Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1996 Gladney was convicted in Wisconsin of murdering Wilson. Wilson died of gunshot wounds, following a struggle for a gun during an argument about money. At trial, Gladney did not dispute that he intentionally killed Wilson, but he argued unsuccessfully that he should not be found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide because he acted in “imperfect self-defense,” which, unlike perfect self-defense, does not serve as a complete defense to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide but instead mitigates that charge down to second-degree intentional homicide. Over a decade later, Gladney filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his due process rights were violated because subsequent state case law cast doubt on whether he was convicted under the correct imperfect self-defense standard and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to interview a witness who would have corroborated his self-defense theory. The court concluded that the petition was untimely, noting Gladney’s 2010 discovery that his lawyer failed to interview that witness and rejecting Gladney’s theory that the statute of limitations did not apply because he had demonstrated actual innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gladney’s federal petition was filed far too late and he did not demonstrate actual innocence. View "Gladney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In 2008 Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. His presentence investigation report classified him as a career offender based on two convictions for assault. Despite the fact that his convictions were for “intentional, knowing, or reckless” assault, counsel did not object. The court sentenced Ramirez as a career offender, treating the Texas convictions as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Ramirez retained new counsel and moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career-offender designation. The judge denied the motion and, because postconviction counsel failed to keep Ramirez informed about the postconviction proceedings, Ramirez did not timely request a certificate of appealability. He tried filing a late request, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He moved under FRCP 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment. The district judge denied the motion, on the belief that there is a rigid rule under which there is no right to counsel on collateral review. The Seventh Circuit remanded. noting that the Supreme Court significantly changed its approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at initial review collateral proceedings in 2011 and 2013, so that Ramirez’s argument is cognizable under Rule 60(b), View "Ramirez v. United States" on Justia Law

Stinson spent 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. He was exonerated by DNA evidence and sued the lead detective and two forensic odontologists who investigated the murder and testified at trial. The odontologists were the key prosecution witnesses. They testified that bite marks on the victim’s body matched Stinson’s dentition. In his suit for damages, 42 U.S.C. 1983, Stinson alleged that the odontologists fabricated their opinions, the detective put them up to it, and the three suppressed evidence of the fabrication, in violation of his right to due process. The district court denied the defendants’ claim of absolute or qualified immunity from suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While absolute immunity does not apply because Stinson sued the defendants primarily for their investigative misconduct, not their testimony at trial, the defendants remain protected by qualified immunity, which is lost only if Stinson presents evidence showing that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. He did not do so. Stinson’s evidence, accepted as true, shows at most that the odontologists were negligent; it does not support his claim that they fabricated their opinions. An error in forensic analysis—even a glaring error—is not actionable as a violation of due process. View "Stinson v. Gauger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Stateville prison in Illinois, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the prison’s medical staff was deliberately indifferent to the results of 11 blood tests, administered over a period of more than five years, that indicated that he was either diabetic or prediabetic, or had progressed from prediabetic to diabetic during the period. He alleges that not until the last of these tests, late in 2010, did he learn that his blood glucose counts were dangerously high The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred. We need to distinguish between two types of glucose blood test—fasting and random. The Seventh Circuit reversed. For the medical staff of a prison to know that an inmate is diabetic or prediabetic, yet not tell him, let alone do nothing to treat his condition, is to be deliberately indifferent. The defendant now knows that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, but plaintiff may not have known of the cause of his distressing symptoms until November 2010, and the two-year statute of limitations would have been tolled during the interval between that discovery and his filing suit because he was exhausting prison administrative remedies. View "Nally v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

D. Stahl claimed she was the victim of vicious, physical bullying by fellow East Porter students. D. complained to school officials. Apart from witnessing the counselor talk to one alleged bully and seeing the principal call another to her office, D. does not know if officials took any action. D. alleges that some teachers and coaches participated or were complicit in the bullying. Eighth Grade girls, preparing to play basketball, taunted D. D’s mother, Debbie came to the school and yelled at the alleged bullies. D.’s father, George, arrived and confronted the principal. Leaving the gym, George and his father confronted alleged bullies. The girls yelled that the men had attacked them. The principal called the police, who did not issue a citation. Superintendent Gardin stated that Debbie and George were banned from East Porter property until they met with him. The Stahls never arranged a meeting. D voluntarily did not return. The Stahls contacted a neighboring school district. George testified that he was advised that the school had “open enrollment." George told the principal about the ban. That evening, the principal informed them that D. would not be permitted to enroll.The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the Stahls’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no genuine issue of material fact under the state-created danger standard. D. did not identify any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently with regard to her attempt to transfer schools. View "D. S. v. East Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp" on Justia Law

Bebo is the respondent in an administrative enforcement proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleging that she violated federal law by manipulating internal books and records, making false representations to auditors, and making false disclosures to the SEC. Rather than wait for a final decision in the administrative enforcement proceeding, Bebo filed suit in federal court challenging on constitutional grounds the authority of the SEC to conduct the proceeding. She invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the administrative review scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrative law judge assigned to the case is expected to issue an initial decision within the coming months. If the decision is adverse to Bebo, she will have the right to file a petition for review with the SEC. The SEC will then have the power either to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or to grant the petition and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review and will be able to raise her constitutional claims. View "Bebo v. Sec. Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

While he was an inmate, the Pontiac Illinois prison refused to equip Plaintiff with gloves and a hat when he exercised in the prison yard in cold winter weather. His indoor cell was too small for the exercise he needed to prevent his back muscles from atrophying because of arthritis. The refusal was pursuant to a policy that the prison justified on the ground that offenders have placed feces inside gloves and hats and swung them at staff members or offenders from a distance, and have used them to hide dangerous contraband. Plaintiff in discovery requested incident reports to support the justification but was told that the database is searchable only by date of report, so the demand was too burdensome. The district judge agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it is difficult to believe that Pontiac prison has no searchable records of inmates’ assaults on guards and that the defendants should at least be required to present testimony documenting the use of gloves and hats as weapons, but that the suit fails for failure to allege indifference to his need for those items. The court noted that prison personnel had very limited knowledge of Plaintiff’s problem. View "Diaz v. Davidson" on Justia Law

When Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in August 2013, he was carrying a .22 caliber cartridge and did not have documentation showing that he is lawfully in the United States, which made his possession of the cartridge a crime under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that section 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringed on his rights under the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion on the broad ground that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower court’s rationale swept too far, but that the Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by section 922(g)(5). View "United States v. Meza-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Rowe was diagnosed with reflux esophagitis, (GERD), which may cause esophageal bleeding and can increase the risk of esophageal cancer. The prison physician told him to take Zantac pills. Rowe was permitted to keep Zantac in his cell and take pills when he felt the need, until his pills were confiscated and he was told that he would be allowed to take a Zantac only when a nurse gave it to him or buy it at the commissary. He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. No reason was articulated for forbidding him to keep Zantac given him by prison staff while permitting him to keep Zantac that he bought at the commissary. Zantac is not a narcotic. Rowe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. After he filed suit, he ceased receiving Zantac because his authorization to receive over-the-counter Zantac free of charge lapsed. He was told to purchase the drug from the commissary if he wanted it. Rowe claims he could not afford to buy it. A doctor opined that his condition didn’t require Zantac. The doctor later relented. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, noting contradictory evidence and that the claim is “far from frivolous.” The court urged the court to consider appointing a neutral expert. View "Rowe v. Gibson" on Justia Law