Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois prisoner Wheeler sued the prison’s medical director, Dr. Talbot, for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wheeler claims that he experiences excruciating pain from “large and protruding” keloids (growths of scar tissue) on his chest, hips, and legs; that he tested positive for a stomach infection caused by the bacterium helicobacter pylori; and that Dr. Talbot ignored both conditions. The district court allowed the keloid claim to proceed but dismissed the h. pylori claim because the blood-test results that Wheeler attached to his complaint establish that he tested negative for the infection. The court then denied a motion requesting an order requiring Dr. Talbot to refer Wheeler immediately to “a suitable doctor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even ignoring the lack of advance notice to Dr. Talbot, there was enough in the record to demonstrate that immediate referral was unwarranted. The limited evidence established neither that Wheeler will experience irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction nor that his deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Talbot has a reasonable likelihood of success.View "Wheeler v. Talbot" on Justia Law

Campbell pleaded guilty in state court to first degree sexual assault of a child (his 10-year-old daughter). The maximum sentence was 60 years. The state agreed to dismiss three other counts and recommend a sentence of no more than 20 years, with no more than five to seven years’ initial confinement and the balance as extended supervision. The presentence report recommended 20-40 years’ initial confinement and seven to 10 years’ extended supervision. The state recommended a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The court sentenced Campbell to 30 years’ initial confinement and 10 years’ extended supervision. On remand, the prosecutor did not refer to the plea agreement not did defense counsel object to the omission, but the court was made aware of the agreement. The prosecutor spoke of the need to protect Campbell’s daughter and the public. The court imposed an initial term of 34 years. The state appeals court affirmed. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in deciding that Campbell could not establish that counsel was ineffective in failing to object because the prosecutor had not materially and substantially breached the plea agreement.View "Campbell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Evansville detectives received a tip from Hutchinson that Hutchinson’s neighbor, Schmitt had acquired a semi-automatic assault rifle in exchange for $200 and two grams of methamphetamine. Hutchinson had arranged the deal and stated that Schmitt had the gun at home. With an arrest warrant, SWAT officers entered Schmitt’s residence the next day and immediately found Schmitt and Wyatt, and, in plain view, marijuana, methamphetamine, and pills containing controlled substances. Less than five minutes later, an officer in the basement saw a semiautomatic rifle and loaded magazines. They obtained a warrant to seize the drugs, firearm, and related evidence. Schmitt was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. The district judge denied a motion to suppress, finding that the gun was in plain view during a protective sweep. Schmitt, who pled guilty in state court to possession of the drugs, also moved to exclude the drugs. Finding that the drug evidence was “inextricably intertwined with the charged act,” and “would be a motive for the defendant to have a firearm,” the federal court concluded that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. At trial, the judge allowed introduction of Schmitt’s state conviction record. Schmitt was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court should not have admitted Schmitt’s conviction; Schmitt did not open the door to that evidence and it was not relevant except to impeach the government’s own witness, but the error was harmless.View "United States v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaining that during nine months while he was a pretrial detainee in a Porter County, Indiana jail he was denied medical care for a bullet wound to his abdomen, and other essential medical care. The district court, while fully crediting his testimony, dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. There was no record in the jail’s grievance log of the plaintiff filing a grievance. He testified that he never received, or been given access to, a copy of the jail’s grievance procedure, though he knew from other inmates that there was such a procedure and had asked a guard for, but was never given a grievance form. Another prisoner testified that he overheard the plaintiff ask for the grievance form. The plaintiff eventually met with the Warden, who promised to speak to the medical staff and “take care of the problem.” He did not suggest that the plaintiff file a grievance. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the plaintiff asked a supervisor whether he should file a grievance and was told “not to worry about it.” When a jail official invites noncompliance with a procedure the prisoner is not required to follow the procedure.View "Swisher v. Porter Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Since 2005 Indiana has required voters to present photographic identification at the polls. In 2008, the Supreme Court (Crawford decision) held that the statute is compatible with the Constitution. In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a similar statute, 2011 Wis. Act 23. A district court held that Act 23 is unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation. The Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction, but subsequently reversed, holding that the district court’s findings do not justify an outcome different from Crawford, in which the Justices concluded that prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in the integrity of elections justify a photo ID requirement, even though persons who do not already have government-issued photo IDs must spend time to acquire necessary documents (such as birth certificates) and stand in line at a public agency to get one. Wisconsin’s law differs from Indiana’s, but not in ways that matter under the analysis in Crawford. View "League of United Latin Am. Citizens of WI v. Deininger" on Justia Law

