Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Baptist is a native of Belize who entered the U.S.as a lawful permanent resident in 1988.In 1992, Baptist pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to probation. In 1995, Baptist was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was again sentenced to probation. In 1996, Baptist was again convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At the time, the offense was considered an aggravated felony and he was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Baptist signed a stipulated removal order in 1998. Afterwards, he illegally reentered the U.S. several times; each time he was discovered, he was again removed to Belize. In 2005, Baptist illegally entered once more and avoided detection until he was arrested in 2010. Charged with being illegally present in the U.S. after having been previously removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Baptist moved to dismiss the indictment, collaterally attacking his 1998 removal as violating his due process rights. The district court denied Baptist’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Baptist failed to establish that his removal proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.” View "United States v. Baptist" on Justia Law

Townsend, a prisoner at the Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), sued GBCA officials for civil rights violations. Townsend suffered from significant mental illness and engaged in disruptive behavior, including suicide attempts and fighting. Townsend was repeatedly subjected observation placements and Behavioral Action Plans (BAPs). The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but otherwise vacated. Townsend has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the imposition of the BAP violated his due process rights by imposing an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life, without appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether the BAP imposed conditions of confinement that denied Townsend the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities. View "Townsend v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Harden pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine under a written plea agreement. With Harden’s consent, the court instructed a magistrate judge to conduct a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy under a local rule allowing magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas. The magistrate judge accepted Harden’s guilty plea. The district court then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed sentence. Harden appealed the magistrate judge’s acceptance of his plea, arguing that the magistrate’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea, instead of preparing a report and recommendation to the district court, violated the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 636; Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and the U.S. Constitution. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the prevalence of guilty pleas does not render them less important, or the protections waived by plea any less fundamental. A felony guilty plea is equal in importance to a felony trial; without explicit authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate the task. The Supreme Court has never suggested that magistrate judges, with the parties’ consent, may perform every duty of an Article III judge. View "United States v. Harden" on Justia Law

