Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Frentz, a long-time alcoholic who was taking medication to deal with delirium tremens, was arrested for the murder of his housemate. He claimed to be suffering hallucinations and filed notice that he would pursue a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. After consulting with an expert, his attorney did not pursue the defense. Frentz was convicted of the murder and associated drug charges. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed. His state postconviction petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing the insanity defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his petition. Frentz sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Indiana court did not unreasonably apply federal law in denying Frentz’s postconviction petition. Counsel’s decisions were consistent with researching and deciding for strategic reasons not to pursue the insanity defense: Frentz changed his story several times, suggesting attempts to fabricate a cover story, rather than confusion or an inability to remember what had happened. The testimony of jailhouse informants, if credited, indicated a callous disregard for the victim's life and suggested that Frentz had attempted to conceal his crime, beginning almost immediately after the shooting when he reportedly drove his truck up and down the road (as corroborated by other witnesses). A jury could have relied on this evidence in disbelieving any claim of mental incapacity. View "Frentz v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2008, Yeoman attempted to fire a gun during an attempted robbery. He was apprehended minutes later. Yeoman pled “no contest” to attempted first-degree intentional homicide and is serving a 25-year sentence in a Wisconsin prison. On appeal he argued that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Yeoman’s car, that the officers failed to honor Yeoman’s invocation of his right to remain silent, and that the searches of his car and his person were unreasonable. Before filing his federal petition for habeas corpus relief, he exhausted some but not all of his claims in the Wisconsin courts. In state habeas proceedings, he had not raised claims that his post‐conviction lawyer was ineffective. In federal district court, Yeoman requested a stay, to hold his petition in abeyance so that he could return to state court and exhaust his remedies there. The court declined to enter the stay after concluding that Yeoman lacked good cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that, although Yeoman’s claims were not plainly meritless, and he had not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay, Yeoman’s strategic decision, based on a misapprehension of the law, did not constitute good cause for failure to exhaust. View "Yeoman v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Golla, who has a law degree, alleged, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the Office of the Chief Judge engaged in intentional reverse racial discrimination by paying Taylor, an African‐American male, a significantly higher salary than Golla, a white male, despite working in the same department and performing the same duties under essentially the same title. Golla started working in the Office in 1983. He was fired in 1995 but reinstated 10 months after he filed a complaint with the EEOC. Under a settlement agreement, Golla was reinstated at a pay position and title, Law Clerk I, which he retained until he resigned in 2013. When asked during his deposition whether anyone in the workplace made racial comments toward him, Golla answered, "nothing direct racial." He claimed his African-American supervisor made comments that were demeaning. The district court rejected Golla’s claim, finding no direct evidence of reverse racial discrimination that resulted in the pay disparity and that Golla failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination under the indirect method of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence as a whole was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Golla was paid at a lower pay grade than Taylor because of his race View "Golla v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County" on Justia Law

Conley was ensnared in a sting operation set up by the FBI and ATF, in which a government actor, pretending to be a criminal, presented him with an opportunity to be part of a robbery of an illegal (fictional) drug stash house containing 50 kilograms of cocaine and allegedly protected only by one unarmed and two armed guards. Conley was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); attempt of the latter; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924 (c)(1)(A); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was insufficient evidence to convict Conley beyond a reasonable doubt, and that testimony by a codefendant, who received a drastically reduced sentence for his testimony, was unreliable and should not have been credited for the purposes of establishing the elements of the offense. Because an ATF undercover agent recruited Myreon, the ringleader, who then recruited David, who recruited Adams, who recruited Conley, Conley was too many degrees of separation from the government agent to utilize an entrapment defense. View "United States v. Conley" on Justia Law

Tagami supports GoTopless, a nonprofit organization that advocates for a woman’s right to bare her breasts in public. She participated in the group’s annual “GoTopless Day” by walking around Chicago unclothed from the waist up, having applied “opaque” body paint to her breasts. A police officer ticketed her for violating an ordinance, which states: Any person who shall appear … in such a manner that the genitals, vulva, pubis, pubic hair, buttocks, perineum, anus, anal region, or pubic hair region of any person, or any portion of the breast at or below the upper edge of the areola thereof of any female person, is exposed to public view or is not covered by an opaque covering, shall be fined. Tagami was ordered to pay a $100 fine. Tagami sued, claiming that the ordinance violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both claims. Being in a state of nudity is not an inherently expressive condition; Tagami did not offer any facts from which it might reasonably be inferred that onlookers would have readily understood that this was actually a political protest against the public indecency ordinance. The ordinance survives intermediate scrutiny as a sex-based classification. View "Tagami v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Johnson and Lang traveled from California to an Illinois mink farm where they released approximately 2000 minks from their cages and destroyed or damaged other property on the farm. While on their way to damage a fox farm, Johnson and Lang were arrested on state charges of possession of burglary tools. Johnson and Lang were charged in federal court with violating the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), 18 U.S.C. 43(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(C). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss, holding that AETA is not overbroad and does not violate the First Amendment because it does not prohibit lawful advocacy that causes only loss of profits or goodwill. AETA’s definite terms do not invite discriminatory prosecutions. Having the word “terrorism” in the title of the statute does not violate the defendants’ substantive due process rights because Congress had a rational basis for using the word. View "United States v. Lang" on Justia Law

