Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sorensen's friend Berg told Sorensen to drive a Suburu and follow him. Sorensen drove the Subaru but got lost and slept in the Subaru, waking up the next day. Sorensen then picked up Charles and subsequently noticed a handgun in the driver-side door. He and Charles both had felony records. He drove to a Goodwill parking lot, thinking that there was a drop box for disposing of illegal items without police involvement. He exited the car with the gun. In the meantime, police had received a report that the Subaru was stolen, containing a loaded revolver and ammunition. Officers discovered the Subaru and arrested Charles. Sorensen heard Charles talking to the officers, panicked, and hid the gun on a shelf in the Goodwill store. A Goodwill employee notified officers that a man (Sorensen) had been hiding in a maintenance closet and ran out of the store upon being discovered. Officers arrested Sorensen with the Subaru keys on his person. Sorensen showed them the location of the gun. Officers found the loaded firearm; there were many people, including children, in the store.Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Sorenson sought to present an innocent possession defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, noting that circuit precedent does not recognize an innocent possession defense to section 922(g)(1) and that, even under a broad interpretation of that defense, Sorenson would not qualify. He did not take reasonable steps to turn over the firearm to law enforcement directly or through a third party. View "United States v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

Springfield Officer Weiss obtained a warrant to search Outland’s person and residence for heroin and drug paraphernalia. Another officer conducted a traffic stop and search, discovered drug paraphernalia, read Outland his Miranda rights, and began transporting him to a DEA facility. Outland collapsed; his face and coat were covered in a white substance (heroin). The officer drove Outland to the emergency room. He was unresponsive when triaged at 10:46 a.m. Hospital staff began administering medications. Around 11:30 a.m., Outland passed swallowing tests. Although he continued to appear drowsy and had apneic episodes, he was generally alert and oriented; his “mentation” was “improved significantly.” He was placed on a Narcan drip, awaiting an ICU bed. At regular intervals, staff described Outland as alert, awake, and oriented. Weiss arrived around 1:00 p.m. The officer assigned to Outland stated that Outland had asked to speak with Weiss. Outland stated his name and date of birth. Weiss read him his Miranda rights and confirmed that he understood his rights. Outland made several incriminating statements about trafficking in heroin.Outland was charged with distributing and conspiring to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)–(C), 846. On remand, the district court rejected his arguments that he was so intoxicated as to render his statement involuntary and was unable to voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights because of the medications. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. View "United States v. Outland" on Justia Law

In 2012, Horton was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm crimes. Horton had been convicted of four prior state drug felonies. The court imposed three concurrent life sentences. Horton’s direct appeal and collateral relief motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, failed. Under 2255(h) a successive motion is permitted only if it contains “newly discovered evidence” of innocence or is based on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” Horton filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing the “saving clause,” 28 U.S.C. 2255(e); a 2241 motion “shall not be entertained” unless the remedy by motion under 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”The Seventh Circuit previously held (Davenport) that 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective”— and 2241 is available—when the limits on successive 2255 motions bar relief and the prisoner’s claim is based on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that was previously foreclosed by circuit precedent. Horton's Davenport claim challenged his sentences based on the Supreme Court’s 2016 Mathis decision.In the interim, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Hendrix, (2022): The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy 2255’s conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all." The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, abrogating Davenport. View "Horton v. Lovett" on Justia Law

Sanders was convicted in 2006 of firearms offenses. The court imposed an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, based on three prior convictions, including one for Illinois residential burglary. His direct appeal and 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for collateral relief failed. Sanders has three times unsuccessfully sought permission to file a successive 2255 motion. A successive motion is permitted only if it contains “newly discovered evidence” of innocence or is based on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”Sanders filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, citing the “saving clause.” 28 U.S.C. 2255(e); A federal prisoner’s 2241 motion “shall not be entertained” unless the remedy by motion under 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Seventh Circuit precedent (Davenport) applied the saving-clause gateway to habeas claims premised on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that was previously foreclosed by circuit precedent. Sanders’s Davenport claim challenged his ACCA-enhanced sentence based on the Supreme Court’s 2016 Mathis decision.The district judge denied relief. The Supreme Court held, in Jones v. Hendrix, (2022): The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy the 2255 conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, abrogating Davenport. View "Sanders v. Joseph" on Justia Law

While serving a 55-year sentence for murder, Love assaulted a correctional officer, resulting in state convictions for felony battery. The Indiana Department of Correction also found Love guilty of violating prison rules and imposed sanctions including revocation of 5,700 days of his accrued good time credit, which extended Love’s release date by more than 15 years. Love unsuccessfully pursued prison appeals. The district court denied his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Love procedurally defaulted his constitutional claims and forfeited them by failing to present them in administrative proceedings or the district court.One argument concerned Executive Directive 17-09, under which the Department must revoke all accrued good time credit from inmates found guilty of qualifying offenses. There is no additional hearing; the inmate is not provided an opportunity to argue why revocation of less time is appropriate. Love argued that the Department cannot, consistent with due process, predetermine how it will use its discretionary power over sanctions without first considering arguments in mitigation. Love also argued that Directive 17-09 is facially arbitrary in tying punishment to the amount of good time credit an inmate has rather than the severity of his misconduct. Love offered two examples where other inmates presumably should have been punished in accordance with the Directive but were allegedly shown leniency instead. View "Love v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In 2007, Hogsett was convicted of crimes, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that Hogsett was an armed career criminal, with three prior convictions for violent felonies, and sentenced him to 295 months. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) interpreted “violent felony” in 924(e) to exclude crimes that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. Hogsett sought to challenge his sentence under Borden. To collaterally attack a conviction or sentence, a federal prisoner files a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, not a habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241. Hogsett had filed a 2255 motion in 2010. A prisoner can only file another 2255 motion in two circumstances: newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish innocence or a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Hogsett argued that he was eligible to file under 2255(e), the “saving clause,” which applies when “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of Hogsett’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court cited the Supreme Court’s intervening Jones holding: “The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy” 2255(h)’s requirements “does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause … he cannot bring it at all.” Borden is a statutory interpretation decision. View "Hogsett v. Lillard" on Justia Law