On September 16, 2003, Matz and others were on the porch of a Milwaukee apartment when officers assigned to the warrant squad were driving through the area in an unmarked squad on an unrelated matter. On the porch they saw and recognized Salazar, who they believed was a suspect in two homicides and several shootings. By the time Klotka made a U-turn and approached, everyone on the porch was leaving. Matz admits seeing the police, who were in uniform, but claims that he had already left the porch. He acknowledges hearing someone say “detects” as he was leaving. The officers pursued the individuals into an alley, drawing guns while shouting, “Police! Stop!” Eventually, Matz was handcuffed and put into a patrol car; the car he was driving was stolen. Salazar was arrested. According to Matz, he was questioned for several hours after stating that he did not want to talk and wanted an attorney; was kept in a cell and never provided with medications he had been taking for psychosis and depression; and was recovering from pneumonia when he admitted his involvement in two homicides. He later recanted his inculpatory statement and named Salazar as the shooter, although he admitted being present. Matz nonetheless pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless homicide and felony murder with robbery as the underlying crime and was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment. Matz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in 2010. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Matz v. Klotka" on Justia Law

Edwards was pulled over on suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle and the police found a sawed-off shotgun in the car. Moments before the stop, his girlfriend had called 911 to report that Edwards had just stolen her car. A nearby officer heard dispatch, spotted the car, and initiated a traffic stop. Edwards was driving, did not have a valid driver’s license, could not produce the vehicle’s registration, and was evasive about whether he had his girlfriend’s permission to drive the car, so the officer placed him under arrest. A search of the car revealed the sawed-off shotgun on the floor behind the front passenger seat. Edwards admitted the gun was his. Edwards was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon and possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun. The district court granted a motion to suppress the gun. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A warrantless search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of one of its occupants requires reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Edwards was arrested for driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent; it was entirely reasonable to believe that evidence of the car’s ownership—its registration or title—would be found in the car. The search was validView "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area but containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas, including the Statehouse and many state-government buildings. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed; as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs have received citations for violating this ordinance and allege that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The parties agreed that panhandling is a form of speech, to which the First Amendment applies, and that if it drew lines on the basis of speech’s content it would be unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the ordinance, which it called “indifferent to the solicitor’s stated reason for seeking money, or whether the requester states any reason at all…. Springfield has not meddled with the marketplace of ideas.” The prohibition is based on where a person says something rather than what position a person takes.View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

A federal district judge issued an injunction that blocks the State of Wisconsin from conducting a judicially supervised criminal investigation into whether certain persons have violated the state’s campaign-finance laws. The court acted despite 28 U.S.C. 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In 1972 the Supreme Court (Mitchum v. Foster) held that 42 U.S.C.1983 authorizes anti-suit injunctions if appropriate under principles of “equity, comity, and federalism.” The Seventh Circuit held that this case does not present a situation in which state proceedings may be displaced. The Anti-Injunction Act embodies a fundamental principle of federalism: state courts are free to conduct their own litigation, without ongoing supervision by federal judges, let alone threats by federal judges to hold state judges in contempt. The scope given to state litigation is especially great in the realm of criminal investigations and prosecutions. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss, leaving all further proceedings to the courts of Wisconsin.View "O'Keefe v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law