Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, while Hinkle was finishing his elected term as Sheriff of Wayne County, his 14-year-old step-daughter accused him of sexually abusing her while helping her apply chigger medicine. A Charleston police officer interviewed the girl and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services notified state police. White, a state police investigator, interviewed the step-daughter and she repeated her claim. Her sister (another stepdaughter) said that Hinkle had also helped her apply chigger medication and that it was nonsexual. She said she thought her sister was lying because Hinkle and her mom were too strict. Hinkle denied the allegation. The step-daughter later recanted her claim of sexual abuse several times. A prosecutor declined to press charges, but the accusations became well-known in the community. White talked to a lot of people with whom he had no business sharing details of the investigation. The rumors grew to include a story that Hinkle was an arsonist. Hinkle filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against White and his supervisor, alleging denial of his right to liberty in the occupation of his choice without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Hinkle had not established a protected liberty interest. View "Hinkle v. White" on Justia Law

In 2011 Faulkner pleaded guilty to two counts of the use of a communication facility in facilitation of a drug-related felony; he was sentenced to a 91-month term of imprisonment. Two years later, he and other members of the Imperial Insane Vice Lords gang, were indicted on conspiracy, firearms, and drug charges. Faulkner moved to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that the judge enhanced his 2011 sentence based on the same conduct that the 2013 indictment covered and that the charges included in the 2011 indictment (which were dropped pursuant to a plea agreement) are the same as those in the later indictment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Faulkner’s multiple punishment claim is precluded by precedent. His effort to show that he is the victim of multiple prosecutions for the same offense failed because he did not establish that the offenses with which he was charged and to which he pleaded guilty in 2011 are identical to those alleged in his later indictment. View "United States v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

Quadri bought an apartment in Chicago at a foreclosure sale. Later, she learned that the police had investigated a disturbance there, and visited the apartment with her real estate agent and a locksmith. Quadri’s agent called 911 after they found Hurem in the unit. Hurem told police he had paid rent to Quadri’s husband, but he failed to obtain a receipt, lease, or any other paperwork. He apparently got keys from a former tenant. He refused to leave. Quadri’s husband denied taking rent from Hurem. Two days later, Quadri again found Hurem in the apartment; her agent again called 911. Hurem still could not produce anything proving he had a right to be there and again refused to leave. The officers arrested him, but he was not charged. Hurem sued the Quadris, the officers, and the city, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful eviction and civil rights violations. After the Quadris and the city were dismissed as defendants, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of all but one officer. Hurem dropped his case against the last one. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hurem did not show that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and waived any due process claim. View "Hurem v. Tavares" on Justia Law

Armed men were robbing Milwaukee businesses, wearing dark sweatshirts and ski masks. Officers saw three men approach a store in dark clothing, with hoods pulled over their faces. One attempted to enter, while the others stood watch. They found the doors locked and fled. As officers pursued them, two jumped into a running car driven by a fourth person. The third man fled on foot. The car, registered to Welch, led police on a high-speed chase before being stopped. Police discovered Welch hiding under a car near the store. In his first trial, Welch was convicted of four counts. In the nine-day second trial, he was found guilty of eight counts of armed robbery, conspiracy, fleeing an officer, and bail-jumping. The jury heard testimony from three accomplices, five others linking him to the robberies, two forensic experts, 12 police officers, and 20 victims. Two officers referred to other criminal charges against Welch. After exhausting his appeals, Welch sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting that admission of those statements violated his right to a fair trial and that his counsel was ineffective for not contesting them. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, finding reasonable the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that any error in admitting the statements was harmless, given the quantity and quality of evidence against Welch. View "Welch v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Fort Wayne officer Brown went to serve Mackin with a valid arrest warrant. After placing him in handcuffs, Ramon searched Mackin and recovered, from his pocket a loaded handgun. Brown recorded its serial number on an incident report and completed a “continuity slip” to track the gun’s movements in law enforcement’s custody. Brown placed the firearm and the continuity slip in an evidence locker. Later, an ATF Agent examined a firearm bearing the serial number listed on the incident report and determined that it was functional. Mackin was charged as felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought forfeiture of the firearm, identifying it by an incorrect serial number. Before trial, the government turned over discovery materials, including the continuity slip, which contained empty fields. It included Mackin’s name, the date, time, and address, and a description of the firearm. Remaining boxes are blank, and no signatures appear. The court allowed correction of a scrivener’s error concerning the serial number on the forfeiture allegation. The government did not correct or supplement the continuity slip. Mackin objected to the firearm’s admission. The government produced a new continuity slip, conceding that the form had additional information and had not previously been disclosed to Mackin. The court denied Mackin’s mistrial motion and allowed both continuity slips to be presented to the jury. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Mackin was prejudiced by denial of a mistrial. View "United States v. Mackin" on Justia Law

