Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deputy Deeren announced his candidacy for Sheriff of Trempealeau County in 2017. In early 2018, officials within the Sheriff’s Department discovered that Deeren had failed to disclose information about his arrest record when he applied to become a deputy. Deeren had been asked in a 2015 job interview whether he had any prior contact with law enforcement; he failed to disclose that he had been arrested and charged with criminal sexual assault in 2007. After the Department learned of the arrest in 2018, Deeren was again asked about his prior contacts with law enforcement. Deeren again omitted his 2007 arrest and, when confronted, refused to answer questions about it. Then-Sheriff Anderson and Chief Deputy Reinders sought to terminate Deeren for dishonesty and insubordination. Deeren ultimately resigned from the Department and lost the sheriff’s race to Semingson, another deputy in the Department.Deeren filed suit, alleging that Anderson, Reinders, and Semingson engaged in several retaliatory actions against him in response to his candidacy and in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Deeren failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any defendant engaged in a single act of unconstitutional retaliation. View "Deeren v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Emad, an active member of Milwaukee’s Islamic community for 25 years, practices Salah by praying five times each day in a state of physical purity. Emad also participated every Friday afternoon in congregational prayer known as Jumu’ah. Although most often led by an imam at a mosque, Jumu’ah can be held in other locations but must occur in a group setting. From March 2018 to May 2019, Emad was an immigration detainee. He was one of 175 Muslim detainees. The jail had a written policy that “[p]ersonal worship may be done in your cell.” It was not permitted in the dayroom areas. The cell contained a toilet, leaving Emad unable to pray in a clean environment in accordance with Salah. The jail also prohibited all “[g]roup activities led by inmates,” which kept Emad from participating in Jumu’ah. Emad asserts that the jail has long permitted Christian inmates to pray freely within the facility and to gather in the dayroom and library for Bible studies and group prayer.Emad sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, characterizing Emad’s allegations as “unsettling” but stating that it is essential to know precisely how Emad may have experienced discrimination and what role each named defendant played in favoring Christian prayer over Muslim prayer. The court remanded for development of the factual record. View "Emad v. Dodge County" on Justia Law

In November 2021, the Illinois General Assembly passed Public Act 102-667, which added a provision to the state’s Health Care Right of Conscience Act. The new provision purported to be a “declaration of existing law” that “shall not be construed as a new enactment.” The underlying lawsuit relates to COVID-19 vaccine mandates imposed by several Illinois state agencies. In October 2021, the plaintiffs, who work for these agencies, sued their employers and Governor J.B. Pritzker in Illinois state court, asserting the vaccine mandates were unlawful. The defendants then removed the case to federal court. In response to similar lawsuits, Illinois passed Public Act 102-667 on November 8, 2021. The district court determined that the new provision, by its terms, did not change and instead merely clarified existing law. The defendants then moved under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) to certify the following question for interlocutory appeal: Whether, given [the district] court’s correct determination that Section 13.5 is a declaration of existing law that did not change the HCRCA, [the district] court cannot grant Plaintiffs any meaningful relief. The district court certified this exact question for appeal.   The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ challenges to Public Act 102-667 for lack of standing. The district court is free on remand to issue a proper final judgment pursuant to Rules 54(a) and 58(a), which would cover all the claims in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Plaintiffs could then invoke 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and notice an appeal on any issues not resolved by this interlocutory appeal. View "Illinois Department of Corrections v. Alvin Boone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s criminal history included a 1998 guilty plea to felony mail fraud. After maintaining an otherwise clean record for 24 years, he decided he wanted a gun. But 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) bars gun possession for anyone who, like Plaintiff, has a conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” So he brought this suit under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A to challenge the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as the law applied to him. Relying on pre-Bruen framework, The district court granted a motion from the government and dismissed the case.   