Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois officers arrested Walker after making controlled buys of methamphetamine from him. Walker told Agent Hiland that Hansmeier, who lived in Missouri, was his drug source and dealt large quantities of methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana. Hiland called Agent Murphy of the Northeast Missouri Narcotics Task Force. Murphy and another Task Force member were familiar with Hansmeier and interviewed Walker. Walker stated that he had bought large quantities of methamphetamine from Hansmeier and directed them to Hansmeier’s house. The agents ran background checks and learned that both men were on parole and that Hansmeier had several criminal convictions, including one related to drug distribution. Murphy drafted an affidavit in support of a no-knock search warrant for Hansmeier’s house, relying heavily on the information from Walker. Murphy also inaccurately reported that, during a previous investigation, Hansmeier had flushed drugs down the toilet when officers knocked and announced. A Missouri state-court judge signed the warrant on the morning after Walker's arrest. Officers found a loaded gun, marijuana, a large amount of cash, drug paraphernalia, and about 200 grams of a powdery substance. Hansmeier was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)–(b)(1)(D). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. There were many factors supporting Walker’s credibility. Although the affidavit included false information, nothing indicated that Murphy entertained serious doubts about the truth of the affidavit or attempted to mislead the judge. View "United States v. Hansmeier" on Justia Law

In 2011, Plaintiffs, former arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, brought a due process action challenging the implementation of a workers’ compensation reform statute that terminated their six‐year appointments under prior law. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clearly established right that was violated. While that suit was pending, the Illinois governor declined to reappoint Plaintiffs, which ended their employment. Two years later, Plaintiffs filed suit against the governor and his advisors, alleging retaliation for filing the prior suit and that the retaliation violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, holding that the Due Process Suit was not protected speech. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining decide whether the Due Process Suit was speech on a matter of public concern as is required for a government employee to show retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs’ claims fail because Plaintiffs were policymakers who could be not reappointed for engaging in “speech on a matter of public concern in a manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies.” View "Hagan v. Quinn" on Justia Law

ATF agents executed an arrest warrant at Coleman’s residence and observed what appeared to be heroin. After receiving his Miranda rights, Coleman stated that it was heroin for his personal use. The agents escorted Coleman to a vehicle. Coleman's wife, Charisse, said Coleman kept a gun and that Johnson and Coleman had been selling heroin for 20 years. She provided extensive details. In response to Coleman's unprompted statement, agents read Coleman his Miranda rights again. He signed a waiver and stated that he had guns and heroin inside the residence. Coleman gave consent to search. Agents nonetheless obtained a warrant and found drug paraphernalia, guns, and 168 grams of heroin. Coleman later identified a photo of Johnson and described their operation in detail. Both men had prior convictions for manufacturing and delivering a controlled substance. Chicago Police gave ATF information linking Johnson with a condominium. Agent Matuszczak's search warrant affidavit incorporated the affidavit submitted in support of the Coleman search. Agents executed the warrant at Johnson’s condo and seized 4.8 kilograms of heroin, $155,000 in cash, and items used to repackage and sell drugs. Johnson admitted owning the drugs and money and entered a conditional guilty plea under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of his motions to suppress the evidence; the known facts and circumstances supported a finding of probable cause. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Chambers pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (a)(5)(B). His attorney argued for a downward variance based on Chambers’s diminished capacity, U.S.S.G. 5K2.13. He was sentenced to 168 months, the low end of the range. Chambers voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal and challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance because counsel promised him a five-year sentence and failed to present mitigating evidence. Trial counsel testified that he never told Chambers he would receive a five-year sentence and that he decided against having Chambers’s therapist testify because it might look like Chambers was not accepting responsibility. The judge denied Chambers’s motion, noting that the PSR thoroughly described and counsel made arguments concerning Chambers’s background and mental-health issues. Chambers’s counsel on appeal abandoned him. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Chambers sought relief under Rule 60(b), arguing that he had been deprived of his opportunity to be heard when he was blocked from filing a pro se memorandum in support of his request for a certificate of appealability. The district judge concluded that she lacked authority to direct the appeals court to allow Chambers to submit a memorandum; Rule 60(b) only allowed her to remedy district court errors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the remedy for appellate counsel’s error is a motion to recall the mandate, which the court had already rejected. View "Chambers v. United States" on Justia Law

Mobley was shot in the leg; the shooter fled. The only physical evidence found by Gary, Indiana police was one spent shotgun shell. Earlier that day, Richardson had argued with his girlfriend while standing in Mobley’s yard. Mobley ordered them to leave. Only Holden was willing to give a formal statement to Detective Azcona, stating that “Chris” was the shooter. Azcona later testified that other, unidentified, sources stated that "Chris" had shot Mobley. Three weeks later, officer Hornyak received an anonymous phone call identifying Richardson as the shooter. After Richardson’s arrest, Azcona first spoke with Mobley. He brought prepared questions, which contained numerous references to “Chris.” Azcona showed Mobley a photo array and asked him not if he could identify the shooter, but whether he could identify “Chris Richardson.” Mobley chose his picture. Holden did not testify. Mobley admitted that he was drunk at the time he was shot, but stated that Richardson shot him. No other witness identified the shooter. The shotgun shell was not tested for fingerprints. Azcona testified about Holden’s identification of the shooter. The jury convicted Richardson. The Seventh Circuit reversed a denial of habeas relief. Indiana’s courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause cases. The use of Holden’s testimony and that of the unnamed informants to prove that Richardson was the shooter violated Richardson’s Confrontation Clause rights View "Richardson v. Griffin" on Justia Law

In 2013 the Sheriff of Whitley County, Indiana hired the county’s first black police officer, McKinney. Nine months later, McKinney was fired. He sued for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, his extensive evidence adds up to a strong case of race discrimination. The Sheriff “has offered an ever-growing list of rationales for firing McKinney that fall apart in the face of his evidence.” The Sheriff’s termination letter provided three reasons for his discharge. Four days later, the Board of Commissioners sent McKinney another letter that added two more reasons. After McKinney brought suit, the defense added three more reasons. McKinney presented evidence that he was treated differently than his similarly situated colleagues who are not black. He also presented substantial evidence that the many rationales offered for firing him were baseless and pretextual. The district court erred by disregarding most of McKinney’s evidence, improperly discounting his testimony as “self-serving,” and misreading the circuit’s precedent on the “common actor” inference that is sometimes argued in discrimination cases. View "McKinney v. Sheriff's Office of Whitley County" on Justia Law

An officer saw a car in front of a Summit, Illinois liquor store, took down the license number, and prepared to make a traffic stop, but was called to another incident. After hearing that the store was robbed and seeing the security footage, which included a car of the same description, the officer radioed out the license number. Schreiber was in the car when it was stopped, with loose cash visible on the floor. After a state grand jury indicted him for that robbery, a DNA buccal swab was taken from Schreiber. That sample linked him to a 2010 bank robbery. Federal authorities charged him with that crime. Schreiber moved to suppress the DNA evidence, claiming that state authorities had lacked probable cause to arrest him for the 2011 store robbery and that the swab was the fruit of that illegal arrest. The district court denied the motion. Schreiber was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Police may take a buccal swab after an arrest supported by probable cause and that a grand jury’s issuance of an indictment is conclusive on the question of probable cause. Schreiber did not supply any disputed material facts, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Schreiber" on Justia Law

With a warrant, police installed and monitored a GPS locator on Holst's car, while investigating Holst’s participation in methamphetamine sales. Police tracked Holst’s car as it stopped at a particular place for more than an hour. An informant told them that Holst had traveled to buy methamphetamine. Police stopped Holst’s car as he was driving home and found that drug. Other officers obtained a warrant to search the house in whose driveway Holst’s car had stopped. The search of Castetter’s house turned up methamphetamine, other drugs, and approximately $62,000 in cash. Prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Castetter moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that information derived from the first warrant should be ignored because Holst lives in Michigan, where the first warrant issued, while Castetter lives in Indiana. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The Fourth Amendment does not concern state borders. States may decide not to authorize their police to acquire information extraterritorially or may elect to ignore information from other states’ officers, but Indiana did not do so. Tracking a car by GPS does not offend any state’s sovereign rights. While the first warrant was not based on information about Castetter, all the police learned by monitoring the GPS was the location of Holst’s car. Castetter lacked a privacy interest in that location. The Constitution is not offended if, by executing a warrant to search one person (Holst), police learn incriminating details about another (Castetter). View "United States v. Castetter" on Justia Law

Stephenson was convicted, in Indiana, of the 1996 murders of three people and of theft of ammunition from the trailer in which one victim was staying. Shell casings at the murder scene matched those taken from the trailer. The jury recommended the death penalty, which the judge imposed. Stephenson’s state appeal and petition for postconviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal judge ruled that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel had failed to object to Stephenson having to wear a stun belt in the courtroom. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The district judge then ruled that Stephenson had not been prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to object to his having to wear a stun belt visible to jurors in the penalty phase because the jury had already decided that Stephenson was dangerous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to guilt. Taken together, the evidence old and new, “rife with inconsistencies,” fails to establish Stephenson’s innocence. Stephenson was not prejudiced at the guilt phase by the jury foreman’s acquaintance with the sister of a victim, or two jurors’ discussion of Stephenson’s participation in a bar fight before the murders. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the guilt phase, noting that the Indiana Supreme Court has barred the future use of stun belts in courtrooms, which can compromise a defendant’s participation at trial because it relies on continuous fear. It is possible that Stephenson’s having to wear the stun belt—for no reason, given that he had no history of acting up in a courtroom—contaminated the penalty phase. View "Stephenson v. Neal" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of three counts of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage an illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), three counts of sex trafficking of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a), and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (sex trafficking of a minor), 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court sentenced Jackson to 295 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the section 924(c) conviction and remanded for resentencing. Under the categorical approach, Jackson’s underlying conviction for sex trafficking of a minor does not “have as an element” the use or attempted use of force; the elements clause conviction (section 924(c)(3)(B)) stands or falls under the residual or risk‐of‐force clause, which applies when the underlying crime “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. That section is unconstitutionally vague. The court stated that on resentencing, the court should not apply a two-level increase in Jackson’s offense level for being a manager or supervisor in the offense under U.S.S.G. 3B1. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law