An informant bought cocaine from Davis and introduced him to an undercover agent, posing as a drug courier. The agent recruited Davis to rob a stash house, which he said contained 50 kilograms of cocaine. Davis recruited others. The crew (with semiautomatic firearms) met for a planning session, which was recorded. The seven were charged with conspiring and attempting to possess, with the intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; conspiring and attempting to affect interstate commerce by means of robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Because the prosecution was based on a government-initiated “sting,” the defendants, all African-American, sought discovery of information concerning possible racial profiling and selective prosecution. Announcing its intent not to comply, the government obtained dismissal without prejudice to facilitate immediate appeal. The Seventh Circuit concluded that because the dismissal was without prejudice, it was not a final order. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed the dismissal, holding that 18 U.S.C. 3731 authorizes appeal when a court dismisses an indictment, a count, or part of a count of an indictment, allowing the possibility of a successive indictment on the same charge. The court suggested that remand start with limited inquiries that can be conducted quickly, expanding the probe only if evidence justifies wider discovery; the judge should ensure that required disclosures make no more inroads on prosecutorial discretion than vital to protecting defendants’ constitutional right to be free of race discrimination. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2002, Ribota was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, after a search revealed 25 kilograms of cocaine and two loaded firearms. Once a $50,000 secured bond was posted, on January 7, 2003, he was released under an order requiring him to report to Pretrial Services and to confine his travel within Illinois. On January 30, 2003, a bench warrant issued after he failed to appear at Pretrial Services. Ribota eluded capture for more than nine years, until he was arrested in Denver, in 2012 and was arraigned on the 2003 indictment. He moved to suppress evidence. The prosecutor, not the one who had obtained the 2002 indictment, agreed that the evidence was inadmissible. The court granted the motion and granted the government’s oral motion to dismiss the indictment. The day after the motion to suppress was granted, the government charged Ribota with contempt of court, 18 U.S.C. 401(3), alleging that Ribota willfully violated the court order by failing to report to Pretrial Services and to restrict his travel. Ribota moved to dismiss that indictment as based solely on vindictiveness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. View "United States v. Ribota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civil detainee in Illinois, appealed an adverse jury verdict in his deliberate indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a facility physician. Plaintiff alleged that the district court should have declared a mistrial after the physician violated a pretrial ruling by the court by mentioning to the jury that plaintiff was incarcerated for 26 years. Plaintiff also challenged the strength of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not declaring a mistrial where the jury could already infer from plaintiff's testimony and the medical issues that plaintiff had dating back to 2002 that plaintiff had spent a long in prison. Because plaintiff did not preserve his second argument, the court cannot reach the issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Collins v. Lochard" on Justia Law

Inmate Perez was injured during a prison basketball game. A nurse wrapped his hand. She could not provide medicine or stitch his wound. The following day, Perez saw a physician who prescribed antibiotics, but did not stitch his wound, and, recognizing the injury's severity, recommended a specialist. Approval took days, while Perez had an open, bleeding wound. On May 20, Perez filed a grievance, claiming retribution for a prior grievance. Perez’s May 20th grievance was rejected. On May 21, Perez was taken to Carle Clinic and saw a physician’s assistant, who could not suture the wound because of its age. Prison officials did not follow care instructions, nor did they return Perez for follow-up. Perez filed another grievance on June 17 and unsuccessfully appealed denial of his earlier grievance. On December 6, Perez returned to the Clinic. On January 10, 2011, Perez filed another grievance, concerning the seven-month delay , continued pain, and indifference by prison medical staff. In March, Perez had surgery. Due to the 10-month delay, Perez claims to have irreparable damage. He unsuccessfully sought assistance with his grievance. Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court twice denied requests for counsel, screened his complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, liberally construed, Perez’s complaint stated valid Eighth Amendment and First Amendment retaliation claims. View "Perez v. Fenoglio" on Justia Law

Officer Ortiz saw men in black hoodies and recognized Aranda, who had prior convictions for drug possession and burglaries. Aranda and Leo approached a nearby duplex. Police dispatch announced that a 911 caller was reporting a possible burglary in progress at that duplex. The caller lived in the upper unit and described two Hispanic men wearing black hoodies; one had a gun. The two reappeared and walked toward a neighboring preschool. Leo was wearing a red jacket and had a backpack. Dispatch reported that the caller had given an update that one of the suspects had changed into a red jacket and that the gun was in a backpack. Ortiz announced himself, and ordered them to stop. They kept walking. Ortiz drew his gun and again yelled "stop." They complied. Ortiz handcuffed Aranda. Officer Seeger cuffed Leo. Ortiz frisked Aranda, finding nothing. Seeger patted down Leo and did not find a gun. He emptied Leo’s backpack, finding a black hoodie, a digital scale with marijuana residue, bullets, and a loaded revolver. The officers then learned that residents of the lower unit knew Leo and Aranda, and that the men had not tried to break in. Leo was on probation for attempted burglary and possession of marijuana. The district court rejected a motion to suppress. Leo conditionally pleaded guilty as a felon in possession. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding no probable cause or basis in Terry for the warrantless search. View "United States v. Leo" on Justia Law