On February 28, 2007, Barriera barricaded himself in his bedroom. He had been diagnosed with schizophrenia years earlier, but had not been taking his medicine regularly. His mother (Wilson) feared he might harm himself. When the family’s efforts to convince him to leave his room were unsuccessful, Wilson called 911. She explained that Barriera might be suicidal. A firefighter was able to open the bedroom door enough to observe Barriera holding a hunting knife and moving around the room and called for police assistance. Officers arrived and worked for several minutes to persuade Barriera to leave his room. Later, an officer deployed his taser through the partially open door, hitting Barriera, who removed the prongs from his chest. Seconds later, he lunged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed the taser and another fired his weapon. Barriera was struck by the taser prongs and two bullets.. Barriera later died from his injuries. A jury rejected Wilson’s claims against the officers (under 42 U.S.C. 1983) for excessive force; for wrongful death against the officers under Illinois law; under the Illinois Survival Statute against the officers; and that the city was liable for the torts of the officers under the theory of respondeat superior. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the manner in which the court instructed the jury. View "Wilson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 31-11-6-1 specifies that a marriage may be solemnized (performed) by certain public officials or religious officials designated by religious groups and criminalizes purported marriage solemnization by others. The law omits equivalent officials of secular groups such as humanist societies. Florida, Maine, and South Carolina authorize humanists to solemnize marriages by becoming notaries public, but notaries cannot perform marriages in Indiana. Alaska, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Virginia allow anyone to solemnize a marriage; Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin allow the couple to solemnize their own marriage. Indiana recognizes neither option. The state accommodates some religions, such as the Quakers, that do not have clergy, but does not accommodate others, such as Buddhists. In a challenge under 42 U.S.C.1983, the district court upheld the law, reasoning that a humanist group could call itself a religion, which would be good enough for the state or could conduct a ceremony, followed by a trip to court for a legally effective solemnization. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with instructions to issue an injunction allowing certified secular humanist celebrants to solemnize marriages in Indiana. If Indiana amends its statute to allow notaries to solemnize marriages, the court may modify the injunction to minimize the extent to which a federal decree supersedes the state’s own solution to identified problems. View "Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, and pursuant to state law, Chicago sought to reapportion its 50 aldermanic wards, 65 ILCS 20/21-36. The City Council conducted hearings to solicit the views of citizens and, in 2012, approved the redistricting plan by a vote of 41 to eight. Chicago’s population was 2,695,598, which, if divided equally, would result in 53,912 people in each ward. The wards created by the new map deviate from the average population per ward by a maximum of 8.7 percent. Objectors alleged that the new map was implemented prematurely and deprived constituents of their right to equal protection; that the maximum deviation of 8.7 percent violated the Equal Protection Clause; that the map was arbitrary; that it politically discriminated against “independent” aldermen; and that it departed from traditional redistricting criteria. The district court dismissed, finding that the objectors had not alleged permanent disenfranchisement nor a change to election law and had failed to establish prima facie unconstitutionality because a maximum population deviation below 10 percent is considered minor. The complaint did not allege that the map targeted an objectively defined group. The map preserved the voting rights of minorities; disfavoring certain aldermen over others is an inherent part of the political process and an inevitable result of redistricting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Illinois law bars persons convicted of certain crimes from holding public office, 10 ILCS 5/29-1-5. Parker sought to run for a seat on the Peoria school board. The state’s attorney sought to bar Parker, who had been convicted of felony theft in the 1980s, from pursuing that office. After a brief hearing held on short notice, a state court ordered Parker’s name removed from the ballot and enjoined him from running. Parker sued in federal court, arguing violations of due process and equal protection by denying him a chance to defend himself and targeting him based on his race (African American), and challenging the constitutionality of the law on its face. The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, immunity, and claim preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that immunity, not Rooker-Feldman, bars the enforcement claims and that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude a facial attack on the statute, that challenge fails on the merits. View "Parker v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Arrellano was convicted of one count of conspiring to possess heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and two counts of using a cell phone to facilitate that conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). At trial, the government introduced Arrellano’s cell phone, as well as several wiretapped telephone conversations involving Arrellano’s alleged co-conspirators. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the co-conspirator statements were properly admitted, so that any error in admitting Arrellano’s cell phone was harmless, and the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Arrellano" on Justia Law

Jennifer’s seven-year-old daughter, Liza, was diagnosed with a rare brain tumor that is almost always fatal. Jennifer learned that marijuana oil might be beneficial; some medical evidence supports the belief. The legal status of cannabis oil was unclear, but Jennifer decided to grow her own marijuana and extract the oil. Her father-in-law, Curtis, a Chicago police officer, advised her of the legal risks, but supplied specialized light bulbs and periodically checked the crop. Liza died on July 10, 2012. The funeral was held three days later. Jennifer kept Liza’s body at home, so that the family, including three younger siblings could grieve as Jennifer thought appropriate. Curtis objected. There was conflict about the obituary, who could attend services, the display of religious symbols, and Curtis attempting to take possession of the ashes after Liza’s cremation. After the funeral, Curtis and another officer prepared an affidavit for a warrant to search Jennifer’s house, based on Curtis’s observation of marijuana plants in Jennifer’s basement. The affidavit did not disclose the relationship between them. On the fourth day after the funeral, 12-15 DEA officers searched Jennifer’s home. They found no marijuana. Jennifer had discarded the plants upon Liza’s death. No criminal proceedings were brought. Jennifer sued the officers and the city, alleging violation of her Fourth Amendment rights by including falsehoods in the affidavit and by failing to train officers to prevent irresponsible behavior. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing Curtis’s behavior as “atrocious,” but noting that there was no allegation that he knew the marijuana was gone. The application was misleading, but candor would not have undermined the existence of probable cause. An officer’s motive in applying for a warrant does not invalidate the warrant. “Illinois might be wise to require slightly more information in affidavits in support of warrant applications.” View "Scherr v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law