Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rhodes was charged with two counts of kidnapping. He retained Kovac. A jury acquitted him on one count; a different jury convicted him on the other. Rhodes appealed, claiming that Kovac had rendered ineffective assistance. The case was remanded, based on a problem with the jury. The court appointed a public defender, Kaiser. About two months before the trial was to begin, Kaiser moved to end his appointment. Rhodes wanted to represent himself. The court held a hearing and warned Rhodes, at length, about the dangers of self-representation. Kovac , who was present, said that he believed Rhodes was not engaging in gamesmanship or building a record for appeal, but that Rhodes had not retained him. After receiving a waiver, the judge granted Rhodes’s request. During the weeks that followed, there were several requests for additional time. It was not clear whether Kovac was representing Rhodes. The judge eventually told Rhodes he could not “have it both ways,” refused to grant an adjournment, and denied motions for standby counsel. The jury convicted Rhodes of kidnapping and aggravated battery. Wisconsin courts rejected his appeal. The federal district court granted habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Neither of the state courts’ reasons for rejecting Rhodes’s last-minute request for counsel was unreasonable. View "Rhodes v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Makiel was convicted of the 1988 murder of Hoch and the armed robbery of a gas station where she worked. After exhaustion of state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois courts did not apply federal law unreasonably in concluding that Makiel’s counsel was not ineffective in selecting the issues to pursue on appeal: One issue she raised drew a remand, and, although the other two issues did not prevail, each drew a dissenting opinion. An evidentiary ruling preventing impeachment of a prosecution witness with a pending forgery charge was not clearly a stronger issue than those she raised, nor was the exclusion of testimony about the reputations of prosecution witnesses. The state court did not act unreasonably in finding no violation of Makiel’s constitutional right to compulsory process by exclusion of the testimony of an 11-year-old, who would have blamed another young boy for the murder. The proffered testimony was uncorroborated at the time. Its exclusion was an error and was the basis for the state court’s remand. By the time the state courts decided the constitutional issue, however, he had disavowed his proffered testimony, and there was no reason to think it would have been probative or reliable. View "Makiel v. Butler" on Justia Law

King filed a civil rights lawsuit, claiming that he was forced to wear a see-through jumpsuit that exposed his genitals and buttocks while he was transported from county jail to state prison and that this amounted to an unjustified and humiliating strip-search in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court reviewed King’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915 and determined that King had not stated a viable claim of cruel and unusual punishment, but allowed him to proceed on his theory of unreasonable search. The court later granted summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, finding that King failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that he exhaust the jail’s administrative remedies before suing, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed. King’s transfer to the state prison made it impossible for him to comply with the jail’s grievance procedures, so there were no available remedies to exhaust. King alleged a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the use of the unusual jumpsuit had no legitimate correctional purpose but was used to humiliate and inflict psychological pain, but as a convicted prisoner, King is not entitled to argue that requiring him to wear the jumpsuit subjected him to an unreasonable search. View "King v. McCarty" on Justia Law

While White was on parole from an Illinois state prison sentence, police suspected that he was involved in a shooting and had a warrant to arrest him. Before the police found White, they located his gym bag that he had left in his cousin’s at. Without a search warrant, but relying on a condition of his parole that required White to agree to searches of his property, the police opened the bag and found a gun. White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the court denied his motion to suppress evidence of the gun on the ground that neither he nor his cousin had consented to the search of the bag. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search of the property of a suspected parole violator who had agreed in writing to consent to property searches and whom the police could not locate was reasonable. View "UNited States v. White" on Justia Law

