Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

Reaves was suspected of dealing heroin. From an informant, Peoria police learned that Reaves drove to Detroit in a white Chrysler Pacifica to get his heroin supply. Police confirmed that Reaves owned a white Chrysler Pacifica. The informant picked Reaves out of a line-up. Police set up four controlled buys between the informant and Reaves, then obtained a warrant to place a GPS tracker on Reaves’s Pacifica. While the Pacifica was returning from Detroit on I- 74, Officer Leach observed it illegally drift into a different lane without signaling and pulled the car over. Reaves’s girlfriend, Seekins, was driving. Reaves was a passenger. After asking Seekins whether she had been drinking, Leach asked if he could search the vehicle. Both Reaves and Seekins consented. Seekins, driving on a suspended driver’s license, was arrested. At no time did they withdraw consent or limit the search. The police informed Reaves that the vehicle would be towed, impounded, and subjected to an inventory search. Reaves accepted a ride to a gas station. Officers continued searching. They removed a suspicious side panel and discovered 170 grams of heroin and $6,000 in cash. Reaves was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Reaves’s motion to suppress. Although the impoundment and inventory search were invalid, the police had probable cause to pull over the Pacifica for a traffic violation and Reaves’s consent validated the search. View "United States v. Reaves" on Justia Law

At Carter’s trial, for possessing between five and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, an officer testified about his work with an informant who had said Carter was involved in distributing drugs and that he heard the informant call Carter to order cocaine. Carter’s lawyer did not object to the testimony about the informant’s out-of-court statements and actions. During closing argument, the state referred to the informant’s statements and actions, again without objection. Carter sought post-conviction relief, citing the Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, finding that the testimony was offered not to show the truth of what the informant said but to explain why the police investigated Carter. Carter filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting the same theories. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial. While there is a good argument that Carter’s lawyer should have objected to some of the testimony about the informant and its use during closing argument, Carter did not show prejudice. The court noted Carter’s dramatic efforts to flee and then to dispose of the bags in view of officers. View "Carter v. Douma" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

Two men committed four armed robberies of Peoria, Illinois businesses. They left a plastic bag at the scene of the final robbery. Officers sent it to the State Bureau of Forensic Science. A latent fingerprint impression from the bag matched to Sturdivant (age 18), who was arrested. Sturdivant made a video recorded statement admitting to his involvement in the robberies and was charged with armed robbery and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. Sturdivant pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress his confession. Officers and Sturdivant’s mother testified at a hearing. Evidence indicated that Sturdivant informed the officers that he was an insulin-dependent diabetic and that he was feeling “real tired.” After receiving his Miranda warnings, Sturdivant agreed to talk. After Sturdivant confessed, he agreed to take officers to the location where he discarded the firearm that he discharged in each robbery. After a suppression hearing, consideration of Sturdivant’s age and level of education, and viewing Sturdivant’s video recorded statement, the court denied Sturdivant’s motion, finding that Sturdivant did not appear “in any way to be physically ill” or “to be in a mental state that was any kind of weakened condition.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Sturdivant" on Justia Law

Cipra, Gregory, and Konrady ran a cannabis grow operation at in Lee County, Illinois for two years. Shannon Gregory’s brother, Scott, contacted the DEA and provided detailed information about the operation. DEA Agent Washburn contacted an Illinois State Police Inspector, who independently verified much of the information and obtained search warrants. Following a search of the residences— which revealed an extensive cannabis grow operation— the three were arrested and charged with drug and weapon offenses. Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence from the search, claiming a lack of probable cause. In light of assertions from Scott Gregory that investigators had asked him to lie about the information he provided, they also requested a Franks hearing and filed a motion to compel the identity of the informant. The district court denied the motions. Defendants conditionally pleaded guilty. Following the remand, Scott Gregory’s identity was revealed and the court held a Franks hearing, denied Defendants’ motion to suppress evidence, and held that the search warrants were supported by probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants failed to show that investigators deliberately or recklessly included false information—or omitted material information—that was necessary to a finding of probable cause View "United States v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Price, a convicted felon, was convicted of possessing a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Applying the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the court concluded that Price had three qualifying convictions and imposed a sentence of 250 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2008. The district court rejected his first collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his prior crimes did not fall within the scope of the ACCA’s residual clause; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Price then asked the Seventh Circuit to authorize a successive collateral attack, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), to assert a claim under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the clause is too vague to provide adequate notice. Noting that the government had not responded, the Seventh Circuit granted relief. Johnson explicitly overruled a line of Supreme Court decisions and broke new ground by invalidating a provision of ACCA. Johnson rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause, so the new rule concerns constitutional law and was previously unavailable to Price. Price never presented this claim before. The court concluded that the rule is categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review. View "Price v. United States" on Justia Law

Evansville police became aware of Internet threats against police, coming from an IP address at the home of 68-year-old Louise Milan and her 18-year-old daughter. They had an unsecured wifi network. Before they searched, police saw, two doors from the Milan house, Murray, who had been convicted of intimidating a police officer. Two officers thought him the likeliest source of the threats. Some officers thought, mistakenly, that a man named Milan made the threats. Surveillance revealed no man at the Milan house. A search of the Milan house was conducted by an 11-man (all-white) SWAT team in body armor, accompanied by a news team. The team knocked and, without allowing reasonable time for a response, broke open the door and a window, and hurled two “flash bang” grenades. Police rushed into the house, searched, found no evidence of criminal activity, handcuffed the Milans (black women), and led them outside. A day later, police discovered that Murray had used Milan’s network and requested that he come to police headquarters. Murray was arrested without incident and pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in Milans’ suit. The police acted unreasonably and precipitately in flash banging the house without a minimally responsible investigation. The open network expanded the number of possible suspects and one extra day of surveillance, with a brief investigation of Murray and the male Milans, would have reassured police that there was no danger in the Milan house. View "Milan v. Bolin" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his left ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “meals lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that more than a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The court granted the doctors summary judgment, reasoning that waiting before immobilizing Petties’s ankle could not have constituted deliberate indifference because several physicians held different opinions and that a jury could not reasonably find that rejection of the recommendation for physical therapy constituted deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A jury could not reasonably find that the treatment of Petties’s ankle rose to the level of a constitutional violation. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law