Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In her case, consolidated for pretrial proceedings as part of multidistrict litigation, Dzik alleged that she suffered a venous thromboembolism because she used a prescription birth control pill, Yasmin. Dzik’s medical records disclosed that she last filled a Yasmin prescription 10 months before her injury. Dzik’s counsel “suggested” that her doctor had provided samples of Yasmin before Dzik suffered the VTE. In March 2014, defendants requested additional medical records or an affidavit from Dzik’s doctor substantiating her use of the drug near the time of her injury. Dzik’s counsel ignored the request for 15 months. Bayer settled other cases, prompting the court to enter a case‐management order in August 2015 that provided for automatic dismissal should any plaintiff fail to comply. Defendants notified Dzik’s counsel of their obligations under the order, but got no response. In December 2015, Bayer moved to dismiss several cases, including Dzik’s. Dzik failed to respond. In January 2016, the court dismissed her suit with prejudice. Her attorney, having taken no action for nearly two years, immediately moved (unsuccessfully) to set aside the dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that affidavits submitted by Dzik’s attorneys contradicted the sworn account of defense counsel and concluding that those affidavits were “a red flag,” based on vagueness and a concession of “neglect” by the firm. The order was “crystal clear,” Dzik’s attorneys had ample time to respond to discovery, and their neglect was not excusable. View "Dzik v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

Tri-State sued the Bauers in small claims court for the cost of a water treatment system it had installed following a free, in-home assessment of their water. The Bauers answered and filed a counterclaim, asserting a multi-state class action for fraud. Their subsequent, amended class-action counterclaim added Home Depot and Aquion as counterclaim-defendants and asserts that the counterclaim-defendants conducted in-home water tests that did nothing but identify mineral content, rather than contaminants, and thereby misled consumers into buying their water treatment systems. Home Depot filed notice of removal, 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1), 1453(b), arguing that although it was not an original “defendant” in the underlying case, its status as an additional counterclaim-defendant in an action meeting criteria of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), entitled it to do so. The Bauers argued that the general removal statute, as modified by CAFA, does not permit any kind of counterclaim-defendant to remove. The district court held that CAFA did not disturb the longstanding rule that only original defendants can remove cases to federal court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the remand to state court. The court has previously held that a counterclaim-defendant is not entitled to remove a case to federal court under CAFA; the statute does not support treating an original counterclaim-defendant differently from a new one. View "Bauer v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Darden operates restaurants throughout Illinois under brand names including Olive Garden and Red Lobster. The plaintiffs worked intermittently as hourly employees at Darden-owned restaurants from 2004-2012. After quitting, they brought a proposed class action alleging that Darden failed to pay them pro rata vacation pay upon separation in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1-15. The district judge declined to certify their proposed class and granted Darden summary judgment on Clark’s individual claim. McMaster settled his claim with Darden, reserving the right to appeal the denial of class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The proposed class definition, “All persons separated from hourly employment with [Darden] in Illinois between December 11, 2003, and the conclusion of this action[] who were subject to Darden’s Vacation Policy … and who did not receive all earned vacation pay benefits,” described an impermissible “fail safe” class, and their proposed alternative did not satisfy FRCP 23. The statute does not mandate paid time off. It merely prohibits the forfeiture of accrued earned vacation pay upon separation if the employee is otherwise eligible for paid vacation. Darden’s policy on paid vacation covered only full-time employees. Clark was ineligible because she worked part-time. View "McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Chicago obtained a default administrative judgment of $3,540 against Plaintiff (Manistee Apartments), based upon a finding of code violations. The city registered the judgment and imposed a lien against plaintiff’s real estate. Plaintiff contends that it first received actual notice of the lien during routine title insurance review while it was preparing to sell its properties. In response to plaintiff’s effort to settle the matter, the city demanded $5,655.16, reflecting $720.34 in statutory interest plus $1,394.82 in collection costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff conveyed its property, paid $5,655.16 under protest, and filed a federal class action, alleging due process violations. The court dismissed, stating that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that plausibly supported the assertion that it paid the demand under duress; because its payment was voluntary, plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the claim was more appropriate for small claims court and questioning: why would such a small amount cause the plaintiff to exert so much time and effort? The court stated that it suspected that only lawyers stood to benefit. View "Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

