Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Interstate 90 runs through Campbell, Wisconsin, with a speed limit of 65 miles per hour. Two streets and one pedestrian overpass cross the highway within the town. A traffic survey in 2008 found that 23,000-29,000 trucks and cars pass through the town on I-90 every day. The local Tea Party placed banners on the pedestrian overpass, bearing messages such as “HONK TO IMPEACH OBAMA,” leading the town to enact an ordinance forbidding all signs, flags, and banners (other than traffic-control information) on any of the overpasses, or within 100 feet of the end of those structures. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to the challenge to the 100-foot buffer zone but otherwise affirmed. The ordinance is content-neutral; it does not matter what message any privately placed sign bears. It is a time, place, and manner limit, permitting messages to be conveyed anywhere else in Campbell. A “state or local legislature that attempts to reduce the incidence of sudden braking on a superhighway cannot be thought to be acting irrationally or trying to suppress speech for no good reason.” The town did not try to justify the buffer zone. View "Luce v. Town of Campbell, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a political party that has not attained sufficient votes in past elections must field candidates for all offices on the ballot in the political subdivision in which it wishes to compete. In the 2012 election, the Libertarian Party could field a candidate for Kane County auditor only if it also proposed candidates for six other offices. In its suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Party argued that the full-slate requirement violated its right of political association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit agreed, rejecting an argument that the requirement is justified by its interests in political stability, preventing ballot overcrowding, and avoiding voter confusion. The core of the fundamental right to political association is the right to band together in a political party to advance a policy agenda by electing the party’s members to office. That necessarily includes the candidates’ right to appear on the ballot under the party banner. For a minor party and its nominees, Illinois’s full-slate requirement extinguishes those rights unless the party fields candidates in races it may want no part of. This is a severe burden on fundamental constitutional rights. Illinois has not offered a compelling state interest to justify it. By incentivizing minor parties to manufacture frivolous candidacies, the full-slate requirement actually thwarts the interests Illinois invokes. View "Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Faucett possessed large quantities of child pornography, including 59 sexually explicit photos of his five-year-old granddaughter that he took while she was sleeping. When investigators found the collection on his computer, he initially denied knowledge of it. He later confessed. Faucett pleaded guilty to producing and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B). His presentence report detailed his alcoholism and mental-health issues, including ADHD, insomnia, depression, and anxiety. When he took the pictures of his granddaughter, he had active prescriptions for Adderall (for ADHD) and Paxil (an antidepressant). The defense strategy was acceptance of responsibility. He is serving a 30-year prison term. In a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, he claimed that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him that involuntary intoxication was an available defense and at least should have developed an argument about diminished capacity as a mitigating factor. The district judge denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that neither defense strategy would have had any chance of success. The Seventh Circuit affirmed without addressing whether involuntary intoxication is an available defense in a case like this one. Faucett did not articulate a viable factual basis for the defense even if it would apply. Nor was his counsel constitutionally ineffective for not arguing diminished capacity as a mitigating factor at sentencing. View "Faucett v. United States" on Justia Law

Under Chicago’s 2014 “puppy mill” ordinance, pet retailers in the city “may offer for sale only those dogs, cats, or rabbits” obtained from an animal control or care center, pound, or kennel operated by local, state, or federal government or “a humane society or rescue organization.” Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as exceeding the city’s home-rule powers and the implied limits on state power imposed by the Commerce Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The Illinois Constitution permits home-rule units like Chicago to regulate animal control and welfare concurrently with the state. The ordinance does not discriminate against interstate commerce, even in mild practical effect, so it requires no special cost-benefit justification under the Commerce Clause. The court found that the ordinance survives rational-basis review, noting the city’s concerns that large mill-style breeders are notorious for deplorable conditions and abusive breeding practices, including overbreeding, inbreeding, crowded and filthy living conditions, lack of appropriate socialization, and inadequate food, water, and veterinary care, causing pets to develop health and behavioral problems, creating economic and emotional burdens for pet owners and imposing financial costs on the city as owners abandon their pets. View "Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2013, a confidential informant informed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives about Toby Jones, the leader of a drug‐distribution operation on Chicago’s West Side. The informant introduced Toby and his brother, Kelsey, to ATF Agent Labno, who posed as a firearms and drug dealer. During several controlled drug purchases, Toby negotiated a drugs‐for‐guns transaction with Agent Labno. Eventually, Toby instructed one of his drug workers, Fields, to complete the transaction; Fields was arrested immediately after the exchange. Toby and Kelsey engaged in a week‐long effort to track down and kill the informant, resulting in two separate shootings. In the later shooting, Kelsey fled the scene in a getaway car driven by Whitfield. The brothers were later arrested and convicted of several crimes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court rejected claims that there was insufficient evidence to support convictions involving retaliatory intent, drug conspiracy, and possession of a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and upheld the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress eyewitness identification and its imposition of sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Ford and Hoefle were passengers in a car driven by Mincks when the car was stopped in Moline, Illinois for a traffic violation, around 2:00 a.m. Officers noticed open beer bottles and asked the men to exit the car. While frisking Ford they found a loaded pistol. Ford was arrested. Ford argued that the pat‐down exceeded the scope of a protective frisk for weapons. The government countered that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the men were armed and planned to avenge a shooting that had wounded Hoefle days earlier. The men had previously stated to investigators that they would deal with the shooting themselves. The government also contended that the officer who conducted the frisk had kept his hands outside of Ford’s clothing until encountering a heavy object weighing down his jacket. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. There was reasonable suspicion to frisk Ford under these circumstances. The officers had been warned via e‐mail that Ford and his companions might seek to retaliate for the shooting; the men likely had been drinking, as evidenced by the beer bottles, and their alcohol use gave the police greater reason to worry that one of them “might do something unpredictable, unwise, and dangerous.” View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

