Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

West Side Christian Church applied to the City of Evansville, Indiana, for a permit to set up its “Cross the River” display, consisting of 31 six-foot tall decorated crosses on four blocks of public Riverfront. After Evansville approved the application, residents sought an injunction, claiming that the display violated their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed. The City did not appeal, but West Side, which was an intervenor in the district court, did. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, finding that West Side did not have standing to appeal. The court could not redress any injury West Side might have suffered because Evansville was not party to this appeal and could prohibit the display regardless of any order issued. Any First Amendment injury West Side might have suffered from the injunction was not fairly traceable to, or caused by, Evansville. View "Cabral v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

In 2002, Alexander was 55 years old and weighed 138 pounds. He had a limp and suffered from emphysema. Jones was 33 years old and weighed 230 pounds. Jones and Harris were using crack cocaine at Alexander’s Indianapolis apartment when Alexander asked them to leave. Harris left. Harris later saw Jones carrying Alexander’s television. Jones sold the television. Police discovered Alexander’s body. After identifying Jones as the person last seen in Alexander’s apartment, police discovered that Jones was wanted on outstanding warrants. Jones was arrested and signed an advice and waiver of rights, and agreed to give police his clothing and shoes. He admitted that he had spent the weekend at Alexander’s apartment. Changing his story, he later stated that Alexander had given Jones his television in exchange for drugs; that Alexander became angry and came at him with a pocketknife; that he pushed Alexander; that Alexander’s head hit the wall; that Jones hit him in the head; that Alexander was unconscious; that Jones left; that he returned and took the television; and that he returned again and bound Alexander’s hands and feet. At trial, Jones’s counsel argued self-defense. Counsel did not move to suppress admission of Jones’s clothing, his admissions, or a laboratory report tying Jones’s clothing to the crime scene. The court entered a conviction for felony murder and sentenced Jones to 65 years’ imprisonment. Direct appeal, arguing insufficient evidence, was unsuccessful, as was a state petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to seek suppression of the clothing. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective under “Pirtle.”View "Jones v. Brown" on Justia Law

Officers Mitchell and Bowersock responded to a 911 call by Bumgarner late on a Saturday night in 2008. They learned that Bumgarner and Hawkins had been drinking and got into a heated argument. Hawkins was alleged to have a history of abusiveness, but that night’s argument was “verbal only.” Hawkins had locked Bumgarner out and her keys were in the residence. Bumgarner confirmed with Mitchell that she was not injured. Hawkins did not want to talk to the police. Mitchell prevented him from closing the door, entered his home, and refused to leave after Hawkins called his attorney. Hawkins did not comply with a demand to get off the phone and Bowersock told him he was under arrest, grabbed Hawkins’s left wrist while Mitchell grabbed Hawkins’s right wrist, resulting in a struggle on the floor. The state filed, but later dropped charges against Hawkins. Hawkins sued the officers, claiming that he needed surgery to remove a cyst from above his eye where he was injured and psychiatric counseling for the traumatic encounter. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the officers are liable to Hawkins as a matter of law for seizing him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that on other counts, the court must determine whether his call to the attorney was a motivating factor in arresting Hawkins and whether probable cause existed to arrest Hawkins for disorderly conduct. View "Hawkins v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Indiana pawnbrokers must obtain license from the state’s Department of Financial Institutions (DFI). Saalwaechter, owns Fares Pawn in Evansville, Indiana. He applied for a license in 2009, but DFI denied his application, citing concerns about previous operations on the property and about his store manager’s criminal history. The property has been used as a pawnshop for about 20 years, but different businesses with overlapping ownership. Saalwaechter received a license after he signed an agreement to comply with certain conditions, in particular not employing the manager. Saalwaechter sued DFI, alleging violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Saalwaechter did not contend that DFI treated him unfavorably on account of some identifiable characteristic, such as age, sex, or race, but that the state had singled him out for disparate treatment without a rational basis. The district court granted DFI summary judgment on the “class of one” claim, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that DFI treated Saalwaechter differently from similarly situated applicants without a rational reason. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fares Pawn, LLC v. IN Dep't of Fin. Insts." on Justia Law

Groves was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison, 120 months on each count, to run consecutively. The Seventh Circuit court affirmed in 2009. In 2011, Groves filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255). The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s characterization of his 1995 burglary conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), 4B1.2(a)(2) and “in failing to fulfill movant’s intention to plead guilty.” The court noted extensive evidence that Groves wanted to go to trial and looked at counsel’s performance “as a whole.” View "Groves v. United States" on Justia Law

