Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Champaign County Detectives executed a search warrant at the Olson home, looking for stolen items. They found nothing. Although they had no reason to believe that the Vinsons were involved in the purported theft and possessed no warrant for the Vinson property, they met a Vermillion County Deputy to search the Vinsons’ Vermillion County home. Vinson is the Olsons’s daughter. The plainclothes officers arrived in unmarked cars as the Vinsons’ 14-year-old daughter, C., was checking the mailbox. C., home with her nine-year-old brother, was alarmed. She went inside, locked the door, and called her mother, who was in a high-risk pregnancy, stating that a man was peering through a window. The man then told C. that he was a police officer and “had to conduct a search.” C. went upstairs with her brother, and, through a window, watched the offices search the attached garage and curtilage. The officers found nothing and left. The Vinsons sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for common law trespass, naming the Counties as responsible for payment under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An average citizen might call the police based on the behavior described. That there was no forced entry and nothing was seized is irrelevant a Fourth Amendment claim. View "Vinson v. Vermilion Cnty, Ill." on Justia Law

Bruce’s high-school boyfriend told a school official that Bruce had attempted to kill herself. The official contacted police. Officer Harris went to the home where Bruce was staying and detained her until a sheriff’s deputy, Guernsey, arrived and took Bruce, against her will, to a hospital where she was subjected to a mental health examination. Guernsey said that he had a copy of a physician’s medical examination, but no doctor had examined Bruce, and wrote that Bruce told him that she was thinking of suicide, but Bruce denies making that statement. Harris and Guernsey took no account of her father’s statements contradicting the report and her calm demeanor. Bruce filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that probable cause for the seizure was apparent on the face of Bruce’s complaint and that Guernsey had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of Harris, but reversed and remanded as to Guernsey, who overstepped the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in taking Bruce to the hospital and making false statements that resulted in a more prolonged seizure. View "Bruce v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

Inmates Sorrentino and Neal purchased several items from Stateville’s commissary, but the prison later forbade inmates to possess those items (fans and a typewriter) in their cells. Their property was removed. They filed a proposed class action, alleging that the confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the plaintiffs filed their takings claim in federal court before seeking compensation in an Illinois tribunal. View "Sorrentino v. Godinez" on Justia Law

Sergeant Schwomeyer received a tip that Taylor possessed cocaine and firearms, checked Taylor’s criminal history, and learned that he had been convicted for possessing cocaine. A confidential informant reported that Taylor was trafficking kilogram quantities of cocaine, and another officer told Schwomeyer that Taylor associated with cocaine traffickers. Taylor’s phone records reflected that his most frequent contact had been convicted of dealing cocaine. A judge granted a petition and a GPS unit was attached to Taylor’s car, which revealed that Taylor had traveled to a storage facility. A drug-detection dog alerted to Taylor’s locker. Schwomeyer obtained a warrant. In his affidavit, Schwomeyer did not mention that surveillance of Taylor involved GPS tracking. The locker contained 752.61 grams of cocaine, four firearms, and digital scales. Taylor moved to suppress, arguing that GPS tracking of his car violated the Fourth Amendment and that the warrant was invalid for failure to refer to GPS tracking. The court denied Taylor’s motion, finding that officers reasonably relied on judicial authorization when using the GPS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the events occurred before the Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS to a car to gather information was a search under the Fourth Amendment (Jones, 2012); the officers used the GPS in objectively reasonable reliance on appellate precedent then in effect. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 1995, Beaman was convicted of the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Lockmiller. The Illinois Supreme Court overturned his conviction 13 years later, finding that the state violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, by failure to disclose material information about a viable alternative suspect. After release from prison, Beaman filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against the police officers and prosecutors involved in the investigation and prosecution, claiming that the defendants deliberately conspired to suppress materially exculpatory evidence during the pendency of his criminal case. Several defendants were dismissed. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, three former police officers and the town of Normal, Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beaman did not present enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer the existence of a conspiracy to conceal the Brady material. One piece of evidence, the report on alternative suspect Gates’s polygraph test, was not Brady material and its non-disclosure could not form the basis of a complaint. As to the other Brady material (the report on alternative suspect Murray’s polygraph test) which the defendants did not turn over, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Beaman v. Warner" on Justia Law

