Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002 the city amended its ordinance to allow police to impound vehicles and impose a $500 fine on persons driving without a valid license or proof of insurance. The ordinance generated protests that it applied more harshly against minorities. The city had an outdoor assembly ordinance, requiring written application for a permit 20 days in advance, and providing discretion to require the event organizer to pay a cash deposit as a condition of permit issuance. In addition to enforcing the permit ordinance, city officials barred one protestor from speaking at a city council meeting concerning the towing ordinance. Plaintiffs sued the city, its mayor, and its police chief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights of free speech, of assembly, and to petition government for redress of grievances. The district court denied the mayor and police chief's claims of qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The mayor barred anything and everything one of the protestors proposed to say at a public meeting, in retaliation for the protestor's prior statements. Other claims of immunity require resolution of factual issues.

Defendant, an "infomercialist," violated a court-approved settlement with the FTC by misrepresenting the content of his book, The Weight Loss Cure They Don't Want You to Know About. The district court held him in contempt, ordered him to pay $37.6 million to the FTC, and banned him from making infomercials for three years. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sanctions. On remand, the district court reinstated the $37.6 million remedial fine, explaining that it reached that figure by multiplying the price of the book by the 800-number orders, plus the cost of shipping, less returns, and instructing the FTC to distribute the funds to those who bought the book using the 800-number. Any remainder was to be returned to defendant. The district court also imposed a coercive sanction, a $2 million performance bond, effective for at least five years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court order, the performance bond in particular, does not violate the First Amendment.

Indiana University had an Instructional Television Fixed Service license, issued by the FCC, that authorized broadcast on specified frequencies. A not-for-profit ITFS licensee can lease unused frequencies to a for-profit entity. The university was contemplating assigning frequencies to PBS, but before it did, PBS quitclaimed its rights to the debtor. Thinking that the transfer was final, debtor modified equipment at a cost of $350,000. The bankruptcy trustee filed a claim against the university, contending that it had promised PBS the license, that debtor had reasonably relied on the promise, and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel entitled debtor to damages of $116,000. The claim settled for $100,000. Because the settlement left the estate with insufficient assets to pay unsecured creditors, a creditor challenged it. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trustee decided that pursuing a claim for the license was hopeless and made a reasonable decision.

The district court certified a class in a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for the court re-evaluate the gravity of class counsel’s misconduct and its implications for the likelihood that class counsel will adequately represent the class. The district court concluded that "only the most egregious misconduct" by the law firm representing the class "could ever arguably justify denial of class status." The court must weigh the firm's misleading statements and the risk that the firm is in this case purely for itself and not for the benefits that the suit if successful might confer on the class.

Plaintiff was banned from the senior center because she repeatedly violated the code of conduct by yelling, making threats, and making frivolous complaints to police. She sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violation of free-speech and due-process rights and that the code is facially unconstitutional. A magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the director and board of the center are not final policymakers for purposes of enforcing the code of conduct. Under state and local law, plaintiff could ask the city council to overturn the expulsion. She had been informed of her right to appeal and failure to do so precludes municipal liability to the extent that claimed constitutional violations stem from the ban. The court stated that it was not imposing a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 1983, but recognizing the council's role as policymaker. The board has authority to make rules for the center, so the code of conduct itself is city policy. The court rejected a facial challenge to the code, which consists of reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions and is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

Plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to enjoin defendant from sending unsolicited text messages to cellphone users and damages. He estimated that more than 1,000 people had received these messages and requested damages fixed by the Act, $500 for each violation. The court could award three times that amount, up to $1,500 for each violation, if it determined that defendant acted "willfully and knowingly." Within a month, defendant sent a letter offering to settle the case by giving plaintiff and up to 10 other affected people $1,500 for each text message received, plus court costs, and offering to stop sending unsolicited text messages to mobile subscribers. Plaintiff did not respond. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the offer mooted the claim. To allow a case, not certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake would defy the limits on federal jurisdiction.

During a radio call-in show, plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, called in response to critical comments regarding defendant's (county sheriff) involvement with an African-American community organization dedicated to reducing crime and indicating that defendant was not a good fit for his position. Defendant called in and retorted by describing plaintiff as a "slacker" and mentioning a disciplinary action taken in 2004 against plaintiff for "sexual harassment." In actuality, the disciplinary action was for violation of a department rule that prohibited offensive conduct or language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for disclosure of plaintiff's disciplinary history, a claim under Wisconsin's Open Records Law, and a claim under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was no Records Act violation; there was no request to inspect a disciplinary record, no permission granted, and no balancing test undertaken. The information at issue is a matter of public record, so there was no Privacy Act violation. Rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court noted that there was no threat, coercion, or intimidation.

Plaintiffs, members of a religious organization, demonstrated around the stadium at which the 2006 "Gay Games" were held, but were prohibited from demonstrating and preaching on the sidewalk. They stopped demonstrating on the sidewalk outside a major tourist attraction (Navy Pier) under threat of arrest. One plaintiff, who refused to move from his spot on a public sidewalk outside one of the game venues, was arrested for disorderly conduct. The district court ruled in favor of the city defendants on claims under the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration, and common law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the First Amendment claim dealing with a policy requiring a permit for even small-group demonstrations outside Navy Pier. The constitutionality of that policy must be evaluated in light of the unique features of the location. The city's legitimate concerns justify its actions with respect to the other locations.

Plaintiffs, citizens of Illinois, brought a class action on behalf of licensed drivers in several states against West Publishing, asserting claims under the Driver’' Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2722. They contend that West acquires personal information contained in motor vehicle records of millions of drivers, directly or indirectly, from state DMVs for resale in violation of the Act. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.While the Act does create a federal private right of action for people who claim that their personal information has been disclosed in violation of the Act, it does not prohibit West Publishing from reselling the plaintiffs' personal information to those with uses permitted by the Act.

Plaintiff, publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state prison system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after prison officials concluded that the March 2007 edition posed an unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security and refused to distribute the issue to inmates. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in their favors. A second case was filed by a prisoner, against DOC employees, after they confiscated medical records and legal documents regarding other inmates, as well as copies of an article he published in the newsletter. The district court dismissed the claims on their merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions. The publisher did not establish that confiscation of the newsletter was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. DOC's policy, restricting prisoners' access to third-party mail did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights.