Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While Lee was on supervised release, his probation officer learned that he had assaulted his girlfriend, Pulliam, with a small souvenir baseball bat. The court issued a warrant for Lee’s arrest and initiated proceedings to revoke his supervised release. Law enforcement and medical personnel who interviewed or treated Pulliam testified. Pulliam had told each that Lee was the perpetrator. Pulliam took the stand, recanted, and said that she had made up a story because she was mad at Lee. She explained that she fell down the stairs. The court concluded that Lee had committed assault with a deadly weapon, revoked supervised release, and imposed a four-year term of imprisonment. Although he did not raise the argument below, Lee argued on appeal that he was denied due process under both the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 because he did not receive adequate written notice of the precise crime that led to the revocation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to adopt a per se rule that only citation to a specific statute provides sufficient written notice of the alleged violation. Only the Ninth Circuit has adopted such a rule. Supervised release revocation hearings are not criminal prosecutions; the full panoply of rights does not extend to them. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

A police officer followed a vehicle after discovering that its owner’s driver’s license had expired 18 years earlier. He initiated a traffic stop after observing the vehicle cross into another lane on an Illinois highway without signaling. After the driver, Bentley, changed his story about why he was driving the vehicle, and officers observed that the spare tire was in the back seat, officers decided to call for a drug-detection dog, “Lex.” Lex alerted, and the officers found close to 15 kilograms of cocaine in the vehicle. Bentley gathered evidence suggesting “that Lex is lucky the Canine Training Institute doesn’t calculate class rank. If it did, Lex would have been at the bottom of his class.” Bentley argued that Lex might alert every time he is called out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Harris (2013), and upholding the finding that Lex’s alert, along with the other evidence relating to the stop, was sufficient to support probable cause. View "United States v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Miller sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), which can cause severe heartburn. When Miller arrived at the prison he was taking Zantac for his GERD, but his prescription expired. At his intake screening he stated that he suffers from GERD and that he took prescription medication for it. He later told the director of nursing that he wanted his prescription renewed. A month later he saw another nurse, who scheduled him to see a doctor the following day. The appointment was cancelled because the prison was on lockdown. A guard whom he told that he needed to see a doctor replied that he should file a grievance, which he did. Though he marked it “emergency,” the warden determined that it was not an emergency, which meant that Miller could not see a doctor until the lockdown ended. During the two months before he saw a doctor, he complained repeatedly to staff about his GERD, to no avail. Once, upon vomiting stomach acid, he pressed an emergency button. A guard stated “you are not bleeding, you are not dead… it can’t be an emergency.” Eventually, the doctor renewed his prescription. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the judge engaged in “medical speculation.” View "Miller v. Campanella" on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

Sergeant Laha stopped Ruiz after a license-plate check revealed that his driver’s license was suspended. The stop was captured by Laha’s dash-mounted video camera and lapel microphone. Laha explained the ticket and asked if Ruiz had any questions. Ruiz said, “no,” and Laha told him, “You’re free to go.” As they walked away, Laha called out, “You don’t have any weapons, drugs, anything like that?” Ruiz said no. Laha asked, “Mind if I search?” Ruiz responded, “You can,” closed his car door, walked behind his vehicle, and opened his jacket. Laha did a pat-down and continued: “Nothin’ in your car that you’re concerned about?” Ruiz did not respond. Ruiz took out his phone. As Ruiz talked to his wife, Laha walked beside the car and asked again if he could search. Ruiz responded, “I guess” and nodded. Laha asked, “So we’re good?” Ruiz did not respond, but did not object when Laha opened the door to search. Laha found handguns and ammunition under the driver’s seat. Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Ruiz entered a conditional plea. Ruiz had convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The court rejected the government’s argument that conspiracy to commit armed robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) “residual clause” and imposed a guidelines term of 37 months. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, the government’s ACCA cross-appeal was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress. From the perspective of a reasonable officer, Ruiz’s words and actions manifested consent to search. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Ruiz" on Justia Law

Carter lost his home in Crete, Illinois, after its mortgage foreclosed. He sued the financial institutions involved in making, servicing, or foreclosing his mortgage, alleging constitutional claims based on the fact that the “foreclosing entity” (not identified) did not hold the note or mortgage at the time of the foreclosure. The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the suit and a similar pending suit are “indeed frivolous” and affirmed dismissal. In neither case did the complaint allege anything that might support an inference that the defendants were state actors under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A claim must be dismissed “if it is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that a case doesn’t belong in federal court, the parties cannot by agreeing to litigate it there authorize the federal courts to decide it.” View "Carter v. Homeward Residential, Inc." on Justia Law

Based on 2004 Milwaukee muggings, McGhee was charged with armed robbery, theft of movable property from a person, and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. Public defender Thomey was appointed. On the first day of trial, Thomey notified the court that McGhee wished to raise an alibi defense and requested that he be allowed to call two unlisted witnesses. Counsel explained that McGhee had not mentioned it to him until two days earlier. Defense counsel also moved to withdraw because McGhee wished to discharge him andhe believed that McGhee’s alibi defense raised “certain ethical problems.” The court denied the motions. Following the court’s rulings, McGhee stated that “my attorney never asked me about no alibi. … I called his office …. He doesn’t return my phone calls to come see me. How can I tell him I have a alibi if I can’t get in touch with him? I’m in the prison…. and [for him to ]say something about my witnesses as far as perjury … that’s a bunch of BS.” Seeking federal habeas relief, McGhee argued that the state court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial; the state court reasonably determined that McGhee had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation. View "McGhee v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Officer Beasley was dispatched and spoke to Hack, who stated that he had been asleep when his neighbor, Howlett, grabbed and threatened him, and thrust a hand down the front of Hack’s pants. Hack guessed that Howlett had entered by prying open a bathroom window. Hack described Howlett as wearing a white t‐shirt. Beasley called Howlett. Beasley recalls that Howlett stated, without prompting, that he did not enter Hack’s bathroom or “g[e]t into his neighbor’s pants.” Howlett says that he never made these statements. When Howlett arrived, wearing a tan collared shirt, not a white t‐shirt, Hack identified Howlett as the person who had assaulted him. Beasley arrested Howlett. Howlett was charged with burglary, criminal confinement, residential entry, intimidation, and battery. He was acquitted. Howlett filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the false‐arrest allegations, finding them time-barred, and rejected a malicious prosecution claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beasley had probable cause to arrest Howlett. Beasley and the city are immune from Howlett’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim. Howlett’s malicious‐prosecution claim against Beasley and the city cannot survive summary judgment because Howlett did not allege a separate constitutional injury and did not submit evidence that Beasley acted out of malice or lacked probable cause. View "Howlett v. Hack" on Justia Law

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Two Milwaukee police officers on bicycle patrol were investigating gunshots around 16th and Center Street. They saw Smith crossing 16th Street as he prepared to enter an alley. The officers rode ahead of Smith into the alley and when they were five feet from Smith, they stopped and positioned their bicycles at a 45‐degree angle to him. One officer dismounted, approached Smith, and asked whether he had a gun or any other weapon in his possession. When Smith indicated that he had a gun, the officers confiscated it and arrested him. Smith was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that Smith’s encounter with the officers was consensual, and no seizure had occurred. Smith entered a conditional plea agreement and was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed,reasoning that Smith's encounter with the officers cannot be treated as consensual because a reasonable person in his situation would not have felt free to ignore the police and go about his business. Since he was seized without reasonable suspicion, Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law