floor landing contained another large stash of money and three kilograms of cocaine. Beltran claimed that his consent was the product of coercion, as he was handcuffed. The district court denied his motion to suppress. He was convicted of possessing and conspiring to possess, with the intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin, 26 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and sentenced to 168 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Beltran" on Justia Law

Campbell worked at the Forest Preserve District’s Cermak Family Aquatic Center. In 2010, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the center’s office. Weeks later, the FPD fired him. Nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981, alleging that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process; that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the law; and that his termination violated that statute’s prohibition on racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. Campbell later conceded that his section 1983 claims were time‐barred. The district court dismissed, finding that section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of section 1981 committed by state actors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 section 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of section 1983 and that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under section 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. 1658’s four‐year statute of limitations, rather than the two‐year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Illinois. View "Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s campaign-finance law in light of the Supreme Court decision, Citizens United (2010), alleging that laws concerning groups that spend money for political speech independently of candidates and parties are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in violation of the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit previously invalidated section 11.26(4), which capped at $10,000 the aggregate annual amount a donor could give to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. Remaining claims challenge a ban on political spending by corporations, interlocking definitions that determine “political committee” status, “noncoordination” oath and disclaimer requirements for independent political messages, among other provisions. The district court enjoined the ban on corporate political spending, partially enjoined a regulatory disclaimer rule, and denied an injunction on other challenges. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to enter a new injunction to conform to the specificity requirements of FRCP Rule 65(d). On the merits, the court stated that the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory clarity and close fit between the government’s means and its end; some forms of regulation are categorically impermissible. Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 11 has not been updated to reflect new Supreme Court doctrine; administrative rules do not cohere with the statutes and the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some provisions. Certain provisions (the ban on corporate political spending and the cap on the amount a corporation may spend to raise money for an affiliated PAC) are obviously unconstitutional under Citizens. Others fail First Amendment standards as applied to independent political speakers. Some provisions are valid. View "WI Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland" on Justia Law

Avila pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court repeated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, producing child pornography and 16 counts of possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Avila’s appellate counsel identified only frivolous grounds for appeal and submitted a no-merit report to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Avila responded that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive just five years of imprisonment and 10 years of supervision. Avila said he was never informed of the true severity of the sentence he faced and he would have refused to plead guilty on those terms. The state appellate court rejected the claims as waived by his guilty pleas. The federal district court denied Avila’s habeas petition and denied him a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court applied a rule of law directly contrary to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Taylor (2000)). The general rule that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal is subject to an exception for ineffective assistance in deciding to enter the plea. View "Avila v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Hernandez picked up a red bag in an alley. Chicago Officers Varchetto and Pierri, patrolling in an unmarked car, saw him pick up the bag and run up the alley. He saw the officers and dropped the bag. As the officers approached, he volunteered, “I just have some dope.” Hernandez handed a key holder to Varchetto, who found five small bags of heroin inside. The officers arrested Hernandez. Pierri asked him what was in the red bag. Hernandez replied that he had “ripped the guys around the corner for dope and a gun.” Pierri opened the bag and found a loaded gun, 61 small bags of crack cocaine, and 55 small bags of marijuana. The officers then gave Hernandez Miranda warnings and took him to the station. During the ride, without prompting, Hernandez volunteered that he had received fake drugs from the owners of the red bag and was beaten when he complained; taking it was retaliation. At the station, Hernandez was again given Miranda warnings. He repeated his story with more detail. Hernandez unsuccessfully moved to suppress his post-Miranda confession on the ground that it was a product of having confessed during a pre-Miranda interrogation. He was convicted of possessing a gun as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the single question asked before Hernandez was given Miranda warnings falls within the “public safety” exception to Miranda.View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After drinking vodka, Ford rode with Grace to Ford’s home. The men passed 15-year-old Hodge, sitting next door. Ford and Hodge greeted each other. Inside Ford’s house, Ford said, “I can’t stand that mother fucker. I’ll be back.” Ford left the house; Grace soon heard a popping sound. He looked out and saw Hodge lying in the street. Ford came inside and said, “I got to get the fuck out of here … meet me … and pick me up.” Grace located a police officer and led him to the crime scene. Hodge, shot in the back of his head, died the next day. Gary Police Officer Quasney immediately spoke with witness Simmons, who stated that he had seen the victim talking to a black male in a black hooded sweatshirt, who shot Hodge. At a second trial, following a mistrial, Simmons was unavailable. The trial court denied the state’s request for admission of prior testimony, but admitted Quasney’s testimony recounting Simmons’s statements under the excited utterance exception. During closing arguments, Ford’s attorney argued that the state had failed to explain why Ford would shoot Hodge. In response, the prosecutor asserted that motive could not be known because the victim was dead and “If that person who committed the offense don’t talk, how would we ever know?” Convicted, Ford was sentenced to 50 years. Direct appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. The federal district court dismissed his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. Even assuming that an objection would have been sustained, Ford failed to show prejudice.View "Ford v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Olson shared a cell with Russell for about a week in 2007. Olson approached Sergeant Schneider and stated: “[M]y celly, Russell, has twice tried to swing off on me and I want him moved … I fear he’s gonna try to do it again … he isn’t taking his meds and hears voices that tell him to attack people.” Schneider asked other officers about Russell, but nobody had heard of any problems or of any issues with Russell’s medication. Schneider asked the officer supervising distribution to be sure Russell took his medication. The next evening Russell attacked Olson, damaging one of Olson’s teeth. The nurse on duty recommended that the tooth be pulled, but about a month passed before Olson saw a dentist. Olson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of an attack by Russell and to his dental needs. The district court declined to appoint counsel, finding that Olson was a competent pro se litigant and that his claims were not complex, and ultimately granted summary judgment against Olson on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that Schneider was subjectively aware that Russell was dangerous or that the staff failed to act promptly once aware of Olson’s serious medical needs.View "Olson v. Morgan" on Justia Law