Around 9:00 p.m., as Mr. White was escorting guests outside, an unknown teenager (Hyles) charged uninvited into the White family’s Chicago home. Minutes later, police officers who were chasing Hyles pushed past White and followed Hyles into the house with guns drawn. White either fell or was pushed down. Officers found Hyles huddled in a basement room and arrested him, but they did not leave the house. Instead, they searched the house. Police claim that Mrs. White signed a consent; she claims she thought she was signing a complaint for trespass. The Whites sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages related to the entry and search of their home. After a trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the officers on three claims. The jury ruled for the defendants on the remaining four claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s credibility determinations concerning whether GPS data supported the police account of the incidents. While finding the admission of the transcript of Hyles’s guilty‐plea proceedings “unusual,” to establish the factual events that supported probable cause, the court noted that the Whites invited error by insisting that the entire transcript be read. View "White v. Hefel" on Justia Law

Armstrong’s Illinois conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed, based on a finding Armstrong’s guilty plea for unlawful restraint did not require him to register. Armstrong sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers who arrested him knew that he was not required to register, ignored and concealed exculpatory evidence, falsified documents, and propelled his prosecution. His previous case, with a nearly identical complaint, filed before his conviction was overturned, was dismissed as untimely and barred by the rule against collateral challenges to convictions. In this case, Armstrong sought leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and recruitment of a lawyer to help him. The court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened Armstrong’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), and concluded that the false-arrest claim already had been litigated and that other allegations did not state a “Brady” claim for a violation of due process or improper withholding of exculpatory evidence. The court dismissed an amended complaint with prejudice without appointing counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis of Armstrong’s request for the assistance of counsel was flawed for failure to ask: has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate the claim himself? View "Armstrong v. Villa Park Police Department" on Justia Law

In 2001, Socha, Leonard, and Holm, each forged a stolen check. Holm admitted his forgery and implicated Leonard. Socha’s name was not mentioned. While Leonard was avoiding the police, Holm and Drews left Leonard at Vincent's (Holm's brother) house, dug a grave, then drove Leonard to the grave, murdered and buried him. Socha was 144 miles away, with Holm’s girlfriend, Mrazik, where they were seen in bars. Drews later bragged about the murder to Mrazik, who told a friend, who informed the police. Holm and Drews were arrested. Months later, Mrazik, Drews, and Holm alleged that Socha was involved in the murder plan and entered into plea agreements. Socha was convicted as a party to first-degree intentional homicide. Meanwhile, the police interviewed Swanson, Holm’s cellmate. The recording and interview transcript were turned given to Holm’s counsel, but Socha was not aware of the interview until after his trial. Swanson discussed his impressions that Holm was lying and that Holm’s accusation of Socha was concocted, but also called Socha “a major player in the murder.” Socha knew about the Swanson interview before he filed his appeal and post-conviction motions. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals characterized the Swanson evidence as “inconsequential” and not “very exculpatory.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding the state court decision “not so outlandish as to be unreasonable.” View "Socha v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Smith, a registered sex offender, was convicted of driving with a revoked license and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment followed by mandatory supervised release. To begin his supervised release, Smith needed the Illinois Department of Corrections to approve a host site. On his release date, Smith submitted two host sites. The Department had not investigated the proposed sites. A parole supervisor ordered Smith’s parole officer, Anderson, to issue a parole violation report rather than release Smith. Anderson’s report contained incorrect statements, claiming that electronic monitoring was a condition of Smith’s supervised release and that the Department had attempted to place Smith at a host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic monitoring requirement. Smith spent another six months in custody before being released on good‐time credit. He sued Anderson under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Anderson. For relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity bars Smith’s claim. No court has held that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements; lacking these arrangements, their continued detention does not violate clearly established rights. View "Smith v. Anderson" on Justia Law