For nearly a decade, Gries and McCullars actively participated in a private online chat room frequented by pedophiles sharing large volumes of child pornography. They were indicted for conspiracy to distribute child pornography, conspiracy to sexually exploit a child, and engaging in a child-exploitation enterprise. Other users of the chat room cooperated with investigators, pleaded guilty, and received sentencing consideration. The charges against Gries and McCullars proceeded to trial; several cooperators testified against them. To convict Gries and McCullars of the enterprise offense, the government had to prove that they committed three or more crimes against children “in concert” with three or more persons, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)(2). The jury found them guilty on all charges. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the jury’s special verdict was sufficient to support the section 2252A(g)(2) enterprise convictions without the conspiracy predicates, at sentencing the parties and the judge overlooked that the conspiracy counts are lesser-included offenses of the enterprise count. Instead of merging those convictions with the enterprise conviction and imposing sentence on the greater offense alone, the judge imposed concurrent sentences on all three convictions. That error violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. McCullars" on Justia Law

After his arrest, Perry stated that he suffered from seizures as a result of a previous head injury, that his seizures were treated with medication, and that he had not taken his medication. He was placed in a “bullpen” and, 12 hours later, suffered a seizure and was transported to the hospital. After he returned to the jail, the city failed to provide Perry with medical care although he displayed signs of deteriorating health. He was shackled and had a spit mask placed over his face. Officers ignored his cries for help and complaints that he could not breathe and transferred him to the county facility, where nurses decided that Perry was medically unfit to be booked, but provided no medical care and failed to remove the mask, which was seeping blood. When a nurse removed the mask, Perry was not breathing. Despite emergency efforts, Perry died less than 24 hours after his arrest. On summary judgment, the district court rejected his family’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and a Monell claim, alleging that the city had a de facto policy of failing to investigate in-custody deaths and ignoring detainees' medical complaints. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part; the evidence, which includes surveillance footage, would permit a jury to grant relief on the section 1983 claims. Rejecting claims of qualified immunity, the court stated that it was clearly established that a detainee was entitled to objectively reasonable medical care. View "Estate of Perry v. Wenzel" on Justia Law

Orlowski, a 21-year-old inmate, was asleep in his bunk. At 12:28 a.m. and 1:36 a.m. dorm supervisor Alexander patrolled and did not notice anything unusual. Sergeant Manns toured the dorm and did not note anything unusual. At 3:45 a.m., Alexander began awakening inmates for kitchen duty. Alexander saw Orlowski breathing abnormally, making noises, and “his body would make sudden moves.” Green, another inmate, persisted in voicing concern about Orlowski and was put in the “hole.” Alexander thought that Orlowski might have a sleep disorder. Despite efforts to wake him up, Orlowski remained unresponsive. Alexander left him but noted the situation in the logbook and called Manns. Manns denies that Alexander gave him all the information. Orlowski did not wake up for breakfast. At 4:35 a.m., Corrections Manager Ertman read Alexander’s log entry and saw Orlowski. Alexander observed Orlowski at 4:55 a.m. and at 5:48 a.m. At 6:10 a.m., the inmates returned from breakfast. Alexander heard someone shouting “man down!” Alexander called a medical emergency. Orlowski was pronounced dead at 6:54 a.m. He died from a methadone overdose, caused by pills purchased from another inmate. According to medical experts, Orlowski would have fully recovered if he had received medical care between 3:45 and 5:48 a.m. The district court rejected all claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the Eighth Amendment claim. There is a material dispute of fact as to whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Orlowski’s severe medical condition. The court affirmed rejection of a substantive due process claim; there is no evidence that defendants intentionally interfered in plaintiff’s familial relationship. View "Orlowski v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police received a tip that a residence was being used as a drug house and secured a no-knock warrant. Entering, the officers saw Lee, beside a table holding a digital scale, a razor blade, sandwich baggies, a cell phone, $157 in cash, and a baggie containing 5.7 grams of cocaine. Officers searched Lee and found $582 and the house keys. Officers recovered two larger bags of cocaine, a loaded handgun, and latex gloves from other parts of the house. Lee claimed to be an innocent bystander, at the house was to help his brother move. Lee was convicted of drug crimes but acquitted of a firearm charge. Lee moved for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve objections, adequately cross-examine witnesses, and develop factual points at trial. Applying the Strickland standard, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Lee’s claim for lack of prejudice, explicitly addressing all but one of Lee’s complaints. Lee unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Under Supreme Court precedent, when a state court rejects a prisoner’s federal claim without discussion, a federal habeas court must presume that the court adjudicated it on the merits unless some state-law procedural principle indicates otherwise, even when the decision expressly addresses some but not all of a prisoner’s claims. Lee did not rebut the presumption, so the state court’s entire decision is subject to deferential review. The Wisconsin court reasonably applied Strickland. View "Lee v. Avila" on Justia Law