Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act authorizes the commitment and indefinite detention of individuals who are charged with a crime and found to suffer from a mental disorder "coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses.” The Act requires care and treatment for the committed person, "designed to effect recovery.” Once detainees are deemed “no longer dangerous,” the state must discharge them. The Supreme Court held, in 1986, that the Act, on its face, complies with the Due Process Clause, noting the lack of punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the realistic possibility of release.Every Big Muddy River Program detainee participates in a weekly core therapy group. Only detainees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct participate in offense-specific and didactic groups. Big Muddy does not provide individual therapy. Therapists evaluate detainees semiannually and provide them with copies of their evaluations and treatment plans. Detainees may discuss their evaluations with the therapists only in group therapy, not one-on-one. The state contracts with Wexford to evaluate detainees for release. The plaintiffs alleged that Big Muddy’s treatment program was run in a constitutionally deficient manner.The district court concluded that the disparity between Big Muddy’s treatment program and professional standards amounted to a constitutional violation and issued an injunction, requiring that Big Muddy provide the plaintiffs a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week; reinstate inactive groups; and use independent evaluators for discharge evaluations.The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging concern about whether Illinois is complying with its Fourteenth Amendment obligations. Detainees receive minimal treatment, raising serious questions about whether rehabilitation and release are realistically available. The district court, however, issued too broad an injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), which requires the least intrusive means available to correct the constitutional violation. View "Howe v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Evans twice sold heroin to a confidential source (50 grams, 125 grams). Officers stopped Evans 30 minutes later and found cash from the controlled purchase, methamphetamine, two handguns, and ammunition. He was charged with two drug distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841, and two firearm counts, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 922(g)(1). Following conflicts with Evans’s first two lawyers, Sarm was appointed to represent Evans. After Evans withdrew a plea, prosecutors added another 924(c) count.At trial, Sarm only subjected four of 11 witnesses to meaningful cross-examination and rested without presenting any evidence or calling any defense witnesses. Convicted, Evans was sentenced to 788 months; 50 years came from the 924(c) convictions, each of which carried mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences of 25 years because Evans had a prior qualifying 924(c) conviction. Nineteen days after the trial, Sarm overdosed on heroin. The district court appointed new counsel but, without a hearing, denied a motion for a new trial.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Evans made a single choice to possess a firearm over a continuous 30-minute span that included a sale of heroin and the police finding methamphetamine and a gun in his car. The facts support one 924(c) conviction, not two. Evans faced serious charges with serious sentencing consequences; his appointed counsel had never tried a federal criminal case and was using heroin before, during, and after trial. Evans was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

In 2020, Reardon unsuccessfully ran for Coles County State’s Attorney against the incumbent, Danley. Reardon brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against public officials (including Danley), the City of Mattoon, and Coles County, alleging violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.In 2019, Danley and the Mattoon Police Department (MPD) subpoenaed Reardon’s Facebook account information during an investigation into his potential involvement in a perjury/bribery case. A judge denied Reardon’s motion to quash but declined to release the documents until after a probable cause hearing. The Seventh Circuit noted that section 1983 curtails the availability of injunctive relief against judicial officers.Coles County Board Member Metzger removed a Reardon campaign sign from a resident’s lawn weeks before the election, allegedly mistakenly believing the sign was installed without permission. The Board determined that no further action was needed. Reardon did not sufficiently allege that Metzger was “acting under color of state law,” and Coles County is not liable based on the Board’s alleged ratification of Metzger’s conduct.Two weeks before the election, Mattoon Chief of Police Taylor posted a photo of himself (in uniform) with Danley, inside his office, on the official MPD Facebook page with a caption encouraging people to vote for Danley. Reardon failed to provide any authority to support that Taylor or Danley violated the Constitution. View "Reardon v. Danley" on Justia Law

When police responded to a shooting outside a casino, the victim was dead. They found Grady’s cell phone, which they used, along with surveillance video, to track him down and arrest him. They searched Grady’s apartment and discovered a gun. An expert witness later testified that it was the weapon that was used in the shooting. Grady and his roommate, Bronson, gave different accounts of what happened that night.A state-court jury convicted Grady of first-degree murder. In response to a special verdict form, the jury found that the prosecution had not proved that Grady was the triggerman. Bronson was sentenced to 24 years, Grady to 60 years. Grady’s direct appeal focused on his sentence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance post-conviction petition, concluding that the evidence presented against Grady was “overwhelming” and Grady could not demonstrate the necessary prejudice under Strickland.Contending that the special-verdict finding negated the prosecution’s sole theory of guilt, Grady sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, because his direct-appeal lawyer raised only two issues on appeal, both of which Grady regards as significantly weaker than the inconsistent-verdict argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s rejection of this contention was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. View "Grady v. Truitt" on Justia Law

C.S. has developmental and cognitive disabilities, including autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. C.S., then in sixth grade attempted to use the hallway elevator. A teacher told C.S. to stop. C.S. did not comply. Ultimately, three staff members forced C.S. onto the floor and pinned her face down while handcuffing her hands behind her back, and later bound her legs before returning her to her wheelchair. C.S. was handcuffed and bound for 34 minutes until her mother, Thomas, took her home. Thomas also alleged that days later, C.S. may have scratched or grabbed another student and was required to eat her lunch in the school office. While there, C.S. became dysregulated, prompting staff to respond “with similar aggressive force,” including calling the police. The District sought a juvenile delinquency prosecution of C.S. Charges were dropped when C.S. was found not competent to stand trial. A.S. (C.S.’s brother) had previously attended the same school and, after an incident, the school’s then-principal requested charges against A.S. His prosecution was also dropped after a finding that he was incompetent to stand trial.Thomas alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that the District had a “practice or protocol of utilizing excessive punitive and retaliatory force or threats of force to punish students with behavioral disabilities.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thomas’s suit. Thomas failed to plausibly allege a widespread custom or practice of violating disabled students’ Fourth Amendment rights. View "Thomas v. Neenah Joint School District" on Justia Law

