Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gardner was shot to death in front of a Chicago apartment building in 1999. The state charged three men, including Carter, with Gardner’s murder. Carter was tried alongside his brother, Stone. Both were convicted of murder; Carter was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful state postconviction proceeding, Carter filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief on each of eight grounds presented. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to a single claim: ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim turned on the potential effect of the testimony of two witnesses who were not called in his defense at trial. The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the proffered testimony would not have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that, while trial counsel’s performance may have been deficient in failing to investigate potential witnesses, the state court’s resolution of the prejudice analysis was not unreasonable. The result have been the same even if the witnesses had testified that Carter was unarmed; such testimony would not have illuminated whether Carter was legally accountable for the actions of his co‐defendants. View "Carter v. Duncan" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

A drug-dealer-turned-informant (Weil) identified Hernandez and Gonzalez his suppliers. Weil had sold methamphetamine provided by Gonzalez, who lived in California but had designated Hernandez as a local go-between. The men had discussed the arrangement in recorded phone calls. After a controlled buy, arranged by Weil, a search of Hernandez’s apartment revealed four pounds of methamphetamine found in the lining of a cooler. Both Hernandez and Gonzalez were present in the apartment. Gonzalez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 360 months in prison for the drug crimes plus a consecutive 60 months for the firearm offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence that he possessed the methamphetamine. A rational jury could find from the evidence at trial both that the drugs recovered were the same drugs discussed in the recordings—the shipment that Gonzalez planned to send by courier from California ahead of his own his arrival—and that Gonzalez retained control over those drugs after they arrived in Illinois. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 1995, Neal was working on Mitchell’s car in the backyard of Neal’s home when Mitchell hit Neal in the head with a brick, causing Neal’s death. Mitchell asserted that Neal had attacked him with a wrench. A post‐mortem toxicology report revealed that Neal had been using alcohol and cocaine. The prosecution presented forensic evidence and a witness (also using alcohol and drugs at the time of the incident) to refute Mitchell’s claim of self‐defense. A jury convicted Mitchell of first degree murder. The court sentenced him to 57 years in prison. After unsuccessful direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, Mitchell unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process violation. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed. Mitchell did not show that his trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to request a second-degree murder “provocation” jury instruction or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision. The due process claim, concerning an unsworn, unsigned affidavit, which avers that the state offered not to charge the witness as an accessory to murder in exchange for her testimony against Mitchell, was procedurally defaulted. View "Mitchell v. Enloe" on Justia Law

Hughes is confined at Rushville as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207. He will remain there unless it is no longer “substantially probable that [he] will engage in acts of sexual violence.” He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rushville's program director, grievance examiner, and security therapy aide infringed his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by disregarding his grievances concerning dental care and insulting him. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal, reasoning that grievances are protected speech and that the abuse to which Hughes was subjected and the warning that his life would be better if he stopped filing grievances went beyond simple verbal harassment. The court noted that Hughes is not a prison inmate but a civil detainee, “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Staff of an institution that houses and treats persons suffering from mental disorders should understand that they are dealing with psychologically impaired persons and should have known better than to shout at a possibly vulnerable person, call him “ignorant,” “stupid,” and a “moron,” ignore grievances that may be meritorious and serious, and threaten him with retaliation for complaining. View "Hughes v. Scott" on Justia Law

Sheboygan officer Fickett stopped a car driving without license plates. He recognized Guidry, the driver, who was suspected of using and dealing drugs. Fickett called officer Saeger, who handled a drug-detection canine. Saeger arrived about five minutes later. Fickett was still preparing Guidry’s citation. Guidry initially stated that he did not consent to a dog sniff, and remained in the car. After another request, Guidry exited, leaving his door open. As the dog passed that door, he alerted. Guidry admitted that he had smoked marijuana at home and still had a “half blunt” in the car. Saeger searched the car and found the blunt, and a “safe can” containing baggies of heroin and cocaine. The next day, officers described the car search and provided information obtained from confidential informants during an ongoing investigation and obtained a warrant. A search of Guidry’s residence uncovered heroin, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana. A woman present during the search stated that Guidry maintained another residence where he prostituted women, feeding them heroin. Hours later, a commissioner authorized another warrant. Ultimately, Guidry was sentenced to 25 years in prison after pleading guilty to possessing and distributing illegal drugs and prostituting women. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence, upholding denial of motions to suppress evidence found during searches of his car and residences, but remanded disputed conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Guidry" on Justia Law

