Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wilson-Trattner dated Roeger, a Hancock County Sheriff’s Department deputy. The relationship became combative. On one occasion Roeger threw Wilson-Trattner against a wall and choked her; other incidents involved lewd and threatening text messages, statements that Wilson-Trattner had “fucked with the wrong person,” Roeger locking Wilson-Trattner out of her home, and Roeger punching a hole in her door. The Sheriff’s Office responses included statements that “we’re sick of getting these calls.” The McCordsville Department eventually arrested Roeger. He pled guilty and resigned from the Sheriff’s Department. Wilson-Trattner filed suit. The district court granted judgment for the defense on Wilson-Trattner’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive due process claim (against individual officers and Roeger in their individual and official capacities), her failure to train claim (against Sheriff Shepherd in his official capacity) and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (against Shepherd in his official capacity). It declined to grant judgment on battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Roeger. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Roeger was not serving as a state actor in his interactions with Wilson-Trattner. None of the defendants’ conduct was sufficiently outrageous to give rise to a cognizable claim; there was no evidence that they created or increased a danger to Wilson-Trattner. Mere indifference or inaction in the face of private violence cannot support a substantive due process claim. View "Wilson-Trattner v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A man entered a Rock Falls bank and handed the teller (Miller) a robbery note. Miller handed over $1,870. Miller immediately filled out a form, describing the robber's appearance and clothing. Police thought, based on the description, that Gonzalez was involved. Miller was shown poor quality printouts of Gonzalez’s driver’s license pictures, taken three years earlier. She stated that she did not recognize the person, although she thought one photograph depicted a man with features similar to those of the robber. Police released a still image taken from the bank’s video surveillance system. An employee at a restaurant close to the bank saw the photo and contacted the police because she had seen the sweatshirt in a dumpster. An officer retrieved the sweatshirt and found $20 bills in the pocket. Others told the police that they thought the robber in the still image resembled Gonzalez and connected him to the sweatshirt. Miller quickly identified Gonzalez from a six-man photo array that included his Facebook photo. Gonzalez was addicted to crack cocaine and stated that his addiction was “out of control.” Gonzalez was scheduled to visit his daughter at the time of the robbery, at a Rock Falls McDonald’s, next to the restaurant; he missed the visit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction for bank robbery. Although there were significant problems with the challenged identification procedures, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Chicago Police Officers pulled over 18-year-old Jackson for a missing front license plate. The officers claim that Jackson fired a weapon toward the squad car and ran away. The officers shot him three times in the back; he died the next day. Two eyewitnesses testified that they thought Jackson did not have a weapon. The defense offered testimony that gunshot residue was found on Jackson’s hand and that casings were found at the site from which Jackson shot. The gun found near Jackson was swabbed for DNA, but the samples were never tested by the Illinois State Police. Jackson’s mother brought a civil suit for excessive force and wrongful death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in excluding evidence or argument relating to the failure to test the DNA swabs. The only issue was whether the officers were justified in shooting Jackson. A lack of DNA evidence, without more, would not tend to prove or disprove justification. There was nothing tying the shooting officers to any missing DNA evidence. It would be unfair to assume that testing of the DNA swabs would have helped, or harmed, Mitchell’s case View "Mitchell v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Indiana’s alcohol regulatory scheme, like that of many states, divides the market into three tiers of the distribution chain (producers, wholesalers, and retailers) and three kinds of alcohol (beer, liquor, and wine). With limited exceptions, Indiana prohibits any person who holds a permit in one tier of the distribution chain from also holding an interest in a permit in another tier. For example, anyone who holds an interest in a retailing permit is generally prohibited from having any interest in a manufacturer’s or wholesaler’s permit of any type. Indiana also restricts the issuance of wholesaling permits by type of alcohol. The law allows some wholesaling permits to be combined: a beer wholesaler can get a permit to wholesale wine; a liquor wholesaler can get a permit to wholesale wine, but a beer wholesaler may not acquire an interest in a liquor-wholesaling permit and vice versa. Monarch holds permits to wholesale beer and wine and would like to wholesale liquor. Monarch sued, alleging that this aspect of the law facially discriminates against beer wholesalers in violation of the equal protection guarantee. The district court and Seventh Circuit upheld the law as surviving “rational basis” review. Monarch could not identify a similarly situated class that receives better treatment under the statute and reducing liquor consumption is a legitimate governmental interest. View "Monarch Beverage Co., Inc. v. Grubb" on Justia Law

Meadows worked for the Rockford Housing Authority (RHA), and leased, for $10 per month, an RHA apartment in a high-rise occupied by elderly and disabled tenants. RHA tenants complained that someone else was living in Meadows’s apartment. RHA’s manager saw an unidentified man leave the apartment and lock the door with a key and reported to RHA’s director, who contacted Metro, a private security company under contract with the RHA. Metro employee Novay, knocked on the door and spoke with a Sockwell, who stated that he was renting the apartment. Novay took Sockwell’s key and escorted him from the building. Meadows returned to the apartment, and, without notifying RHA or Metro, installed a new lock. That evening, RHA's director suggested changing the apartment's locks to protect the other tenants. The next morning, Meadows went to the police station to report that his apartment “had been ransacked.” Novay arrived to supervise the locksmith and found that Sockwell’s key no longer worked. The locksmith picked the locks. Meadows arrived, became enraged, tried to physically remove Novay, and called the police. Meadows was given a new key and allowed to remain in the apartment that day. Meadows sued Metro’s employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants; the employees of a private security company, who carried out the RHA’s order, are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Meadows v. Rockford Housing Authority" on Justia Law

