Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wheaton College, a nondenominational Illinois college, hires from a various Christian traditions and admits students of varied faiths, but requires all to sign a “Covenant” that requires them to “uphold the God-given worth of human beings, from conception to death.” The Covenant does not mention contraception, but Wheaton believes that “emergency contraception” is forbidden on religious grounds if it can destroy a fertilized ovum. Wheaton also opposes intrauterine devices (IUDs) that prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum. Wheaton excludes coverage of emergency contraception and IUDs from its health plans, but covers “traditional contraception.” Of the 20 types of FDA-approved female contraceptives, Wheaton disapproves only emergency contraceptives and certain IUDs. Wheaton challenged the Affordable Care Act as violating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, and the First Amendment, by making it complicit in the provision of emergency-contraception. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: What had been Wheaton’s plan, concerning emergency contraception, the Affordable Care Act made the government’s plan when Wheaton refused to comply with the Act’s provision on contraception coverage. When notified that a health insurance provider has religious objections to providing coverage for some government-approved medical procedure, the government directs the insurer to provide the coverage itself. View "Wheaton College v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of privately-owned Chicago building, received housing vouchers from the Chicago Housing Authority to enable them to rent apartments. They claimed that the Authority is complicit in and responsible for a deprivation of their constitutionally protected privacy by the building owners. The owners require their tenants to be tested annually for illegal drugs; passing the test is a condition of a tenant’s being allowed to renew his or her lease for another year. The requirement applies to all tenants, not just those who might be suspected of using illegal drugs. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on the ground that the drug-testing policy was private rather than state action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the plaintiffs had requested transfer from the drug-testing building in which he or she currently resides to a building that does not require drug testing. A CHA representative testified that his agency would have approved such a request. That the CHA may encourage or even request testing does not constitute state action. View "Stubenfield v. Chicago Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Stanbridge is confined in a secured facility under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1, which allows for civil commitment of individuals who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffer from a mental disorder that predisposes them to future acts of sexual violence. Stanbridge sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 2005 criminal conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Stanbridge had already served his full sentence for his 2005 conviction. The district court, therefore, dismissed Stanbridge’s petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider claims related to Stanbridge’s criminal conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Stanbridge’s argument that he remains “in custody” pursuant to his sexual abuse conviction because that conviction serves as a necessary, though not sufficient, predicate for his current confinement. Stanbridge’s civil commitment is merely a collateral consequence of his criminal conviction, insufficient to render Stanbridge in custody pursuant to that conviction. View "Stanbridge v. Scott" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a Milwaukee police officer from 1995 until 2011, was discharged from his employment after, in January 2011, he failed to report for work. Gonzalez is Caucasian and worked in District 4, a predominately African-American police district. He had seven earlier disciplinary actions within two years and his request for leave during the time in question had been denied. Gonzalez alleges that he was discharged because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city after denying Gonzalez’s motion to compel discovery, in which he specifically requested that the city turn over a District 4 “climate survey.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting he lateness of Gonzalez’s request, his lack of diligence in obtaining information about the climate survey, and his inability to show how he was prejudiced by the district court’s ruling,. View "Gonzalez v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

In December 2010, DNA testing linked Sylla to an attempted bank robbery that occurred in August, 2003. The perpetrator had bled during an exchange of gunfire. Sylla’s DNA had been entered into CODIS by the Bureau of Prisons after he pleaded guilty to a federal bank robbery charge in 2006. Sylla was indicted on July 16, 2013 after the Indiana state lab confirmed the match. He moved to dismiss, claiming that the applicable five-year statute of limitations had run, 18 U.S.C. 3282(a). The district court denied his motion and the jury found him guilty. The Seventh circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the federal DNA tolling statute, 18 U.S.C. 3297, was unconstitutional as applied to his case. That statute provides: In a case in which DNA testing implicates an identified person in the commission of a felony, no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of the offense shall preclude such prosecution until a period of time following the implication of the person by DNA testing has elapsed that is equal to the otherwise applicable limitation period. View "United States v. Sylla" on Justia Law

