Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Iqbal bought a gasoline service station and contracted with S-Mart Petroleum for gasoline. Iqbal then hired Patel to conduct the business, ceding operational control to him. He chose Patel on the recommendation of Johnson, S-Mart’s president. Patel ran the business but did not pay for the gasoline, leading S-Mart to sue. The Indiana state court entered a judgment of more than $65,000 against Iqbal as guarantor. Under a settlement, Iqbal gave S-Mart a note, secured by a mortgage on the business premises. When he still did not pay, a state court entered a second judgment against him, and the property was sold in a foreclosure auction. Iqbal filed a federal suit, alleging that Patel and Johnson acted in cahoots to defraud him out of his business and seeking treble damages under 18 U.S.C. 1964, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it challenged the state court’s judgments. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predated the state litigation and caused injury independently of it. View "Iqbal v. Patel" on Justia Law

In 2008 Motorola agreed to make a good-faith effort to purchase two percent of its cell-phone user-manual needs from Druckzentrum, a printer based in Germany. After a year, Motorola’s sales contracted sharply. Motorola consolidated its cell-phone manufacturing and distribution operations in China, buying all related print products there. Motorola notified Druckzentrum. The companies continued to do business for a few months. After losing Motorola’s business Druckzentrum entered bankruptcy and sued Motorola, alleging breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. Druckzentrum claimed that the contract gave it an exclusive right to all of Motorola’s user-manual printing business for cell phones sold in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia during the contract period. The district judge entered summary judgment for Motorola. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The written contract contained no promise of an exclusive right and was fully integrated, so Druckzentrum cannot use parol evidence of prior understandings. Although Motorola promised to make a good-faith effort, the contract listed reasons Motorola might justifiably miss the target, including business downturns. There was no evidence of bad faith. The evidence was insufficient to create a jury issue on the claim that Motorola fraudulently induced Druckzentrum to enter into or continue the contract. View "Druckzentrum Harry Jung GmbH v. Motorola Mobility LLC" on Justia Law

In 1999 Seltzer registered the word “Kashwére” as a trademark for chenille soft goods. In 2009, Seltzer sold his company’s assets, including the trademark, to its principal officers. They formed TMG, which granted Seltzer an exclusive license to sell chenille products under the Kashwére name in Japan, through Flat Be. TMG claims that Seltzer violated his license by creating USAJPN and transferring to it all rights conferred by his license, to create an appearance of distance between Seltzer and Flat Be. Although Seltzer owned a majority interest in USAJPN, he needed TMG’s approval for the transfer. Flat Be also created a line of fabrics, “Kashwére Re,’ that are not chenille. Seltzer’s license does not authorize use of the Kashwére name for products that are not chenille, but he claimed that a TMG owner approved the Kashwére Re project. USAJPN also failed to comply with a requirement to disclose the TMG licensee. The district judge denied TMG’s request to order the license cancelled or to enjoin future violations and award damages. The Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of TMG on Seltzer’s and Flat Be’s counterclaims, but reversed summary judgment in favor of Seltzer and Flat Be on TMG’s claims. View "Kashwere, LLC v. Kashwere USAJPN, LLC" on Justia Law

Whirlpool purchased injection-molded plastic knobs and decorative metal stampings from Grigoleit. In 1992 Whirlpool told Grigoleit that it would start using products made by Phillips. Grigoleit believed that Phillips was using a method protected by its patents. Ultimately Grigoleit licensed its patents to Whirlpool and Phillips; instead of royalties Grigoleit got Whirlpool’s business for the “Estate” and “Roper” brand lines and a promise of consideration for other business. The agreement and the patents expired in 2003. An arbitrator concluded that Whirlpool had failed to consider Grigoleit’s parts for some lines of washers and dryers and was liable for payment of money royalties or damages. Grigoleit demanded the profit it would have made had Whirlpool purchased its requirements of knobs exclusively from Grigoleit. The district court concluded that a reasonable royalty fell in the range of 1¢ to 12¢ per part and the parties then agreed that royalties would then be $140,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that lost profits differ from royalties. The caption on the contract is “LICENSE AGREEMENT” and the heading on paragraph 3 is “Royalties.” The agreement is a patent license; the court was not obliged to treat it as a requirements contract.View "Grigoleit Co. v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Gerdau leased a locomotive from Titan for use in switching at its Knoxville mill. Titan shipped the locomotive in 2008, but it was damaged in transit and sent for repair. It did not reach Gerdau’s plant until 2009. Gerdau rejected it, stating that it needed further repairs. While the locomotive was being repaired, Titan assigned the lease to Leasing, an affiliated business, which then used the lease as security for a loan from Wells Fargo. The loan is nonrecourse: Wells Fargo agreed to look for repayment exclusively from the stream of rentals expected from Gerdau. Leasing made several warranties. Gerdau has never made a payment on the lease. Wells Fargo has taken control of the locomotive and is attempting to sell it. The district court granted summary judgment against Wells Fargo, ruling that Leasing had kept its promises. The court looked to the lease, and then to the Uniform Commercial Code, to see whether the locomotive had been “accepted” when the lease was assigned. Gerdau had an opportunity and the lease required Gerdau to inspect before shipment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gerdau did not acknowledge the locomotive’s receipt; Leasing did not live up to its warranties. It must repay Wells Fargo. Titan must perform the guarantees.View "Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Titan Leasing Inc." on Justia Law