Jones lived with Kelley. Kelley’s daughter (MK) went to a neighbor to call the police to report that Jones sexually assaulted her. Westville police officers went to the scene. Kelley stated that she was afraid of Jones; MK stated that she had been sexually assaulted by Jones for several years. Kelley stated that Jones was a convicted felon, was violent, and had guns in a bedroom safe. The officers verified that Jones was a felon, then went to the residence. Jones opened the door. Officers observed knives on a counter and told Jones that he needed to vacate the premises. Jones followed instructions. He was handcuffed at a picnic table, 10-20 feet from the door. Kelley signed a consent to search form. In the couple’s bedroom, officers found two gun safes, boxes of ammunition, and empty gun holsters. They saw several guns in one safe, which was partially open. The officers stopped the search, obtained a warrant, then seized 12 firearms, over a thousand rounds of ammunition, 17 clips, and several scopes. Jones was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. Jones failed to object to the search when it occurred; the initial search was conducted with Kelley’s consent and the guns were in plain view, The officers did not unlawfully detain or remove Jones; they had probable cause to arrest him. The guns would have inevitably been discovered. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Aguilar, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was confined for 90 days without a hearing based on a purported violation of extended supervision, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. For offenses committed before December 31, 1999, Wisconsin offenders are released from prison to “parole,” whereas for offenses committed after January 1, 2000, the offenders are released to “extended supervision.”Although the supervision for each status is essentially the same, there are legal differences between parole and extended supervision that dictate the punishments available for rule violations. Aguilar was convicted in 1996 and on February 23, 2010, he was released on parole. When Aguilar failed to report, his parole agent completed a Violation Investigation Report in which she properly checked the box indicating he was on “Parole,” but after Aguilar was arrested, she completed an Order to Detain form in which she erroneously checked the box indicating that Aguilar was on “Extended Supervision.” Aguilar admitted to violating rules. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the claims. Aguilar’s evidence supported only a claim of negligent conduct, which is insufficient to support a due process claim or an Eighth Amendment claim. View "Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police arrested Moseley at his house after M.K. accused him of domestic violence. While searching Moseley’s apartment, officers found handcuffs, rope, and other items associated with sexual bondage and seized Moseley’s computer, camera, external hard drive, and CDs and sent the electronic devices to the Department of Justice. When DOJ detectives searched the devices, they discovered nude photos of M.K. and of T.H., who worked with Moseley at a U.S. Marshal’s office. T.H. alleged that Moseley forced her into a sexual relationship by threatening her job. Her statement also chronicled his abusive behavior. The state charged Moseley with possessing nude photos of T.H. taken without her consent. Wis. Stat. 942.09(2). Moseley’s primary defense was that the two had been in a consensual relationship and that T.H. had consented to the photos. Before trial, Moseley unsuccessfully sought in camera review of T.H.’s mental-health records. Moseley was convicted. Wisconsin courts affirmed the denial of in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court decisions that the records did not contain material impeachment evidence and that whether T.H. consented to the relationship was immaterial to whether she consented to the photographs, were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Moseley v. Kemper" on Justia Law

On June 15, 2013, Johnson was shot by police while running down a Chicago alley. He died of his injuries. On March 23, 2015, Johnson’s mother, Liberty, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming the city and unknown police officers, and claiming false arrest, excessive force, and violation of due process. She argued that the city adopted policies that permit police to use excessive force, and failed to properly train and supervise the officers. Her attorney, Mulroney, served a subpoena on the city one week after filing the complaint, requesting the production of reports pertaining to the incident. On May 21, Mulroney advised the city that the documents were needed to identify the unknown officers. On May 26, the city’s counsel emailed Mulroney reports that identified the officers who shot Johnson. On June 24, Liberty sought leave to file an amended complaint. The city did not object. An amended complaint, filed July 6, 2015, named the officers. Liberty failed to respond to the city’s motion to dismiss; the district court granted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the officers as time‐barred. Liberty’s claims began to accrue on June 16, 2013; the limitations period expired on June 16, 2015, eight days before she sought leave to amend. Liberty is not entitled to equitable tolling or equitable estoppel; she had the information essential to amending her complaint. View "Liberty v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In rural Brown County, most buildings depend on septic systems. Simpson, who installed and repaired septic systems, received a letter demanding immediate repair of the septic system on Simpson’s mother’s property and threatening that if Simpson did not make the repairs, the county would request action through the prosecutor’s office and “may request an executive meeting of the Health Board to recommend that [Simpson’s] license to install septics be rescinded.” Two weeks later, without further process or an opportunity to be heard, Simpson received a letter: “Based on the findings our Health Board members approved the removal of your name from our list of approved septic contractors.” The letter did not inform Simpson of any law he had violated, and did not identify any opportunities for administrative or judicial review. Simpson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that post-deprivation remedies, such as common-law judicial review, satisfied the due process requirement and that Simpson had not availed himself of such remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Simpson plausibly alleged that he was denied the pre-deprivation notice and hearing he was due and that even if the County had some basis for summary action, it has not shown there is an adequate state law post-deprivation remedy. View "Simpson v. Brown County" on Justia Law