The Seventh Circuit remanded to allow the district court to undertake the Bruen analysis. The court explained the parties may be unable altogether to find answers to certain questions, may find incomplete information in response to others, and perhaps in some instances, may identify substantial historical information pertinent to one or another dimension of the required inquiry. In the end, the district court will have to give the best answer available to whether the government has carried its burden of “affirmatively proving that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” View "Patrick Atkinson v Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), which makes it a crime to "knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement" in connection with certain firearm purchases. Initially, Defendnat entered a guilty plea, but then sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 922(n), which makes it a crime to purchase or receive a firearm while under indictment for a felony, violates the Second Amendment. The district court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the indictment. The government appealed.On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant was not charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(n). The government is permitted to enact a law that penalizes providing an untruthful answer, which is the question the court was presented with. Whether Section 922(n) violates the Second Amendment remains unresolved. View "USA v. John Holden" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on several counts of sex trafficking a minor, child pornography and cyberstalking. A jury convicted Defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison.Defendant appealed on two issues. First, the district court erred in admitting his confession to detectives. However, each of the challenged statements were made after Defendant was Mirandized. While Defendant indicated prior to this point that he would "rather have a lawyer," even if that statement invoked his right to counsel, subsequent re-initiation of the conversation by Defendant waived his right to counsel.Second, Defendant claimed the district court erred in refusing to provide a limiting instruction related to three threatening voicemails Defendant left for members of the victim's family. These statements were "other acts" admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). View "USA v. Khalil Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Kankakee Fire Department (“KFD”)—was attacked by another firefighter while responding to a fire at a senior living facility. The City suspended the other firefighter for twenty-four hours without pay, ordered him to complete an anger management course, and directed him to avoid working on the same shift as Plaintiff for three months. Plaintiff experienced ongoing physical and mental injuries from the incident, causing her to take leave from work and apply for workers’ compensation. She returned to work six months later but permanently left her position shortly after. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Defendants, among other things, retaliated against her for certain protected activities under Title VII and condoned aggressive and inappropriate behaviors as part of a “code of silence” that resulted in her attack. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and this appeal followed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the merits, Plaintiff’s claim fails because none of her evidence, separately or taken together, creates a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants had a practice of condoning aggressive behavior, resulting in a constitutional injury. Further the court wrote that the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that there was such a high risk of constitutional injury from the other firefighter that the “single incident” theory of municipal liability applies here. The court held Plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment regarding her Fourth Amendment Monell claim and her Title VII retaliation claim. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. View "Michelle Giese v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former mayor of Portage, Indiana, arranged a public bidding process to determine where the city was going to purchase new garbage trucks. Defendant put his long-time friend in charge of the bidding process. Ultimately, the company that won the bid ended up paying Defendant $13,000 less than three weeks after receiving the contract.In November 2016, a federal grand jury indicted Snyder for federal funds bribery and obstructing the IRS. He went to trial in January and February 2019. The jury convicted on one count of federal funds bribery and one count of obstructing the IRS. Defendant appealed, challenging decisions on motions to dismiss, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected all of Defendant's claims on appeal and affirmed his conviction and sentence View "USA v. James Snyder" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the parties and the district court agreed that the appropriate guideline range based on Defendant's prior criminal history was 37 to 46 months.Citing the fact that he accepted responsibility for the crime and his traumatic upbringing, Defendant sought a 37-month sentence. Defendant also claimed he carried the weapon for protection, given his gang history. The government, citing Defendant's lengthy criminal history and multiple firearms convictions, sought a high-end 46-month sentence. The court sentenced Defendant to 78 months in prison. Defendant appealed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.In front of the Seventh Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court improperly relied on its own personal fears in fashioning an above-the-guidelines sentence. While "[t]he district court trod on dangerous ground" in personally expressing its own fears, its remarks did not rise to the level of “extraneous and inflammatory.” The Seventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's challenge that the district court disregarded the applicable guideline range.Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Defendant's claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable as it "failed to address his offense conduct, juvenile history, and the general lack of evidence surrounding deterrence." The court noted that the district court adequately considered Defendant's upbringing within the context of the offense, and that Section 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically permits judges to consider general deterrence when sentencing. View "USA v. Elvin Saldana-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Bell v. Hepp" on Justia Law