As a Chicago gang member, States participated in drug trafficking and kidnappings. Officers went to his apartment to arrest him. States fired five shots through the door and hit an officer in the finger. A jury convicted him on 12 counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison, plus 57 years in consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)—two for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and one for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. States subsequently moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the reimposition of his sentence.The Supreme Court subsequently held (Johnson) that the ACCA residual clause, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. Section 924(c) has an analogous residual clause (later struck down). States filed a successive 2255 motion to vacate his 924(c) convictions. His predicate crimes of violence were Hobbs Act extortion and attempted murder of a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 1113–1114. The court vacated the extortion-predicate conviction but denied the motion with respect to the conviction predicated on attempted murder; then-controlling circuit precedent established that an attempt to commit a crime of violence is a crime of violence under 924(c)'s elements clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence--concurrent 20-year terms plus two consecutive five-year sentences for the 924(c) convictions. The district court correctly held that attempted murder of a federal officer is a crime of violence and that drug trafficking and kidnapping offenses could not be grouped. View "United States v. States" on Justia Law

Hess, a 17-year-old student, was required to participate in a ride-along with Hammond Officer Garcia. Her complaint describes a day-long sequence of inappropriate comments and questions punctuated by unwelcome physical sexual contact. Garcia allegedly rubbed his arm against her breast, repeatedly placed his hand on Hess’s thigh, put his hand on her buttocks, stated that Hess wanted to become a prostitute, and, while in a secluded location, asked another officer if he wanted to have sex with Hess. After Hess’s ride along, another female classmate participated in the course-required ride with Garcia. When the classmate told Hess that Garcia had acted inappropriately, the girls reported their experiences.Hess sued Garcia and Chief Doughty in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Doughty for lack of allegations of the requisite level of involvement in the alleged violations. The court reversed the dismissal of the claim against Garcia. It is well established that sexual assault by a government official acting under the color of law can violate the Equal Protection Clause as sex discrimination, the Fourth Amendment right “of the people to be secure in their persons,” and the right to bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause. The court rejected arguments that the alleged conduct was simply “boorish” and not serious enough to implicate the Constitution. Sexual assault is an intentional act that never serves a legitimate governmental purpose. View "Hess v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians is a federally recognized tribe in northwestern Wisconsin. In 2013 the Tribe’s Community Health Center hired Mestek as the Director of Health Information. In 2017 the Health Center implemented a new electronic health records system. Mestek soon raised questions about how the new system operated, expressing concern to management that the Center was improperly billing Medicare and Medicaid. An eventual external audit of the Center’s billing practices uncovered several problems. After receiving the audit results in 2018, Bae, the head of the Health Center, called Mestek into her office to ask if she was “loyal.” Mestek answered yes, but persisted in her efforts to uncover billing irregularities. A month later, Mestek learned that she was being fired in a meeting with the Medical Director and the HR Director. Mestek sued the Health Center and six individuals (in both their personal and official capacities) under the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity precluded Mestek from proceeding; the Health Center is an arm of the Tribe. The individual employee defendants also properly invoked the Tribe’s immunity because Mestek sued them in their official capacities. View "Mestek v. Lac Courte Oreilles Community Health Center" on Justia Law

Snowden, staying at a hotel, received a call asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. When Snowden arrived, DEA Agent Henning pushed him into a door and onto the ground. Snowden did not resist. Henning punched him several times. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket.Snowden sued Henning, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The court construed the complaint to allege a “Bivens” claim (an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations), then dismissed that claim, noting factual distinctions between Snowden’s case and Bivens–the location of the arrest, the presence of a warrant, and the number of officers involved. Bivens involved allegations concerning the rights of privacy implicated in an unlawful warrantless home entry, arrest, and search, the court reasoned, while Snowden alleged excessive force incident to a lawful arrest, and special factors weighed against recognizing a new Bivens context, including the availability of an alternative remedy.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Bivens remedy beyond specific Fifth and Eighth Amendment contexts, Snowden’s claim does not present a new context. Agent Henning operated under the same legal mandate as the Bivens officers and is the same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer. Like Bivens, Snowden seeks damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The legal landscape of excessive-force claims is well-settled. Nor does allowing a Bivens claim here risk a “disruptive intrusion” into the “functioning of other branches.” View "Snowden v. Henning" on Justia Law