Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions. View "Llovet v. City of Chicago " on Justia Law

Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury. View "Ashburn v. Atchison" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review. View "Webster v. Caraway" on Justia Law

FBI surveillance of Terre Haute neighbors Denny and Miller included recording activities of those homes, using a camera mounted on a utility pole. The camera captured a live feed, but skipped every few seconds and did not produce a fluid, continuous video. Agents monitored the live feed. On February 8, the camera recorded Constantino, a security guard, arriving at Denny’s residence in Constantino’s company car, entering Denny’s residence, and later leaving. Denny cooperated with the FBI and later revealed that Constantino sold him methamphetamine inside his home that day. Agents followed Constantino to a restaurant and saw him carrying a handgun on his hip. The camera showed Constantino return to Denny’s residence on February 14, with his brother Nicholas, who walked to a toolbox attached to their truck. The video records the toolbox open and then shut, with Nicholas beside it, but does not show him removing anything. The brothers entered the home. Denny later testified that they placed methamphetamine in his microwave and received $8,000 from him. Agents stopped them, seized a loaded gun from Constantino’s waistband, and found another gun and $8,000 cash in the toolbox. Both were indicted for conspiring to supply more than 500 grams of meth; possession and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Affirming their convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that the video was an accurate depiction of events; skips did not render it inadmissible. Nothing about the video would cause a reasonable jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Two predicate drug offenses involving distinct conduct were sufficient to support two firearms convictions; the mandatory 25 year sentence for a second conviction does not violate double jeopardy. View "United States v. Cejas" on Justia Law

Based on a tip that Gutierrez was involved in drug trafficking, officers went to his home with a certified narcotics canine and knocked at the front door. They saw movement inside, but no one answered the door. The officers had the dog examine the door for the scent of narcotics, and he alerted. After knocking for 15 minutes, the officers forcibly entered and secured the home, but did not search. An officer swore out an affidavit, relying on the dog’s positive alert, and returned with a search warrant. The ensuing search revealed 11 pounds of methamphetamine in Gutierrez’s home. A few months later, the Supreme Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on an individual’s porch is a Fourth Amendment search. Gutierrez pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum, 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that under the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Davis v. United States, the evidence should not be suppressed if “binding appellate precedent specifically authorize[d]” the officers’ conduct at the time they acted. Seventh Circuit precedent did authorize the officers’ conduct. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Charged with committing four drug-related robberies of Milwaukee pharmacies; having used a firearm in connection with the robberies; and having possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, defendant was first represented by appointed counsel. He disagreed with how counsel proposed to handle the hearing on a motion to suppress and sought to discharge counsel and proceed pro se. He did not seek a continuance; nor did he object to the hearing being conducted by a magistrate. The magistrate responded that “this hearing will proceed with the defendant … represented by counsel. Following the hearing, the court will address the defendant’s motion to remove counsel and proceed pro se.” The hearing lasted nine hours; 12 witnesses testified. After the hearing, the magistrate granted the motion to discharge counsel, then mooted it with respect to the suppression hearing, denying defendant’s motion to reopen the hearing to present additional evidence. The magistrate recommended that the original motion to suppress, be denied. The district judge agreed with both recommendations. Defendant represented himself at trial and on appeal. He was sentenced to 780 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered the court to hold a new hearing on the motion to suppress, allowing the defendant to represent himself. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Dewitt’s eye problems began in 2007 during his first incarceration at an Indiana Department of Corrections facility. Dewitt submitted the first of many Requests for Healthcare to Corizon stating something was wrong with his bloodshot left eye. After attempts to receive treatment from IDOC providers, Dewitt was released on parole in 2008. A doctor determined that Dewitt had a form of glaucoma and advised that he undergo laser-eye surgery to prevent future attacks. He underwent a surgical procedure on his right eye. His left eye continued to have higher than normal intra-ocular pressure. Dewitt was again incarcerated in 2009 and filed another Request for Healthcare. After several more attempts to obtain care, in 2012, he underwent surgery to remove part of his left eye’s ciliary body. Dewitt filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting deliberately indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court denied three requests for appointed counsel, finding that Dewitt’s claims were not overly complex or meritorious. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for recruitment of counsel and that those denials affected Dewitt’s ability to develop and litigate his case. View "DeWitt v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1990, Carter went to Stegemiller’s home because Stegemiller had filed a small claims case against his mother. Carter asked to discuss the case, then forced his way into Stegemiller’s home, started to strangle her, and struck her in the head with a tire iron. Carter held Stegemiller down and removed her jewelry while Carter’s accomplice, Mitchell, raped her. Before she lost consciousness, Stegemiller saw the men taking a stereo speaker from her home and heard one say “[M]ake sure she’s dead … she can identify us.” The two removed the telephones and locked and barricaded the doors so that Stegemiller could not leave or seek help. Stegemiller survived, with serious injuries. Convicted of felony burglary, robbery, rape, and attempted murder, Carter was sentenced to 90 years. A month later, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.” On direct appeal, Carter’s attorney failed to argue that the attempted murder jury instruction given at Carter’s trial constituted fundamental error. Carter lost his appeal. Rejecting a petition for post-conviction relief, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Carter did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside the verdict. The district court rejected a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carter v. Butt" on Justia Law

Gibson, sued former manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigments, which were used, before the federal government banned them in the 1970s, in paints, including paints applied to residences. Gibson claimed negligence and strict liability, but cannot identify which manufacturer made the white lead carbonate pigment that injured him. He relied on the “risk contribution” theory of tort liability fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mallet in 2005, under which plaintiffs are relieved of the traditional requirement to prove that a specific manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injury. The district court held that risk-contribution theory violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the broad deference that the Constitution grants to the development of state common law. The risk-contribution theory survives substantive due process scrutiny and the manufacturers’ other constitutional challenges. View "Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co." on Justia Law

Late on a Sunday night, gunshots were fired in northwest Chicago neighborhood. Numerous 911 callers reported from 5 to 9 shots. A dispatcher told officers to check the intersections at Wabansia and Karlov and at Armitage and Kildare, roughly a half-mile apart. Less than two minutes later, based on additional calls, the dispatcher added that shots were fired from a black car traveling south on Karlov near Wabansia. Officers driving south on Kostner Avenue, parallel to and a few streets west of Karlov, passed a black car headed north, and stopped the car. Burgess was a passenger and the officers found a revolver on his seat, five of its six rounds spent. Just over four minutes had passed from the initial dispatch to the officers’ report that Burgess was in custody. Having a 2001 conviction for second-degree murder, Burgess was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for possessing the gun as a convicted felon. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress on the theory that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the car. The court found that, based on what the officers observed regarding the light traffic at that hour and what they knew from the dispatches, and the seriousness of the reported crime, reasonable suspicion justified the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All told, the circumstances provided ample justification for stopping Burgess’s car.. Reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion is not a matter of certainty. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law