Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Martinez, Vallejo, and 47 others were indicted for crimes committed while they were members of the Milwaukee chapter of the Latin Kings gang organization. Martinez and Vallejo pled guilty to a RICO offense, 18 U.S.C. 1962, and admitted to engaging in predicate racketeering activities, including a 2003 murder. Vallejo, who was 17 years old at the time, and Martinez, who was 16, each fired several shots at the victim. Martinez also pled guilty to attempted murder of a rival gang member; Vallejo’s plea agreement included two attempted murders. All of the attempted murders occurred while the defendants were under the age of 18. In both cases, the court imposed the “maximum sentence”—life in prison.. Neither Martinez nor Vallejo filed a direct appeal. In 2012, the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juveniles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Martinez and Vallejo’s life sentences were imposed after an individualized sentencing, and not by statutory mandate,and did not violate Miller. View "Vallejo v. United States" on Justia Law

Mullins lived in apartment 2 in the complex behind the BigFoot Lounge in Rockford, Illinois. Mullins and Washington (called “T”) used Mullins’s apartment as a stash house for their cocaine and marijuana distribution operation. Winnebago County Sheriff’s Deputy Boomer submitted an affidavit and obtained a search warrant for Mullins’s apartment. The affidavit stated that a confidential informant had told members of the Narcotics Unit that a black male known as T was selling cocaine and marijuana in the area, was storing the drugs in an apartment behind the BigFoot Lounge, and drove a black Cadillac Escalade with Minnesota registration 161EKT when he delivered drugs. Deputy Boomer reported that he had seen the Cadillac Escalade with Minnesota registration 161EKT in the parking lot of the apartment building behind the lounge. The affidavit also described surveillance by the Narcotics Unit and controlled drug buy. Deputies executed the warrant, recovering 626 grams of marijuana, 16 grams of powder cocaine, more than 150 grams of crack cocaine, drug packaging materials, digital scales, and mail addressed to Mullins. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), upholding denial of Mullins’s motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. Factual inaccuracies in the warrant affidavit were immaterial to the probable cause determination. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Officer Stirmell followed a speeding pickup truck and activated his sirens. The driver, Greg, ignored the sirens and continued driving. Stirmell radioed for assistance. Greg drove to his father’s house, ran from his truck, and jumped the fence into his father’s backyard. Stirmell ceased pursuit and began searching Greg’s truck. Springfield Officers Brown, Warnisher, and others arrived and searched the backyard. The officers knew Greg had refused to stop, but were also under the mistaken impression that Greg had an outstanding arrest warrant. Greg’s father, Dawson, went out and, at an officer’s request, called Greg’s cell phone to locate him. Greg did not answer. Dawson remained outside and answered the officers’ questions. He stated that he was 72 years old, and that his son had no involvement in drug dealing. Greg re-appeared, running toward the side door of Dawson’s house. Dawson claims that while the officers were attempting to subdue Greg, Warnisher kicked Dawson and Brown tackled Dawson from behind. The officers dispute his version of events. Dawson was handcuffed and arrested for resisting arrest and obstruction, but was never formally charged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Dawson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, finding that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances. View "Dawson v. Brown" on Justia Law

An inmate of a Wisconsin state prison filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Schneider, a guard, had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him. The district court dismissed the complaint at “screening,” 28 U.S.C. 1915A, before any response by the defendants. The magistrate stated that “standing alone, verbal harassment of an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation.” The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that attempting to draw a categorical distinction between verbal and physical harassment is arbitrary. The alleged pain sufficient to constitute cruel punishment may be physical or psychological. While most verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment, some does. View "Beal v. Foster" on Justia Law

Chicago’s Department of Administrative Hearings determined that Discount Inn had violated city ordinances, providing that “any person who owns or controls property within the city must cut or otherwise control all weeds on such property so that the average height of such weeds does not exceed ten inches” and that “it shall be the duty of the owner of any open lot ... to cause the lot to be surrounded with a noncombustible screen fence … . P. The owner shall maintain any such fence in a safe condition." Both ordinances provide for fines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of constitutional challenges to the ordinances.The fencing of vacant lots is important to enable the identification of such land as being owned rather than abandoned, and to discourage squatters and the use of vacant lots as sites for the sale of illegal drugs. While expressing concern about the lack of a definition of “weed” and enforcement of the average height limit, the court stated that taken to its logical extreme, Discount Inn’s defense of the weed would preclude any efforts by local governments to prevent unsightly or dangerous uses of private property. View "Discount Inn, Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Smith filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Smith, as a pretrial detainee and Army veteran, was enrolled in a special program for veterans. Under that program, Smith worked in the jail laundry and could live in a special wing for veterans, apart from the general population. Smith claimed that he was paid only $3 a day, not the federal minimum wage; that he was subjected to inhumane conditions, required to stand in a “hot, smelly room” several hours each day; and that he had insufficient food, was subjected to rodents and insects, had no mirrors, lacked outdoor recreation, and had to drink filthy water. The court conducted preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1951A) and summarily dismissed Smith’s work- and wage-related claims, finding that Smith had no constitutional right to be paid for his jail job assignment, let alone minimum wage, and that his allegations were insufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court determined that Smith stated colorable conditions of confinement claims, but ultimately dismissed without prejudice, advising Smith of the deficiencies in his pleading and twice instructing him to file an amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed the ultimate dismissal (with prejudice) of the inadequate food and contaminated water claims and remanded, but otherwise affirmed. View "Smith v. Dart" on Justia Law

