Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

As the governing body for middle and high school athletic programs, WIAA sponsors post-season tournaments. In 2005, WIAA gave a video production company exclusive rights to stream nearly all tournament events online; if the company elects not to stream a game, other broadcasters may do so after obtaining permission and paying a fee. The contract does not prohibit media coverage, photography, or interviews before or after games. Private media may also broadcast up to two minutes of a game, or write or blog about it, so long as they do not engage in "play-by-play." Defendant newspapers decided to stream four WIAA tournament games without obtaining consent or paying the fee. The district court entered declaratory judgment in favor of WIAA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Streaming or broadcasting an event is not the same thing as reporting on or describing it. The court noted the distinction between state-as-regulator and state-as- proprietor, and that tournament games are a performance product of WIAA that it has the right to control.

Plaintiff claims that defendants are billing aggregators engaged in "cramming" by placing unauthorized charges on telephone bills, arranged unauthorized charges on plaintiff's telephone bill, and were responsible for unauthorized charges on the telephone bills of more than one million Indiana telephone numbers. Defendants produced evidence that plaintiff actually ordered the services in question. Plaintiff argued that the service was not legally authorized if defendants did not possess all customer authorization documentation required by the Indiana anti-cramming regulation, 170 IAC 7-1.1-19(p). That law does not provide a private right of action, but plaintiff argued that defendants' failure to comply proved unjust enrichment and provided a basis for suit under Indiana's Deceptive Commercial Solicitation Act, Ind. Code 24-5-19-9. The district court denied class certification and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The anti-cramming regulation does not apply to these defendants, which are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies. There was no unjust enrichment and the DCSA does not apply; plaintiff ordered and received services. Common issues do not predominate over individual issues, as required for a class under FRCP 23(b)(3).

Inmates filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the Indiana Department of Corrections violated their First Amendment Rights by prohibiting them from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals. The prohibition was enacted in response to an investigation of the link between pen-pal correspondence and inmate fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the IDOC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs conceded that preventing prisoners from developing relationships with outsiders in order to defraud them by inducing financial contributions is a legitimate governmental objective. The prohibitions are reasonably related to that objective; viable alternative means of communication are available.

The national organization, chartered by Congress (36 U.S.C. 80302), decided to reduce the number of local councils, which are, essentially, franchises. The plan called for dissolution of the plaintiff council and dividing its territory among other councils. The district court ruled in favor of the national organization, reasoning that to apply the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to the national organization would violate the organizationâs freedom of expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The fact that a law of general application might indirectly and unintentionally impede the organization's efforts to communicate its message is not enough to render the law inapplicable. The law, which forbids a franchisor to terminate or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause, applies to the nonprofit organization; the national organization "all but abandoned" its argument that it had good cause.

Defendants faxed unsolicited advertisements to plaintiff and others, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. One of the recipients filed a proposed class action in Wisconsin, but dismissed its complaint after the four-year limitations period had run, but before the class was certified. Plaintiff's motion to intervene was denied. The district court denied a motion to dismiss plaintiff's subsequent complaint, reasoning that the limitations period was tolled by the state court filing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal.

The hospital opposed a proposed medical office building by lobbying public officials, conducting a public relations campaign, offering incentives to discourage prospective tenants, and making negative statements about the developer. Prospective tenants withdrew from conditional agreements and approvals were denied. The developer sued, alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, under which efforts to petition government are shielded from liability, and rejecting a claim of "sham." Even if the hospital made material misrepresentations during and relating to village board proceedings, which were legislative in nature, those misrepresentations are legally irrelevant because those meetings were inherently political in nature. The public relations campaign was inextricably intertwined with efforts before the board. The hospitalâs contacts with other healthcare providers constituted mere speech that is not actionable under the Sherman Act. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the record that the successful effort to convince physicians not to relocate their practices constituted predatory conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws.