Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Armstrong was imprisoned for 29 years for a rape and murder. He maintains his innocence. His conviction was set aside in 2005. In 2009 a Wisconsin state judge dismissed the charges because the prosecution had destroyed key exculpatory evidence. Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging shocking prosecutorial misconduct, including: destroying potentially exculpatory evidence from the crime scene; arranging for highly suggestive hypnosis of an eyewitness; contriving suggestive identification show-ups; concealing a later confession from a third party that was relayed by a person with no apparent motive to fabricate the report; and enlisting lab technicians to perform an inconclusive DNA test that consumed the last of a sample that could have proven Armstrong’s innocence and identified the true killer. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; federal due process claims based on destruction of exculpatory evidence are not barred by the availability of state tort remedies for the same wrongs. At the time of the original investigation, it was clearly established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate a suspect’s due process rights. A reasonable police officer or prosecutor would not have concluded that he could destroy evidence to avoid disclosing it. If Armstrong can show that unconstitutional destruction of exculpatory evidence caused him to a deprivation of liberty, he can sue for that injury without a second trial. View "Armstrong v. Norsetter" on Justia Law

Officers approached Ruiz’s car after they witnessed Ruiz engage in what they deemed to be suspicious behavior, including actions consistent with operating a “trap”—a concealed, non-factory compartment in a vehicle often used to hide drugs. Ruiz consented to the search of his car and then followed the officers to a nearby police station where he showed the officers two traps in his car loaded with heroin. Ruiz pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; the stop exceeded its lawful purpose and ripened into a de facto arrest; the encounter with the officers was custodial, requiring the suppression of all statements he made prior to receiving Miranda warnings; and he did not consent voluntarily to go to the police station and open the traps. View "United States v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Hill pleaded guilty to attempted extortion and to making a false statement to federal investigators concerning his extortion of bribes from liquor licensees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence in 2011. Hill filed a civil suit, claiming that FBI and IRS agents forced their way into his house with drawn weapons, searched the house, seized and kept his lawfully owned handgun, and twirled a loaded gun making Hill “so scared” that he was “in tears.” While being questioned he felt disoriented, was crying from pain in his head, and blacked out, but the agents did not call for medical assistance. He later learned that he had suffered a stroke. The district court dismissed, citing a Supreme Court holding that a person who has been convicted of a crime cannot seek damages or other relief under federal law (a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or “Bivens”) for violation of his rights by officers who participated in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff [in the civil suit] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that only his claim that his false statement to the officers was coerced is barred. View "Hill v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, citing the Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die. If the district court concludes that Webster meets the requirements of Atkins, it should issue the writ stating that Webster is entitled to relief from the death penalty. View "Webster v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law

There was a burglary of the Buhr property. Olson’s neighbor had placed a deteriorated, unlicensed trailer on the Olsons’ property. Believing that it was abandoned, Olson fixed and painted the trailer, leaving it near the road. The trailer disappeared. Olson did not file a police report. Detective Sherrick discovered the trailer in a ditch and suspected that Olson had stolen the trailer and used it to transport lawn mowers stolen from Buhr. He obtained warrants that authorized the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints and a search of the Olsons’ property. Despite obtaining no evidence implicating Olson, Detectives Sherrick and Shaw allegedly told assistant state’s attorney Ziegler that Olson should be charged. Ziegler had no personal knowledge. He swore that the facts set forth in the information were true, relying on the detectives’ statements. Olson was arrested. Charges were later dismissed. The district court dismissed Olson’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The prosecutor allegedly swore to the truth of facts to obtain the warrant. Acting as a witness, not as a state advocate, he is not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Neither the detectives nor the prosecutor are entitled to qualified immunity. The complaint permits a reasonable inference that the detectives, the prosecutor, or all three gave false information to the judge who issued the warrant. View "Olson v. Champaign County" on Justia Law

Eagan, Minnesota, assisted in apprehending Procknow, who had absconded while serving supervised release imposed by a Wisconsin state court for forgery. Authorities had received information that Procknow and his girlfriend were staying at an Eagan hotel. The girlfriend was registered at the hotel. Officers spotted Procknow’s car, chased Procknow through the lobby, and arrested him. Through the windows of Procknow’s car, they saw a scanner or copier. Learning of the arrests, the hotel manager stated that the their stay was being terminated and asked the officers to collect a dog, believed to be in their room and ensure that there were no other occupants. Officers knocked, and announced. No one answered, so they used a hotel key and found a dog. Entering to ensure that there were no other occupants, officers saw, in plain view, an electric typewriter, a credit card issued in the name of “Smith,” and financial forms bearing various names and social security numbers. Officer photographed the room, sealed it, and obtained search warrants for the room and car. They seized blank W‐2 forms, partially completed tax forms, lists of business employer identification numbers, and prepaid debit cards (tax refunds) in the names of different people. Further investigation revealed that Procknow had obtained the personal identifying information of at least 40 individuals, which he used to file fraudulent tax returns and claim refunds. Procknow pleaded guilty to theft of government money and aggravated identify theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the warrantless entry into the hotel room and evidence obtained by grand jury subpoena following the withdrawal of IRS administrative summonses requesting the same information. View "United States v. Procknow" on Justia Law

Highland Park, Illinois prohibits possession of assault weapons or large‐capacity magazines (those that can accept more than 10 rounds). The ordinance defines an assault weapon as any semi‐automatic gun that can accept a large‐capacity magazine and has: a pistol grip without a stock (for semi‐ automatic pistols, the capacity to accept a magazine outside the pistol grip); a folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; a grip for the non‐trigger hand; a barrel shroud; or a muzzle brake or compensator. Some weapons, such as AR‐15s and AK‐47s, are prohibited by name. Opponents sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, arguing that it violated the Second Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, stating that the Second Amendment “does not imperil every law regulating firearms.” Supreme Court precedent allows at least some categorical limits on the kinds of weapons that can be possessed. Instead of trying to decide what “level” of scrutiny applies, the court considered whether the law banned weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,” and whether law‐abiding citizens retain adequate means of self‐defense. Whether the limits expressed in Supreme Court precedent should be extended is a question for the Justices. View "Friedman v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

Schlemm, a member of the Navajo Tribe, and a prisoner, sought an order requiring the prison to accommodate his religious practices under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. Members of the Tribe honor the dead through dancing, praying, and eating traditional foods. Wisconsin concedes that this celebration is religious and that Schlemm sincerely believes that “traditional foods” should include game meat. The prison rejected his request for game meat or ground beef and his offer to secure a sealed platter from an outside vendor. The prison permits Jewish inmates to have outside vendors supply sealed Seder platters. Defendants maintain that serving venison would be too expensive, would exceed the capacity of institutional kitchens, and would violate a rule limiting prison foods to those certified by the USDA. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the denial does not impose a “substantial burden” on Schlemm’s religious exercise; the state has a “compelling governmental interest” in costs and using USDA-inspected meats; and that the denial is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the state was not entitled to summary judgment and ordering a preliminary injunction allowing Schlemm to order venison and to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group ceremonies. View "Schlemm v. Frank" on Justia Law

In 2004, Thurman, a drug dealer, attempted to bribe four Maywood police officers. They reported the attempt to the State’s Attorney. That Office also learned that an individual arrested by Maywood police had stated that Thurman had officers on his payroll. An undercover sting, “Operation Pocket Change,” began with the officers pretending to be dirty cops and accepting from Thurman weekly payments of $1,200. Monitoring Thurman’s cell phone (with a warrant), revealed numerous contacts between Thurman and Officer Wade, resulting in a wiretap. The team agreed to announce, at a roll call at which Wade was present, that officers should stay clear of an area in which Thurman’s dealers were known to sell. In intercepted telephone calls, Wade warned Thurman that “Granny’s house was hot.” Wade claims that he did not hear the announcement, but made up the tip in an attempt to turn Thurman into a confidential informant. A search of Wade’s home computer uncovered a fraudulent arrest warrant for Thurman. Thurman later stated that Wade helped him rob a supplier by pretending to arrest him and seizing the drugs, using the fake warrant. A jury acquitted Wade, who sued the village and the officers for equal protection violations and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Probable cause supported his prosecution. Wade cannot succeed by reframing the claim as a class-of-one equal protection claim. The court noted Wade’s failure to identify a similarly-situated individual who was treated more favorably. View "Wade v. Collier" on Justia Law