Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Shannon McNamara was killed in her college apartment. McNamara’s window screen was cut. A box cutter handle and a credit card bearing the name “Anthony Mertz” were found in the apartment. Mertz claimed that he was drinking with friends the night of the murder and could not remember anything after a certain time. In an initial interview, investigators noticed Mertz’s scratches, bruises, and red knuckles. Tests on DNA scrapings from under McNamara’s fingernails were inconclusive, but did not exclude Mertz. Latex gloves were found in Mertz’s apartment, and a box cutter went missing from his work place the day that McNamara was killed. Convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, and first-degree murder, Mertz was sentenced to death. The governor commuted his sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, the government presented evidence that Mertz committed assaults on several other women and men and that Mertz committed an unsolved 1999 murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Mertz’s habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to rebut evidence that Mertz committed an uncharged murder and arson, finding that Mertz could not show prejudice. View "Mertz v. Williams" on Justia Law

When Keller was admitted to the Terre Haute Penitentiary, he told the intake psychologist, Bleier, that he suffered from mental illness that affected his ability to function and feared that he would be attacked if placed in the general prison population. Bleier placed Keller in the general population. While on his way to lunch Keller was attacked by another inmate without provocation. The attack lasted several minutes. No guard saw the attack. Keller was eventually spotted lying face‐down, unconscious on the ground. Examinations by the prison medical staff and a hospital emergency room revealed extensive injuries to his face and head. Keller sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, alleging that prison employees violated mandatory regulations: Bleier did not examine all of his available medical documents before releasing him into the general prison population and the guards failed to monitor their assigned areas of the yard. The district court granted the government summary judgment based on the discretionary function exception under the Act. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the government did not sustain its burden to prove as a matter of law that the discretionary function exception shielded it from liability. View "Keller v. United States" on Justia Law

Brown, age 22, was in his Green Bay apartment with two friends, when there was knocking on his door and a yell of “police, search warrant!” As the police began to force open the front door, Brown ran upstairs to his bedroom and grabbed an unloaded shotgun. Police followed. As they reached the top of the stairs they saw him standing in the bedroom pointing the shotgun at them. Officer Secor shot Brown dead. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that claimed that the police search was executed in an unreasonable manner. According to the estate, when Brown peered out of his front window after the knocking, he saw Secor—holding an automatic rifle, dressed in a dark hoodie, with long hair, earrings, a goatee, and sideburns,. Brown turned yelled “What the … we are getting robbed again” and fled upstairs. The estate argued that the police had no need to conduct the search after dark because they were looking for some loot of modest value. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the trial court’s rejection of a report by plaintiff’s expert, criticizing police procedure. View "Estate of Brown v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Pyles, an Illinois prisoner, injured his back when he slipped on wet stairs at Menard Correctional Center. Pyles sometimes used those stairs when showering, and a month before his fall he had alerted the warden, Gaetz, that this stairway can be treacherous because of the water tracked from the nearby showers. Pyles sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to the hazard, and that Wexford Health, which provides contract medical care to Menard inmates, and a Wexford physician, Fahim, were deliberately indifferent to his back injury. Pyles alleged that, after initially being treated for his fall, he suffered ongoing, significant pain, yet Dr. Fahim refused to investigate its cause. At screening, (28 U.S.C. 1915A) the district court dismissed the claim against the warden. A magistrate judge later granted summary judgment for Wexford and Dr. Fahim on the medical claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The slipping hazard about which Pyles complained was not sufficiently dangerous to support an Eighth Amendment claim. From the evidence submitted at summary judgment, a finder of fact could not reasonably conclude that Pyles’s medical claim rests on more than a disagreement with Dr. Fahim about the appropriate course of treatment. View "Pyles v. Fahim" on Justia Law

FFRF, a Wisconsin-based organization of atheists and agnostics, gives its co-presidents housing allowances. They paid income tax on that portion of their salaries. Neither sought to exclude this income on their tax returns and neither has claimed a refund. FFRF and the co-presidents challenged the parsonage exemption, 26 U.S.C. 107, which allows a minister to receive tax-free housing from his church, whether by giving the minister access to a church-owned residence or by giving the minister an allowance to obtain housing. Plaintiffs conceded that they lacked standing to challenge section 107(1), covering in-kind housing, but argued that they had standing to challenge section 107(2), which applies to rental allowances. The district court agreed and held that the subsection is an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. A person suffers no judicially cognizable injury merely because others receive a tax benefit that is conditioned on allegedly unconstitutional criteria, even if that person is otherwise “similarly situated” to those who receive the benefit. Only a person that has been denied such a benefit can be deemed to have suffered a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs were not denied the parsonage exemption. View "Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew" on Justia Law