In 1999, Nelson, riding his bike away from a liquor store, received a fatal blow to the head. Eyewitnesses, Johnnie and Evans, identified Owens from a photo array and from a lineup. Owens was the only person in the line-up who also was in the array. At trial, though Owens was in the courtroom, Evans twice pointed to someone else in the photo array as being Owens. Evans testified that there had been two assailants, Johnnie that there had been one. Evans, but not Johnnie, testified that Nelson had spoken with the assailants. Nelson had crack cocaine on his person that appeared to be packaged for individual sale. No evidence was presented that Owens knew Nelson, used or sold illegal drugs, or had any gang affiliation. There was no physical evidence linking Owens to the murder, which occurred almost two hours after sunset. After closing arguments the judge made statements about Owens knowing that Nelson was a drug dealer and found Owens guilty. The appellate court found the error harmless because Johnnie’s eyewitness identification of Owens was sufficient to establish guilt. The federal district court denied Owens habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed: a judge may not convict on the basis of a belief that has no evidentiary basis. View "Owens v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested by Indiana police in December 2011, for domestic battery and intimidation with a deadly weapon. A same-day search of his home revealed guns, a violation of state and federal law because he had been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. Days later, the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause and a detainer. A complaint that charges a felony can establish a basis for an arrest warrant and initiate or expand an investigation, but unlike an indictment or information, cannot initiate felony prosecution. A detainer merely informs the jail that a person being held is wanted on other charges, so that the jail should notify the issuing agency of the prisoner’s imminent release. The federal court issued a warrant for Richardson’s arrest, which was not executed while he remained in jail. In March 2013, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served. The next day the federal warrant was executed, and he was jailed. The following month he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, citing his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district judge denied the motion. Richardson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held that the clock does not begin to tick until a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Campbell was convicted in Illinois state court of first-degree murder for participating in a mob-style beating. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the crime. The state’s case hinged on the testimony of three eyewitnesses; two had been charged with the murder but were granted immunity in exchange for testifying against Campbell. Both had serious criminal histories, and both denied any involvement in the crime when they testified at Campbell’s trial. The third witness testified that Campbell started the fight with the victim, but she saw the fight from inside a van that was parked around the street corner and facing away from the brawl. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Campbell’s habeas corpus petition. The state courts unreasonably applied “Strickland” when they rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without addressing key factual questions: whether Campbell’s lawyer interviewed certain witnesses and whether they would have testified credibly and consistently with their affidavits and statements to the police. Affidavits from two of those witnesses say that Campbell’s lawyer never contacted them, but the affidavits have not been tested through the adversarial process. There is no affidavit from the third exculpatory witness or the lawyer himself, nor a record of live testimony. View "Campbell v. Reardon" on Justia Law

The owners of an adult entertainment establishment in the 500-resident Village of Dix that features nude dancing and permits customers to bring their own alcoholic beverages onto the premises, challenged the enactment of three ordinances that ban public nudity, open containers of alcohol in public, and the possession of liquor in public accommodations. Plaintiffs argued that the public nudity ban violates the free speech protections and that the Village lacks statutory authority to pass the challenged alcohol restrictions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the First Amendment challenge; at this early stage of the litigation, Dix has not established the necessary evidentiary basis for its assertion that nude dancing causes adverse secondary effects to the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. The court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenge to Dix’s alcohol regulations, the enactment of which fell within the parameters of Illinois law and was supported by a rational basis. View "Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World Inc.v. Village of Dix" on Justia Law

Facing financial problems and lawsuits from victims of sexual abuse, the Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2011. A Creditors’ Committee composed of abuse victims sought to void a one-time transfer of $55 million from the Archdiocese’s general accounts to a trust, created after the settlement with victims and earmarked for maintaining cemeteries in accordance with Canon Law, as fraudulent or preferential. The district court found that the application of the Bankruptcy Code to that transfer would violate the Archbishop’s free exercise rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. RFRA is not applicable. The government is not a party; the Committee does not act under “color of law” and is not the “government” for RFRA purposes. It is composed of non-governmental actors, owes a fiduciary duty to the creditors and no one else, and has other nongovernmental traits. Although the Free Exercise Clause is implicated, but does not bar application of the Code to the $55 million. The Code and its relevant provisions are generally and neutrally applicable and represent a compelling governmental interest in protecting creditors that is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. View "Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Listecki" on Justia Law