Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indiana inmate Rowe was diagnosed with reflux esophagitis, (GERD), which may cause esophageal bleeding and can increase the risk of esophageal cancer. The prison physician told him to take Zantac pills. Rowe was permitted to keep Zantac in his cell and take pills when he felt the need, until his pills were confiscated and he was told that he would be allowed to take a Zantac only when a nurse gave it to him or buy it at the commissary. He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. No reason was articulated for forbidding him to keep Zantac given him by prison staff while permitting him to keep Zantac that he bought at the commissary. Zantac is not a narcotic. Rowe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. After he filed suit, he ceased receiving Zantac because his authorization to receive over-the-counter Zantac free of charge lapsed. He was told to purchase the drug from the commissary if he wanted it. Rowe claims he could not afford to buy it. A doctor opined that his condition didn’t require Zantac. The doctor later relented. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, noting contradictory evidence and that the claim is “far from frivolous.” The court urged the court to consider appointing a neutral expert. View "Rowe v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Flores was pulled over on an Illinois highway for driving with an obstructed license plate—his rear plate was affixed to his car by a standard frame that covered the plate’s periphery. After Flores consented to a search of his vehicle, police officers discovered over five kilograms of heroin, and Flores confessed to transporting it. He later moved to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have probable cause for the stop. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of the motion, noting that the officer acknowledged that as he “got closer it appeared to read Baja California which is from Mexico.” The officer could not have reasonably believed that the “commonplace” license frame violated state law. View "United States v. Hernandez Flores" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department participated in a reality television program, The Shift. The film crew followed homicide detectives investigating a deadly 2008 home invasion. Police eventually arrested Hart, in the final episode of the program’s first season. After Hart spent nearly two years in jail awaiting trial, the charges were dismissed. The Shift’s audience was not informed. Hart sued detectives and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was arrested without probable cause and that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her probable cause affidavit for his arrest. The court rejected all claims before trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but noted “many troubling aspects of IMPD’s investigation, and this case should warn police departments about having their detectives moonlight as television stars.” A reasonable trier of fact could not find that police lacked probable cause to arrest Hart. Nor could a reasonable jury find that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her affidavit. Four surviving witnesses from the home invasion separately identified Hart as one of the men who attacked them. None of the police had any reason to doubt these identifications when they arrested Hart. View "Hart v. Mannina" on Justia Law

Based on his forcible rape of a 15-year-old, Rengifo was convicted of three counts of first-degree child sexual abuse while armed and one count of second-degree child sexual abuse while armed. After exhausting state remedies, he brought a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court denied the petition and did not address the matter of a certificate of appealability. Rengifo filed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. For purposes of habeas corpus relief, Rengifo’s petition must be deemed as seeking relief from a detention “aris[ing] out of process issued by a State court,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability is therefore required before he can pursue an appeal, but a certificate of appealability cannot be granted. Because the legislature defined the unit of punishment as each act of child sexual abuse, Rengifo did not suffer multiple punishments for the same crime, so his sentences did not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause and he raised no substantial constitutional question that could serve as a predicate for a certificate of appealability. View "Sanchez-Rengifo v. J. Caraway" on Justia Law

While working as an employee of a contractor at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Rebecca Riker engaged in a romantic relationship with inmate Vest. When the relationship became known, her employment ended. She later requested to be allowed to visit Vest. Prison officials denied those requests because the institution’s policy prohibits visitation by former employees. Riker and Vest later submitted an application to marry, which prison officials also denied, because Riker was not on the visitors list. Riker filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that prohibiting Riker from visiting Vest was reasonable and that this restriction did not unconstitutionally burden her right to marry. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that, based on the summary judgment record, the defendants failed to adequately justify refusal to permit the marriage. Acknowledging defendants’ arguments that a former employee who previously violated Department policies is more likely to engage in other prohibited acts and that a former employee might share with an inmate confidential information obtained while employed at the prison, the court stated that nothing in the record supported equating general visitation with a single marriage ceremony. View "Riker v. Lemmon" on Justia Law

Boyd was arrested and released from jail pursuant to a bond agreement, subject to bond conditions, including that he not engage in any criminal activity. While on release, Boyd was arrested and charged in Wisconsin state court with 10 counts, including three counts of armed robbery with the threat of force; being a felon in possession of a firearm; possessing a short-barreled shotgun; taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent by the use of a dangerous weapon; battery; unlawfully and intentionally pointing a firearm at another person; operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent; and resisting or obstructing a law enforcement officer. The state charged Boyd in the same proceeding with 10 counts of bail jumping: it charged one bail-jumping count for each of the underlying substantive offenses that Boyd allegedly committed while on bond. A jury convicted Boyd on all 20 counts. He was sentenced to over 40 years’ imprisonment. After he exhausted state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas relief, in which he contended that he was being punished for both bail jumping and the substantive offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Boyd v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In both cases, consolidated on appeal, family members called police officers to their home because a family member had locked himself in a room of his home and was threatening suicide. The officers responded to the distress call, but in both cases the situation ended with the person’s death as a result of shots fired by the officers. On behalf of the deceased person, the plaintiffs in each case brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they effected the seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity in one case and affirmed denial of the same motion in the other. Officers responding to a scene in which a suicidal person is locked in a room are faced with the difficult determination as to whether delay in responding will allow the person to further harm himself or to become aggressive toward others. It is clearly established, however, that officers cannot resort as an initial matter to lethal force on a person who is merely passively resisting and has not presented any threat of harm to others. View "Brown v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s hearsay statement; and that his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable to require Indiana courts to disregard long-established rules against using ex parte witness interviews as substantive evidence at trial. His able trial counsel tried hard to have the statement admitted; they were not successful but also were not constitutionally ineffective. As for the waiver of counsel claim, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim in a careful discussion tailored to the facts of this case. Its rejection of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area, containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed, as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs received citations for violating this ordinance and alleged that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance in 2014, but granted rehearing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Reed v. Gilbert, and reversed. The majority in Reed stated: “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” and “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” The Seventh Circuit opined that the majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

His aunt and uncle reported to police that Witzlib was making M-80s in the basement of his grandmother’s house, where he and his grandmother lived. A federal license is required for manufacture of the highly explosive devices, 18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1). His aunt stated that Witzlib held “anti-government beliefs,” was unpredictable, and didn’t take the medications prescribed for his “mental health issues.” Local police and a federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agent went to the grandmother’s house and knocked. Witzlib answered. Officers told him that they were “responding to a fireworks complaint” and needed to conduct a “safety check” of the house. He demanded to see a search warrant and stated he would not consent to a search. They ignored him, then spoke to the grandmother, who signed a consent-to-search form, and stated that Witzlib had been making fireworks in the basement. In the basement, they found about 1000 M-80s. They arrested Witzlib; the next day officers removed the M-80s from the basement and, for the first time, obtained a warrant to search the house. They uncovered additional incriminating items. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, noting that the basement was not Witzlib’s private space View "United States v. Witzlib" on Justia Law