Henderson has been an inmate since 1995. He was diagnosed with high blood pressure and diabetes 1999-2000. He received medical treatment. In 2009, he suffered diabetic hypoglycemia and tremulous convulsions and was taken to Stateville’s emergency room. A month later Henderson had surgery in order to undergo hemodialysis several times a week. In 2010, Henderson sued, alleging that health care providers and prison officials acted with deliberate indifference; that testing revealed that his toxic waste levels were “out of range;” but he was not notified nor treated until he had reached Stage 5 kidney disease. Henderson sought to proceed in forma pauperis and moved for recruitment of counsel (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1)), noting that he had a fifth grade education and a low IQ. The district court allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis, but denied recruitment of counsel. Henderson filed an amended complaint and a motion for a discovery order, with a request to depose defendants, and a settlement proposal. After problems during discovery, Henderson filed another motion for recruitment of counsel. Henderson’s discovery motions were denied. Henderson claimed that his documents had been confiscated during a shakedown. The court ultimately rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Henderson needed counsel at every phase of litigation and there was a reasonable likelihood that counsel would have made a difference in the outcome. “In the sea of indigent litigants without counsel, Henderson should have stood out as someone who needed counsel the most.” View "Henderson v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Brown submitted a probable cause affidavit, stating that confidential informant “Doe” had stated that a felon, known to Doe as “T.Y.,” possessed a semiautomatic and a .38-caliber revolver; that Doe had seen the guns in T.Y’s house the day before and many times during the last six weeks; that T.Y. needed the guns because he sold heroin; and that T.Y. was a member of a gang and part of a crew that robbed people. The affidavit described corroboration of the address and Does’ identification of a police photograph of Glover as “T.Y.” Glover had two felony convictions. Doe identified the house at Glover’s address. The affidavit did not include any information on Doe, an informant for six years. He had been affiliated with a gang; had 14 convictions, including four for crimes committed while working as an informant; had used aliases when questioned by police; and had previously been paid for information. That evening officers executed the warrant and found guns, ammunition, 14 grams of heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Doe was paid $450. After the district court denied a motion to suppress, Glover entered a plea, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a Franks hearing. The affidavit provided an insufficient basis for the warrant; it omitted all information regarding the informant’s credibility. The affidavit was not so “bare bones” that officers’ good faith reliance on it was unreasonable, but that omission is sufficient to raise an inference of reckless disregard for the truth that could undermine the good faith exception. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Mendoza convicted of drug conspiracy and other drug offenses, was sentenced to multiple terms of life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mendoza then petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that he was denied due process when the district court moved one of his Spanish-speaking interpreters from the defense table to interpret for a Spanish-speaking witness at trial and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to this interpreter arrangement and failing to translate discovery and adequately review it with him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and took testimony from Mendoza, his trial counsel, and the three interpreters who participated in the trial, then denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that none of the alleged errors changed the outcome of the trial. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

A couple, driving through Madison, saw a man in a Jeep holding what appeared to be a handgun pointed at the ceiling of the Jeep. They called the police. Asked whether the driver was threatening anyone, the caller replied, “[N]o … we couldn’t tell if it was real.” She stated that the man had parked at Dexter’s Pub and that he had been driving “badly.” Officers Lomas, Chaney, and others arrived. As they approached the Jeep, Gibbs walked out of the bar. He matched a description that had been provided. Gibbs complied with instructions to put his hands on the wall. Lomas handcuffed Gibbs. Chaney frisked him. Gibbs stated that he was the driver of the Jeep. Lomas placed Gibbs in the squad car and explained that someone had seen him pointing a gun in the car. Gibbs stated that he had airsoft guns in his car and had been returning from an airsoft event where he had been a referee. Airsoft guns are replicas of firearms. Lomas claims that Gibbs consented to her looking in the Jeep. Gibbs testified that he had denied permission, but had offered to get the items for her. Lomas searched the Jeep and found airsoft guns and a plastic knife. The officers issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct, which was later dismissed. Gibbs sued Lomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He did not sue any of the other officers. The district court denied Lomas’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if Gibbs had a constitutional right to be free from this arrest and search, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gibbs v. Lomas" on Justia Law

Daoud, an 18-year-old American citizen, had an email conversation with undercover FBI employees posing as terrorists who responded to messages that he had posted online. Daoud planned “violent jihad” and discussed his interest in committing attacks in the U.S, using bomb-making instructions that he had read in Inspire magazine, an English-language organ of Al Qaeda, and online. Daoud selected a Chicago bar as the target of a bomb that the agent would supply. The agent told him the bomb would destroy the building and would kill “hundreds” of people. Daoud replied: “that’s the point.” On September 14, 2012, Daoud parked a Jeep containing the fake bomb in front of the bar. In an alley, in the presence of the agent, he tried to detonate the fake bomb and was arrested. In jail, he tried to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. The government notified Daoud, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801, that it intended to present evidence derived from electronic surveillance conducted under the Act. His attorney sought access to the classified materials submitted in support of the government’s FISA warrant applications. The government supplied a heavily redacted, unclassified response and a classified version, accessible only to the court with a statement that disclosure “would harm the national security.” The harm was detailed in a classified affidavit signed by the FBI’s Acting Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. The district judge ordered the materials sought by defense counsel turned over. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that in addition to having the requisite security clearance the seeker of such information must establish need to know. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law