Former employees of an Indiana city sued the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the mayor had fired them because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The mayor responded that political affiliation was a permissible qualification for their jobs. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the mayor with respect to nine of the 11 plaintiffs, finding his argument concerning political qualification for the jobs was sufficiently arguable to entitle him to qualified immunity, but declined to certify interlocutory appeal with respect to the other two plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings pending interlocutory appeal, reasoning that whether a job is one for which political affiliation is a permissible criterion presents a question of law. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. The court later dismissed in part, reasoning that a trial might show that one plaintiff has more discretion than her job description indicates. View "Allman v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perotti , convicted as a felon possessing ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 210 months. Perotti was housed at the Terre Haute penitentiary, where he found employment as an orderly in the prison’s education department, which provides classroom instruction to inmates and oversees the prison’s leisure and law libraries. Perotti was responsible for janitorial tasks, supervised by instructors. An instructor offered him a promotion to the position of law clerk, assisting other prisoners with legal research. He accepted, but was later told that the department administrator had disapproved the promotion because Perotti had filed too many grievances. After an associate warden intervened he was given the position, about a month later. He was removed from that position weeks later, after another instructor filed a misconduct report that Perotti possessed another inmate’s legal materials outside of the library, in violation of prison rules. He was vindicated and awarded back pay, but he was not reinstated nor given another job before he was transferred to another facility. A jury rejected his claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and arranging for Perotti to participate in the trial by video conferencing. View "Perotti v. Diane Quinones" on Justia Law

Rossi was assaulted by several persons, one of whom was an off-duty Chicago police officer. Glenn Mathews, a detective with the Chicago Police Department, was assigned to investigate. For six weeks, Mathews did practically no work on the case; he followed zero leads, did not inspect the crime scene, and questioned no witnesses other than Rossi. Aside from taking some messages and filing perfunctory reports, he exerted no discernible effort. He then closed his investigation. Rossi sued Mathews under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that he violated his constitutional right to judicial access because his failure to investigate led to the spoilage of evidence in his civil suit against the assailants. He also brought a Monell suit against the city for perpetuating a “code of silence” that shields police officers from investigation and promotes misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that Rossi was not denied judicial access because the police did not conceal from him any facts which prevented him from obtaining legal redress from his assailants, and dismissal of Rossi’s Monell claims for lack of evidence of widespread practices on the part of the police department. View "Rossi v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

An undercover agent saw Gary talking on the phone in the passenger seat of a car when the agent bought heroin from the driver. The driver made no attempt to conceal the drug transaction from Gary. Gary was seized following a traffic stop. Officers stopped the car because a narcotics detective gave them the license plate number and told them to make a stop if they observed any violations. During the stop, officers discovered heroin on the driver during a frisk for weapons. Gary was also patted down. One of the officers spoke with Gary’s parole officer, who asked to see Gary. The officer then handcuffed Gary and searched him, finding two cell phones. Gary was transported to the police station. The arresting officer admitted that the sole reason he seized Gary was to bring him to speak with his parole officer at the police station. Gary was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his mere presence in the car with a driver who was observed selling drugs was not enough to find probable cause and that the search of his cell phone exceeded the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest. View "United States v. Gary" on Justia Law

After a sleepover at the Aleshire house, a nine-year-old girl reported to her mother having a “dream” that Aleshire had pulled down her pajama bottoms and photographed her “privates.” Her mother called the police. Aleshire admitted entering the room where the girls (including Aleshire’s daughter) were sleeping, but he denied moving any girl’s clothing. Aleshire stated he was searching for his daughter’s headphones. Executing a state court warrant, police found child pornography, which Aleshire had created. He conditionally pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 2251 and appealed denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that probable cause depends on facts rather than dreams. The judge had reasoned that the girl’s use of “dream” may have been a euphemism selected because she was uncomfortable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A warrant-authorized search must be sustained unless it is clear that the judge who issued the warrant exceeded constitutional bounds. It was permissible to understand the word “dream” as a euphemism. The affidavit relayed a statement by the girl’s mother that the girl had used the word “dream” to describe real events before; Aleshire’s admission that he had entered the girls’ sleeping area; and that he had been convicted of sex crimes. View "United States v. Aleshire" on Justia Law