Burzlaff bought a “Stallion” motorized tricycle from Thoroughbred Motorsports in 2009 for $35,000. When Burzlaff reported the first problems to Thoroughbred, the company instructed him to take his vehicle to a Ford dealer for warranty repairs. Burzlaff did so repeatedly. After the vehicle had been out of service for repairs for 71 days during the first year, Burzlaff demanded, under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, that Thoroughbred replace the vehicle or refund his purchase price. Thoroughbred refused. Further efforts to repair the vehicle at the Thoroughbred factory in Texas failed to correct the defects. Burzlaff sued Thoroughbred under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301, and the Wisconsin Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171. The district court awarded double damages plus costs and attorney fees for a total judgment of $95,000 under the more generous provisions of the state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instructions on the Lemon Law claim, the sufficiency of the evidence on that claim, and the submission of the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. View "Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports Inc." on Justia Law

Brothers Patrick and Thomas each owned one‐third of the stock of Commercial Light, a Chicago electrical contractor. Between 1982 and the 2008 sale of the company, Thomas was the CEO, board chairman, and president. The other officers were the company’s treasurer, and its executive vice‐president. The board of directors had only two members: Thomas and a lawyer. Patrick took no part in the company’s management. Patrick sued, claiming that when Morris became executive vice‐president in 1992, he, with Thomas’s approval, started jacking up the salaries and bonuses paid so that the compensation of the three officers soared, totaling $22 million between 1993 and 2000, and that the lawyer on the board rubber‐stamped Thomas’s compensation decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding breach of fiduciary duty. The jury did not have to find that the compensation was excessive in order to find a breach of fiduciary duty by concealment. Illinois allows as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty a forfeiture of all the fiduciary’s earnings during the period of breach. The court speculated on why the highly-educated Patrick did not discover the concealment until several years after the sale, but noted that the appeal only concerned jury instructions. View "Halperin v. Halperin" on Justia Law

VLM, a Canadian agricultural supplier, sold frozen potatoes to Illinois Trading, a reseller. VLM sued Illinois Trading for $184,000 owed on the contract, with counts based on the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, which creates a trust in favor of the seller when a buyer purchases agricultural goods on short-term credit, 7 U.S.C. 499e(c)(2). To protect the trust assets, VLM sought a preliminary injunction. Illinois Trading had obtained loans from TAB Bank, giving a security interest in its assets. By the time VLM filed suit, TAB had seized Illinois Trading’s assets. The PACA-created trust made VLM’s claim superior to TAB’s security interest. VLM added a claim against TAB for seizing PACA trust assets. Before the amendment, VLM had successfully moved for consolidation of the preliminary-injunction hearing with trial on the merits. The consolidated hearing pertained only to counts against Illinois Trading, not Count V, pertaining to TAB. The court, however, issued an opinion resolving Counts I through IV and also entered judgment for TAB on Count V, because VLM had not presented evidence on that claim. The district court awarded VLM attorney’s fees and interest on the unpaid balance based on provisions in VLM’s invoices. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to Count V; held that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, was controlling not the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code; and reversed and remanded with respect to attorney’s fees and interest View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Transp. Alliance Bank,Inc." on Justia Law

Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries buy LCD panels and incorporate them into cellphones. They alleged that foreign LCD panel manufacturers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by fixing prices. Only about one percent of the panels were bought by Motorola in the U.S. The other 99 percent were bought by, paid for, and delivered to foreign subsidiaries; 42 percent of the panels were bought by subsidiaries and incorporated into products that were shipped to Motorola in the U.S. for resale. The other 57 percent were incorporated into products that were sold abroad and never became U.S. domestic commerce, subject to the Sherman Act. The district judge ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding the 42 percent was barred by 15 U.S.C. 6a(1)(A): the Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.” View "Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp." on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, Mississippi Valley agreed to sell cattle to Swift, planning to fulfill that agreement in part with cattle it had received from J&R. Mississippi Valley was merely the holder of J&R’s cattle, not the purchaser or owner. Because the relationship between Swift and J&R had soured, Mississippi Valley did not inform Swift that some of the cattle were actually J&R’s. Swift paid for the purchases with checks made out to Mississippi Valley, which deposited the checks in its general operating account and periodically sent J&R checks for sales of J&R cattle. Mississippi Valley stopped making timely payments. As the debt mounted, J&R sent increasingly frantic demands for payment. Mississippi Valley sent seven checks to J&R totaling $862,747.31. Less than 90 days later, creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Mississippi Valley. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the seven payments as preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547(b), but J&R argued that Mississippi Valley never had a property interest in the funds but only held the sale proceeds for J&R’s benefit. The bankruptcy court granted J&R summary judgment. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that it is unclear how much money could properly be traced to a constructive trust in favor of J&R.View "In re: MS Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law