In 1992, Holmes, was convicted of two murders committed three years earlier at the restaurant where he worked. He and Vance had stabbed three people and stolen the till. He was sentenced to death. Holmes’s conviction and sentence were affirmed and state post‐conviction relief was denied. He sought federal habeas corpus, raising 18 grounds and claiming that he was not mentally competent to assist his lawyers in the habeas corpus proceeding. The judge found him competent and denied his claims on the merits. On remand, the court again found Holmes competent and reinstated the denial of his claims. The Seventh Circuit again reversed, instructing the court to suspend the habeas corpus proceeding “unless and until the state provides substantial new evidence that Holmes’s psychiatric illness has abated, or its symptoms are sufficiently controlled, to justify the resumption of the proceeding.” The district court complied, suspending the habeas proceeding until 2013, when the prison superintendent moved to lift the stay and dismiss the habeas proceeding, based the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Ryan v. Gonzales, rejecting “the assertion that the right to counsel implies a right to competence.” The court recognized that the substantive claims presented in Holmes’s petition are “record‐based” and granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding many of his claims defaulted and the others without merit. View "Holmes v. Levenhagen" on Justia Law

Hill walked into a Naperville Illinois Credit Union, pointed a pistol at the teller, and ordered her to give him money. Hill escaped with a bag containing about $134,000 and a dye pack. As Hill fled, it stained most of the cash red. Days later, Hill drove to a Milwaukee casino and fed dye-stained bills into a slot machine without playing the game. He cashed out, receiving vouchers for the money he had put into the machine, and redeemed the vouchers for $6,650. He attempted to repeat the process at an Indiana casino. A slot attendant alerted casino security. Questioned by Hammond Police Lieutenant McKechnie, moonlighting as a security officer, Hill seemed nervous. Hill said that he had found the money while changing a tire. The stacks of cash were still wrapped in bank bands; Hill was questioned further and his bag was searched, revealing the rest of the money. Hill was indicted for money laundering, bank robbery, and transporting stolen money in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 2113(a), (c), and (d); 2314). Hill unsuccessfully moved suppress his arrest, the search of his backpack, and his statements to McKechnie and to exclude expert testimony regarding historical cell site analysis. Hill was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motions. View "United States v Hill" on Justia Law

Chicago police responded to an emergency at the house where Pedro and Abraham lived with others. Pedro stated that armed intruders had broken in, tied up the occupants, and demanded money and drugs. In a bedroom, police saw a handgun, a digital scale, and a small amount of marijuana. A drug dog signaled the presence of drugs in Pedro’s van, parked outside. After obtaining a warrant, police discovered, in the van, a safe containing $271,080 and notes including dates and numbers. A second dog alerted to the safe. No drugs were found. Pedro stated that after the intruders left, he moved Abraham’s safe to the van in case they returned and that he did not know its contents. The government brought no criminal charges, but sought forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). The brothers swore that the money is their savings from working and that they were not involved in criminal activity. Weeks before the seizure, U.S. Immigration had recorded Abraham saying that he did not have any “equities” in the U.S.; Abraham’s application for cancellation of removal, filed with the assistance of counsel six months after the seizure, lists only $2,000 in “cash assets.” The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the government. A jury reasonably could find that the evidence fails to establish, even by a preponderance, that the money is substantially connected to drug trafficking. View "Cruz-Hernandez v. Funds in the Amount of $271,080" on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, sets minimum funding and vesting requirements, insures benefits through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation and includes reporting, disclosures, and fiduciary responsibilities, but exempts church plans from its requirements. The plaintiffs, former and current employees, have vested claims to benefits under the Advocate retirement plan. Advocate operates Illinois healthcare locations, employing 33,000 people. Advocate maintains a non-contributory, defined-benefit pension plan that covers substantially all of its employees. Advocate is not a church. Its predecessor formed as a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation from a merger between two health systems—Lutheran General and Evangelical. Advocate is affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the United Church of Christ, but it is not owned or financially supported by either church. In contracts, the parties “affirm their ministry in health care and the covenantal relationship they share.” There is no requirement that Advocate employees or patients belong to any particular religious denomination, or uphold any particular beliefs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the plan “is not entitled to ERISA’s church plan exemption as a matter of law” because the statutory definition requires a church plan to be established by a church. The court rejected Advocate’s First Amendment arguments. View "Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network" on Justia Law