On February 10, 2015, Meyers was given a copy of his receipt after dining at Nicolet Restaurant in de Pere, Wisconsin. He noticed that Nicolet’s receipt did not truncate the expiration date, as required by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. Meyers filed a putative class action, purportedly on behalf of everyone who had been provided a non‐compliant receipt at Nicolet, seeking only statutory damages. The district court denied Meyers’ motion for class certification, holding that Meyers had satisfied FRCP 23(a)’s four prerequisites, but failed to establish that class‐wide issues would “predominate” over issues affecting only individual potential class members. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). In a separate suit, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that sovereign immunity barred Meyers’ claim against the Oneida Tribe, the owner of the restaurant. The Seventh Circuit then held that Meyers lacked standing in his suit against the restaurant. Violation of a statute, completely divorced from any potential real‐world harm, is not sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury‐in‐fact requirement so, the district court lacked authority to certify a class action. View "Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of DePere, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012 Walgreens acquired a 45 percent equity stake in Alliance, plus an option to acquire the rest of Alliance’s equity for a mixture of cash and Walgreens stock. Walgreens later announced its intent to purchase the remainder of Alliance and engineer a reorganization whereby Walgreens would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a new corporation, Walgreens Boots Alliance. Within two weeks after Walgreens filed a proxy statement seeking shareholder approval, a class action was filed; 18 days later, less than a week before the shareholder vote, the parties agreed to settle. The settlement required Walgreens to issue several requested disclosures and authorized class counsel to request $370,000 in attorneys’ fees, without opposition from Walgreens. The Seventh Circuit reversed approval of the settlement, calling the supplemental disclosures “a trivial addition to the extensive disclosures already made in the proxy statement.” “The oddity of this case is the absence of any indication that members of the class have an interest in challenging the reorganization.... The only concrete interest suggested … is an interest in attorneys’ fees.... Certainly class counsel, if one may judge from their performance in this litigation, can’t be trusted to represent the interests of the class.” View "Hays v. Berlau" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (purchasers of containerboard) filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, alleging that the defendants (producers and sellers of containerboard) agreed “to restrict the supply of containerboard by cutting capacity, slowing back production, taking downtime, idling plants, and tightly restricting inventory,” which led to an increase in the price of containerboard. The court certified a class under FRCP 23: All persons that purchased Containerboard Products directly from any of the Defendants or their subsidiaries or affiliates for use or delivery in the United States from at least as early as February 15, 2004 through November 8, 2010. The proposed definition carved out the defendants themselves, entities or personnel related to them, and governmental entities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after examining: whether common questions predominate; whether antitrust injury can be proved using a common method; whether the amount of damages can be proved using a common method; and whether a class action is superior. The court noted that no defendant challenged the Purchasers’ experts and there were few factual disputes. A “smattering” of individual contract defenses did not undermine the superiority of the (b)(3) class action. View "Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int'l Paper Co." on Justia Law

Attorney Turza sent fax advertisements to accountants. In 2013, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that these faxes violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, but reversed a plan to distribute a $4.2 million fund to the class members and donate any remainder to charity. Meanwhile, Turza posted a $4.2 million supersedeas bond. Invoking the common-fund doctrine, the district judge awarded class counsel about $1.4 million. TCPA authorizes an award of up to $500 per improper fax. The court ordered two-thirds of that sent to every class member. If some members fail to cash their checks or cannot be found, there would be a second distribution. The maximum paid out per fax would be $500. If money remains, the residue returns to Turza. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. This is not a common-fund case; suits under TCPA seek recovery for discrete wrongs. If a recipient cannot be located, or spurns the money, counsel are not entitled to be paid for that fax. TCPA is not a fee-shifting statute. Turza is not required to pay the class’s attorneys just because he lost the suit. Distributing more than $500 per fax ($333 to the recipient and $167 to counsel) would either exceed the statutory cap or effectively shift legal fees to Turza. The $4.2 million represents security for payment, so once the debt is satisfied, the surplus can be returned to Turza. View "Holtzman v. Turza" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former detainees, brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cook County, claiming that the level of dental care at the Jail demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court originally certified two classes of plaintiffs under FRCP 23, but later decertified one class and modified the other, finding that the Jail’s implementation of a consent order with the Department of Justice eliminated a common question concerning inadequate staffing and brought care into compliance with national standards. The court could not find another common factor among the claims, noting that “treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at many stages.” The court then determined that the detainees’ motion for injunctive relief was moot. While an appeal was pending, the detainees unsuccessfully moved for a new trial (FRCP 60(b)) based on newly discovered evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding decertification of the classes because of the lack of a common issue of fact or law. The detainees’ questions do not point to the type of systematic and gross deficiency that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment; they did not allege a specific policy that directly causes delay, nor a pattern of egregious delays across the entire class. Filing a Rule 60(b) motion during the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate; there was no final judgment in the case. View "Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

In 2005, FedEx delivery drivers, represented by Defendants (lawyers), filed suit, alleging that FedEx had misclassified them as independent contractors, citing the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/1. In 2011, after the court granted partial summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs were IWPCA employees, Rocha joined the action. His agreement with Defendants limited the scope of representation because he was pursuing other claims against FedEx on behalf of his company with separate representation by Johnson (his spouse). The agreement affirmed Rocha’s right to accept or reject any settlement. In 2012, the parties notified the court of a tentative settlement. Defendants told Rocha and Johnson that FedEx required “a release of all claims against FedEx both individually and on behalf of any associated corporation,” but reasserted Rocha’s right to not join the settlement. After the court approved the settlement, it allowed Defendants to withdraw as Rocha's counsel, dismissed the case with prejudice for all named plaintiffs except Rocha, and dismissed Rocha's case without prejudice. Rocha was not required to pay attorney’s fees or expenses. The district court later dismissed Rocha’s separate suit. Before filing his state‐court complaint (still pending), Rocha sued Defendants, claiming breach of contract, malpractice, fraud, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding no plausible grounds for relief. View "Rocha v. Rudd" on Justia Law