Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2010, Kirklin drove Jones and McCallister to rob a bank and gave Jones firearms. The two left with stolen money but were arrested near the scene. Kirklin was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence. His 171-month sentence included an 84‐month consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); such sentences vary based on whether the defendant was responsible for merely carrying or using the weapon, or for brandishing it, or for discharging it. Video evidence showed that Jones and McCallister had brandished weapons. The court did not instruct the jury to make a specific finding as to whether the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kirklin was responsible for the brandishing but made that determination at sentencing. The Supreme Court's 2002 Harris decision held that whether a firearm was brandished was a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense, and need not be submitted to the jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Three months after Kirklin’s sentencing, the Court granted certiorari in Alleyne, eventually holding that juries must make factual determinations that increase mandatory minimum sentences and that brandishing is an element of the conduct criminalized by the seven‐year mandatory minimum and must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Kirklin’s sentence and later upheld a denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Kirkland's attorney’s performance was not objectively unreasonable for failing to anticipate the overruling of Harris and failing to object to having the court make the factual finding. Given the strength of the evidence against Kirklin, even after certiorari was granted in Alleyne, a defense lawyer might have made a reasonable strategic decision not to challenge the brandishing issue. View "Kirklin v. United States" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Michael, age 16, and three other young men attempted to rob a Rockford pizzeria at gunpoint. Pobjecky, an off‐duty police officer waiting for a pizza, shot and killed Michael. Video recordings captured part of the incident, which involved a struggle for a gun. Michael’s participation in the struggle was disputed. He was apparently crawling when Pobjecky shot him. Wounds showing that three bullets entered Michael’s back contradict Pobjecky’s claim that he shot as Michael advanced toward Pobjecky. All three surviving assailants were convicted of felony murder. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims by Michael’s estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Pobjecky’s use of deadly force was reasonable and justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pobjecky did not know that Michael was unarmed; he was in close quarters with multiple, moving, potentially armed assailants, who forced him to make split‐second, life‐or‐death decisions. The incident lasted only about 45 seconds from the moment the first assailant entered the pizzeria to the moment Pobjecky locked the door. It was objectively reasonable for Pobjecky to stay inside the locked pizzeria awaiting help. It would be objectively unreasonable to demand that he venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, to administer treatment to Michael. View "Horton v. Pobjecky" on Justia Law

Hudson was shot and killed; the gun was not recovered. Riley was charged with first-degree murder and being an armed habitual criminal. The judge severed the armed habitual criminal count and proceeded with the murder trial. In finding Riley not guilty of murder, the jury found that the prosecution had not proven “that during the commission of the offense of first-degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.” Three of the same witnesses testified at the armed habitual criminal trial before the same judge. The parties stipulated that Riley had two qualifying prior convictions, leaving the judge to decide only whether Riley possessed a gun. Defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in the stories of the state’s witnesses and noted that none of them could describe the gun allegedly possessed by Riley, despite identifying him as the shooter. The judge found Riley guilty. On direct appeal, the court ruled that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting Riley as an armed habitual criminal because whether he had possessed a gun was not decided at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his collateral estoppel claim. View "Riley v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Officers Bohlen and Rohde saw Avina near a Milwaukee high school with others, including known Mexican Posse street gang members. The assistant principal told the group to leave school property. They crossed the street. When school was dismissed, they began to harass pedestrians, yelling and flashing gang signs. The officers instructed them to leave the area. The group moved one block down, stood in front of a house that belonged to Avina’s cousin, and continued to harass pedestrians. After 15 minutes, the officers told them to disperse or be arrested. Most entered left. Avina rode his bike back to the school’s lawn. The officers decided to arrest him for trespassing. They could have issued a simple citation but believed that he would continue to loiter. They instructed Avina to get off his bike and put his hands behind his back. He cooperated. They escorted him to their squad car where Bohlen’s handling caused Avina’s arm to break. In Avina’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewed in the light most favorable to Avina, the record establishes that he was fully cooperative when Bohlen moved his arm with enough force to break it, which does not support the conclusion that Bohlen was placing Avina in handcuffs with objectively reasonable force. View "Avina v. Bohlen" on Justia Law

Three Menard Correctional Center officers were preparing inmates to walk from the cell house to dinner when Wilborn rushed out of his cell and attacked Johnson. Bennett and Lloyd took Wilborn to the ground and ordered him to “cuff up” and claim that Wilborn violently resisted. The officers’ testimony was generally consistent; they denied striking Wilborn after they had restrained him. Wilborn testified that he was compliant and in handcuffs when Ealey used pepper spray and that the officers continued to beat him after restraining him. His former cellmate supported his story. Medical staff examined Wilborn but later that day Wilborn was transferred to Tamms Correctional Center. Tamms nurses evaluated Wilborn, recorded his cuts and bruises, gave him acetaminophen, and noted that Wilborn’s shoulder appeared abnormal and that he complained of dislocation. They scheduled Wilborn to see a doctor first thing the next day. Wilborn remained in the infirmary overnight, in pain. The next morning, the doctor sent Wilborn to a hospital, where another doctor reduced Wilborn’s dislocated shoulder about 24 hours after the fight. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Wilborn acted pro se. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the nurses because Wilborn failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court upheld findings that the officers were more credible than Wilborn and his witnesses and the entry of judgment in favor of all remaining defendants. View "Wilborn v. Ealey" on Justia Law

In this complaint brought by an Indiana prisoner, the Seventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court on Plaintiff’s complaint that two prison guards punched him, put him in a chokehold, and placed a plastic bag over his head, all in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district judge concluded that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(a). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that summary judgment on nonexhaustion grounds was improper because the record did not clearly show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Mason" on Justia Law