At around 4:36 AM, Washington’s cellmate, Simmons, awoke to the sound of Washington, a pretrial detainee, gasping for breath. Simmons tried to shake Washington; he did not respond. At 4:37, Simmons pressed the intercom button, which triggers an audible ping and a flashing light at the control desk. Valentine, the control deck officer, did not answer for over one minute. Valentine claims he had trouble understanding Simmons and thought Simmons was referring to a plumbing issue. Valentine ended the call. For 30 seconds. Simmons tried to wake Washington. He used the intercom again around 4:47. Valentine did not answer for about 90 seconds. Other officers had joined him at the desk. This time, Valentine understood Simmons was reporting an emergency. The other officers ran to Washington’s cell, arriving at 4:50, issued an alert for medical assistance, and began CPR. A nurse with a defibrillator arrived around 4:52 and administered an electrical shock. At 5:00, EMTs arrived and continued CPR. Washington was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy concluded that sleep apnea caused Washington to go into cardiac arrhythmia, which caused Washington’s death.In a suit under 18 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Valentine’s delay in obtaining treatment harmed Washington, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Valentine for lack of sufficient evidence to show causation. View "Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Mata fired shots, killing two men and injuring another. Chicago police arrested Mata that evening. The following day, after receiving his Miranda rights and saying that he understood them, Mata gave a videotaped statement: Mata explained that he heard Mares calling his name. He turned around and saw two men holding Mares while other men surrounded him. Mata took out his gun and fired. The men backed away, but one man reached for his pocket. Mata fired five more shots toward the group, then ran toward his car. The men were walking with their backs to him when he fired; he never saw any of them with a weapon. An officer read Mata his Miranda rights again on tape. Mata said he understood his rights and wanted to make the statement; the police had treated him “well and fairly,” and he gave the statement “freely and voluntarily” without threats or promises by the police.Defense counsel moved to suppress Mata’s statements, claiming that Mata was subjected to abuse by the police for two days before being given any Miranda warnings. No hearing was held on the motion. Convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, Mata sought habeas relief, arguing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a hearing on the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Mata procedurally defaulted his claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. View "Mata v. Baker" on Justia Law

Gilbert and his son Michael were charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gilbert pleaded guilty and sought “safety-valve relief” from the mandatory minimum 10-year sentence. While Gilbert was awaiting sentencing, Michael pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate including by providing information about Gilbert’s criminal conduct. The plea agreement itself was not entered into the court’s docket. The government never disclosed the agreement to Gilbert or his lawyer. At Gilbert’s sentencing hearing, Michael testified against his father. The prosecutor elicited false testimony that Michael had pleaded “open”—without the benefit of a written plea agreement. The court subsequently located the written plea agreement and informed the parties. Gilbert’s lawyer did not move to recall Michael for further cross-examination nor did he probe Michael’s motivations for testifying. The court denied Gilbert’s request for safety-valve relief and sentenced Gilbert to 156 months.The Seventh Circuit “reluctantly” affirmed. To obtain relief for a “Brady” violation, a defendant must show that undisclosed information was “material either to guilt or to punishment.” While Gilbert was completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him, that evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing. The court described the prosecution’s conduct as “unsettling.” View "United States v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

On the night of May 6, 2020, Lisby, eight months pregnant, and Lewis walked along the shoulder of State Road 37 in Indianapolis to get back to their motel. Indianapolis Officer Henderson was driving to work in his police vehicle on the same road, at 78 miles per hour, 33 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. He illegally changed lanes over a solid white line and his vehicle partially crossed the fog line onto the shoulder of the road. Henderson struck Lisby without seeing her while still traveling at 55 miles per hour. Lisby was transported to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. Lisby and Lewis’s child was born at the hospital by emergency Cesarian section but died shortly after delivery. Henderson was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a police officer when he killed Lisby.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Henderson. The complaint failed to plead sufficient facts plausibly suggesting that Henderson acted with the criminal recklessness necessary to establish a due process violation. View "Lisby v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Hunter was housed in a general-population wing of “Unit H” at Redgranite Wisconsin state prison. Patterson, Hunter’s cellmate March-December 2017, was regarded as a “lifer” and a “violent individual.” On multiple occasions, Patterson told Hunter that he would beat him while he slept. Hunter communicated Patterson’s threats to Mueske, the Unit H supervisor with authority over housing assignments. Hunter told Officer Walker about Patterson’s threats. At Walker’s suggestion, Hunter filled out an Inmate Complaint form, dated August 9. Walker typically notifies his superiors and drafts an incident report when he learns of threats between inmates, but he did not do so. Wilcox decided to move Patterson out of Unit H on December 6, 2017, but not due to Hunter’s complaints.On the day of Patterson’s move, Hunter approached Patterson, purportedly to say goodbye. Hunter claims that Patterson flew into a rage, accusing Hunter of causing Patterson’s reassignment. Patterson testified that Hunter called him various derogatory terms, including the N-word. Patterson violently battered Hunter and stomped on his head, causing Hunter permanent injuries and triggering his PTSD from his time in the military. The altercation was captured on video. In Hunter’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Mueske and Walker summary judgment. Hunter offered no facts from which a reasonable jury could find that Walker acted with deliberate indifference or that Mueske’s conduct caused his injury. View "Hunter v. Mueske" on Justia Law