Bowling was charged with strangulation (a felony), battery, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The matter was continued with an offer to dismiss the felony count in exchange for a plea of guilty to misdemeanors. Bowling later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in exchange for dismissal of all other charges. Before the plea, while the charges were pending, Bowling attempted to purchase a firearm from a federally licensed dealer and completed ATF Form 4473, answering “no” to: “Are you under indictment or information in any court for a felony, or for any other crime, for which the judge could imprison you for more than one year?” For “Current Residence Address,” Bowling provided a former address, two blocks from his current home; it was listed on his driver’s license and he maintains an office there. The government charged Bowling with making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6). The jury heard allegations that Bowling strangled a minor and induced the minor to consume alcoholic beverages in his home, but never heard about the plea offer. The judge instructed that: “A false street address is material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm.” Bowling was convicted. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial; the court violated Bowling’s due process right to present a mistake-of-fact defense. View "United States v. Bowling" on Justia Law

The Chabad branch of Hasidic Judaism emphasizes mysticism over legalism. There are Chabad emissaries on many college campuses where they manage Chabad houses. Tannenbaum Chabad House, near Northwestern University’s Evanston campus, has been run by Rabbi Klein since 1985. Northwestern paid Sodexo to provide food for its students and Sodexo paid Klein for rabbinic supervision of its provision of kosher food. Northwestern reimbursed Sodexo . In 2001 the university learned that underage students had vomited after excessive consumption of alcohol at Tannenbaum; one was hospitalized. In 2005, at a university dining hall, alcohol was served to underage students, although Klein had assured officials that no alcohol would be served. Although the chaplain warned Klein, hard liquor continued to be served to students on Jewish holidays and Friday evenings. Klein made no effort to limit consumption and drank with the students. After another rabbi complained, the university informed Klein that unless he was replaced, the university would terminate Chabad House's recognition. Klein remained and, in 2012, the university terminated recognition, access to various Northwestern facilities and services, and the Sodexo contract. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000d, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Lubavitch-Chabad of IL v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

Meade wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. Meade, an adjunct faculty member, alleged that poor treatment of adjuncts harmed students. She signed the letter as president of the adjunct faculty union. Two days later, Moraine Valley fired Meade, sending her written notice explicitly citing Meade’s letter. A few weeks later, the college warned Meade that it would regard her further presence on campus as criminal trespass. Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her due process rights, Meade sued the college under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Meade’s letter did not address matters of public interest and could not serve as the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meade may not pursue a due process claim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, but pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She also stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation.View "Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Welton buys, sells, and rents residential real estate and, from 1994-2001, maintained a collateralized line of credit with the NBI. In 2002, NBI declined to extend that line of credit and gave him 90 days to pay off the account. Initially, Welton was unable to make payments, but by 2006 he reached an agreement with NBI. Under that agreement, Welton sent monthly checks to NBI. Those checks were never cashed. In 2007, realizing the checks remained uncashed, Welton sent a certified check in the amount of the uncashed checks. Keely, NBI’s Vice President, contacted Indianapolis Police Officer Anderson to initiate a criminal investigation. After meeting with Keely, Anderson submitted an affidavit in support of probable cause charging Welton with theft and fraud on a financial institution. Welton was arrested, processed, and released. After a trial in 2011, Welton was found not guilty. In 2013, Welton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that several of Anderson’s statements were knowingly false and that Keely provided many of the statements, resulting in a malicious prosecution and denial of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Welton’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent; that there is no constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause and that bare allegations of “fundamental unfairness” were insufficient to implicate the Due Process Clause.View "Welton v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Rollins had driven into a store parking lot and gotten out of his car when a police officer emerged from a police car that had pulled up behind him and ordered him to get back into his car and show his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. He refused to cooperate, was arrested, and two months later pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended or revoked license. He then brought suit, charging that the police had no basis for ordering him back into his car, and that their doing so constituted an unreasonable seizure of him. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a section 1983 suit can’t be brought if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his conviction in a prior proceeding had been invalid. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that because Rollins pleaded guilty, a finding that the defendant was illegally seized would therefore have no relevance to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction. The judge also ignored the fact that there was no evidence that the police seized Rollins lawfully by ordering him back into his car—the action that precipitated his arrest.View "Rollins v. Willett" on Justia Law