Cook committed a home robbery in 2005 and was arrested nine days later in the apartment of a girlfriend, later his fiancée, Thede. Convicted in a Wisconsin state court of armed robbery, armed burglary, battery, theft of moveable property, mistreatment of an animal resulting in the animal’s (a dog’s) death, and false imprisonment, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Cook filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Marinette County (Wisconsin) Sheriff’s Department detectives arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and seeking $25,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages for the arrest and detention, seizure of personal property that he claims was worth $10,000, and infliction of emotional distress. Thede had testified in Cook’s criminal trial that she had admitted the officers to her apartment, but in the civil case she submitted an affidavit which states that when she had testified that she “let them in” she had meant that she “did not tell them to leave or did not object directly to them, but let them remain.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. At worst the entry was a harmless error because of the existence of a warrant. View "Cook v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

In 1995, Evans, then nine months pregnant, was fatally shot and stabbed in her Addison, Illinois apartment. The assailants cut open her womb and removed the unborn baby, Elijah. Debra had three older children— Samantha (10), Joshua (7), and Jordan (2). Samantha was killed. Elijah and Joshua were taken. Two-year-old Jordan was left behind, alive, with his dead mother and sister. The next day, police found Joshua’s lifeless body in an alley. Police arrested Debra’s former boyfriend, Ward, who was the father of Jordan and Elijah; Ward’s cousin, Williams; and her boyfriend, Caffey. Each was tried separately. Caffey received a sentence of death on the murder convictions and a consecutive 30-year term on the aggravated kidnapping conviction. In 2003, Illinois Governor Ryan commuted Caffey’s death sentence to life without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Caffey’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the court improperly excluded hearsay statements made by Ward, Williams, and Iacullo (the owner of a typewriter used to prepare a false birth certificate for Elijah) and deprived Caffey of the ability to mount an effective defense; counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce statements by Iacullo and another that had been ruled admissible; and the court improperly admitted Joshua’s hearsay statements naming Caffey. View "Caffey v. Butler" on Justia Law

A Cook County Jail pretrial detainee was attacked and stabbed. He cried out for help but was ignored by an unidentified guard standing 10-15 feet from him. The plaintiff regained consciousness three days later in a hospital, having suffered nerve damage and a fracture of an eye socket that may eventually cause blindness. He filed suit, alleging failure to create or enforce policies necessary to protect prisoners from attacks by fellow prisoners. Defense counsel sent the plaintiff, several letters, demanding that he sign a release to permit access to all of plaintiff’s health records since his 1977 birth, including records—of no apparent relevance to his case—relating to venereal disease, AIDS and HIV, and permitting disclosure to parties not connected with the attack, injuries, or resulting medical treatments. Although plaintiff suggested limiting the release to the hospital at which he was treated and that time period, the defense moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Without waiting for a reply and without any explanation, the court dismissed with prejudice and denied plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel as moot. The motion had been pending for two months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, calling the dismissal “a miscarriage of justice.” View "Reyes v. Dart" on Justia Law

Dansberry shot and killed 18-year-old Bass during a 1997 attempted armed robbery. An eyewitness saw the crime and Dansberry admitted his culpability. Dansberry entered a “blind” plea of guilty. The court advised Dansberry about the rights he was giving up, the charges, and the range of possible sentences, stating that Dansberry faced a minimum of 20 years in prison up to 90 years, life imprisonment, or death. Dansberry said he understood. The court was incorrect. Dansberry faced a minimum prison term of 26 years, not 20 and a maximum term of 130 years, not 90. The court sentenced him to a total of 80 years. Dansberry later moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was involuntary and unknowing and counsel was constitutionally ineffective. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. The evidence showed that the state had pressed for the death penalty. Dansberry’s main concern, according to counsel, was avoiding execution. After losing his Illinois state-court appeal, Dansberry filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding “harmless error.” It is unlikely, and there was no evidence that Dansberry’s mistaken belief that his minimum sentence was 20 years had any effect on his decision to plead guilty View "Dansberry v. Pfister" on Justia Law