Gilbert was convicted of sexual assault in 1992 and sentenced to prison. In 2006, the state sought Gilbert’s commitment under Wisconsin Stat. 980.02 as a “sexually violent person.” The court found probable cause. Gilbert completed his sentence and was transferred, on parole, to a DHS facility because of the pending commitment proceeding. Gilbert violated parole and was returned to a Corrections facility. Gilbert was again paroled and transferred to the DHS Center. Gilbert violated his second parole and was reincarcerated. A jury found him a “sexually violent person.” the court entered a commitment order. Gilbert was not transferred to a DHS facility until months later because he was serving his sentence for his second parole violation. Gilbert filed a post-conviction motion asserting that his parole revocation meant that the commitment petition must be dismissed. State courts rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his federal habeas petition, rejecting Gilbert’s claim that there was not a “current” determination that he was a sexually violent person when he entered DHS care. The delay between the commitment verdict and Gilbert’s entry into DHS care was caused by Gilbert’s actions and he has continued to be evaluated without any indication that his condition has improved. View "Gilbert v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Sultan claims that medical providers and prison staff forced him to live in unsanitary conditions and denied him medical care. He moved to proceed in forma pauperis and attached a certified statement from his prison trust account, which was $300 overdrawn. The court assessed an initial partial filing fee of $2.02. He earns $10 per month from a prison job. The prison did not remit payment. Responding to an order to show cause, Sultan stated that the administrator was at fault, and that his daughter had tried to wire the money. Sultan tendered a grievance he submitted complaining that staff had not complied with the court’s order to send the fee and a Western Union receipt. The judge gave Sultan another 30 days. Sultan sought 30 more days to pay. The judge dismissed Sultan’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Prison trust “accounts” are not like bank accounts in which the depositor has creditor status, nor does any rule require state administrators to pay a federal court before they satisfy an inmate’s debt to the prison. There is a conflict in asking the prison to process a payment to permit a lawsuit against it. Section 1915(b)(4) provides that no prisoner shall be prohibited from bringing a civil action for lacking means to pay the fee. View "Sultan v. Fenoglio" on Justia Law

Borostowski pled guilty to receiving child pornography, five counts of distributing child pornography, and three counts of possessing child pornography, reserving his right to appeal denial of motions to suppress. The district court sentenced him to 293 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Borostowski challenged findings that he was not in custody when officers questioned him on the day a search warrant was executed at his home, and that a hard drive seized from his mother’s car was within the scope of the warrant. The Seventh Circuit remanded the issues of whether Borostowski was in custody during his interrogation and when he invoked his right to counsel. A reasonable person in Borostowski’s circumstances might not have felt free to end the interview and leave, given the strong police presence, the use of handcuffs and a de facto two-man guard as restraints, the extended length of interrogation, and confinement to a small crowded room, despite being told that he was not under arrest or in custody and that the tone never became hostile or combative. The court affirmed with respect to the contents of the hard drive retrieved from the car and found no plain error in the procedure used in sentencing. View "United States v. Borostowski" on Justia Law

Clark entered a credit union wearing a two‐tone baseball hat and sunglasses, walked out, and got into his blue Ford Crown Victoria. Days later, a man fitting Clark’s description robbed a bank wearing a two‐tone baseball hat and sunglasses and left in a blue Ford Crown Victoria. Authorities arrested Clark. A magistrate judge found that Clark waived his right to counsel for proceedings before that court. The district court reconsidered on the government’s motion and questioned Clark about proceeding pro se. Clark decided against self‐representation, was convicted, and argued that the district court infringed on his Sixth Amendment rights by improperly reconsidering an issue already decided by the magistrate. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claim, noting that the magistrate’s ruling was limited to Clark’s initial appearance and that the addition of DNA evidence gave the court reason to question whether Clark understood the risks of going pro se. The credit union evidence was properly admitted for a non‐propensity purpose, to establish Clark’s identity. Expressing discomfort with the introduction of a video and witness testimony to characterize Clark’s actions as “casing” the credit union, the court characterized any errors in introducing more than a photo and failing to weigh the probative and prejudicial values of the evidence on the record as harmless. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Rockford Narcotics Unit Detective Jimenez obtained a warrant to search the upper apartment at 1522 Clifton for cocaine and narcotics paraphernalia. The affidavit stated that a “concerned citizen” called in that “1522 Clifton … is dealing drugs.” Weeks later, police received a complaint from Ibarra, who stated that Ibarra’s granddaughter had knocked on the rear door of that building, looking for her mother (Love). Kelly answered, holding a gun and with Love behind him, warned, “call the police, I’ll shoot them too.” Officer Kennedy visited the residence. Love came to the rear door and denied that she was there against her will. Kennedy saw Love descend interior stairs. Days later, Jimenez used a confidential informant to make a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Kelly. Executing the warrant, officers forcibly entered through the rear door, climbed to the upper door, announced their presence, and forced entry. Jimenez then realized that Kelly lived in a rear two‐story unit . Officers continued the search. Noticing that a vent cover had been removed, officers went to the basement, walked through an unlocked door to the front, heard items drop, disassembled ductwork and recovered a handgun and crack cocaine. Officers discovered marijuana, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia upstairs. Kelly was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress; probable cause supported the warrant and the search did not exceed its scope. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law