Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brock-Miller pled guilty, with a plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. She received a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. She then challenged her conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. The court declined to hold a hearing and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing. The district court erred when it concluded that her prior conviction under Indiana Code 16- 42-19-18 was a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. 802(44) and that Brock-Miller was eligible for a recidivist enhancement. The court analyzed the wrong version of the state law; there is little to no overlap between the controlled substances listed in the federal definition of “felony drug offense” and the prescription “legend drugs” regulated by the Indiana law. Counsel’s apparent error in identifying the applicable Indiana statute and failure to file a plainly meritorious objection could constitute deficient performance if proved. View "Brock v. United States" on Justia Law

Hicks led an organization that processed, packaged, and sold drugs in Chicago. A jury found him and co-defendants guilty of conspiracy with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Hicks’s presentence report put his offense level at 46, corresponding to a guideline sentence of life imprisonment. An offense level of 42 would have produced a range of 360 months to life. The district judge stated that the proper offense level was probably 45 but the table stops at 43, that it was immaterial to decide the exact offense level, and that the recommended life sentence would be fair given the quantity at issue and Hicks’s leadership role. The judge nonetheless imposed a below-guideline sentence of 360 months because he thought that Hicks was capable of reform. After his unsuccessful direct appeal, Hicks moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective because he did not explain federal conspiracy law and did not discuss the advantages of pleading guilty but had advised him that “there was a strong chance at walking.” The district judge denied Hicks’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that a guilty plea offered without any agreement would have had “no value.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hicks’s argument that his attorney’s performance prejudiced him is too speculative to require an evidentiary hearing. View "Hicks v. United States" on Justia Law

Otis’s amended pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleged that Waterford Officer Demarasse stopped Otis on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Otis claims she alerted the officer that she was “very sick and bleeding” heavily and asked to be taken to a hospital. Demarasse refused and proceeded to administer a field sobriety test; Otis felt she was “about to pass out” and, again, asked to be taken to a hospital. Demarasse allegedly refused, arrested Otis, cuffed her, and drove her to the police station, where Otis claims, she was subjected to additional testing, then taken to jail, where she was held for 12 hours. Her blood sample was negative for alcohol and controlled substances. Otis then "inexplicably" sent the court more than 100 pages of attachments, mostly police reports and medical records, attempting to add the municipalities as defendants Demarasse’s report contradicted Otis’s allegations and recounts driving Otis to Burlington Memorial Hospital. Reports from another hospital establish that, two days later, Otis was diagnosed with “[a]cute blood loss anemia secondary to dysfunctional uterine bleeding.” The court dismissed her action, finding Otis’s allegations “no longer plausible.” The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court erred in concluding that Otis had pleaded herself out of court by attaching the police report, which contained facts different from those in the complaint. Otis’s submissions fairly allege that Demarasse knew about her need for medical attention and responded in an objectively unreasonable manner. View "Otis v. Demarasse" on Justia Law

Thorncreek, a Park Forest townhouse complex, applied to the Village for a permit to use a vacant townhouse as a business office but began to conduct its business from the townhouse without a permit. The Village cited it for zoning violations and operating without the required permit. The Village later filed suit to halt the zoning and operating violations and to redress certain building-code violations. Thorncreek counterclaimed against the Village and 10 officials, claiming civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the Illinois Civil Rights Act. Two Thorncreek "areas" went into foreclosure. Thorncreek blamed the Village’s regulatory overreach in denying a business license, interfering with business operations, refusing to grant a conditional use permit, failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally enforcing a building-code provision requiring electrical upgrades, based on irrational animus against Clapper, the owner, and racial bias against its black residents. A jury found the Village and Village Manager Mick liable for a class-of-one equal-protection violation; found Mick and Kerestes, the director of community development, liable for conspiracy (section 1985(3)); otherwise rejected the claims, and awarded $2,014,000 in compensatory damages. Because the jury rejected the race-based equal-protection claim, the judge struck the verdict against Kerestes. The judge awarded $430,999.25 in fees and $44,844.33 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the judgment against Mick, the admission of evidence concerning Clapper’s wealth, and the admission of Thorncreek’s financial records. View "Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC v. Village of Park Forest" on Justia Law

For decades, Elkhart, Indiana’s Concord High School has held a “Christmas Spectacular” concert. In 2015, the Freedom From Religion Foundation wrote a letter expressing concerns about the religious nature of the Spectacular’s second half, which included religious songs interspersed with a narrator reading passages from the New Testament, and a student-performed nativity scene. The superintendent rejected the claim. Plaintiff sued under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. While the suit was pending, Concord volunteered to remove the scriptural reading and add songs representing Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. The judge concluded that the proposal was not adequate and granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the school from performing the proposed version. Concord actually performed a second half that spent about four and a half minutes each explaining and performing a song to represent Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. Images are projected onto screens with each song. For the remaining 20 minutes, students perform numerous religious Christmas songs and a two-minute nativity scene, with mannequins, not student actors. There are no New Testament readings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the 2015 show did not violate the Establishment Clause and a declaratory judgment that the 2014 and proposed versions were unconstitutional, with an award of $10 in nominal damages. Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction was denied. View "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is conducted by a judge, to collect evidence and determine whether probable cause exists to issue a criminal complaint. During the time at issue, a proceeding could subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath, and, issue search warrants; the proceeding could be conducted in secret so that the targets would be unaware of it. A Milwaukee judge commenced a proceeding to investigate alleged campaign‐finance violations and entered a secrecy order. The targets were not notified of the execution of search warrants for electronic records. Eventually a judge concluded that the targets of subpoenas had done nothing wrong--Wisconsin law did not prohibit coordination between campaign committees and outside groups to finance issue advocacy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. The court ordered that the proceedings be closed; a modified order required that all original documents relating to the proceeding be filed with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. All other copies were destroyed. MacIver filed suit on behalf of a putative class, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a)–(c), 2711(3), arguing that the proceeding did not constitute a “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Act's provision that “good faith reliance on … a court warrant or order … is a complete defense” and the defense of qualified immunity. MacIver’s interpretation of the Act was not “clearly established” at the time defendants’ warrants were issued. View "John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Madlock, an African American woman, has worked at WEPCO since 1977. While Madlock was working in the Industrial Billing section, she was not in management, but was a point person for her team of “billers.” In 2011, WEPCO assigned a new management team, to perform a comprehensive review and institute metrics to measure performance. Wrycza, a white woman, became Madlock’s supervisor. The two did not get along. Madlock’s conduct, such as personal phone use, had already drawn the attention of management, and under Wrycza, Madlock’s conduct came under greater scrutiny. Wrycza followed WEPCO’s graduated discipline system to deal with billing errors and Madlock’s use of unprofessional language. Madlock was transferred to a different department, where she worked between two managers. The transfer did not affect Madlock’s title or salary, but co‐workers described it as a demotion and "a total humiliation." Madlock’s new supervisor, Phillips, a black woman, prompted Madlock to file an internal discrimination complaint against Wrycza. Madlock made another billing error. Madlock’s grievances were denied; the Vice President of Customer Service expressed shock at Madlock's errors. Madlock was denied a promotion due to her work record. Madlock sued (42 U.S.C. 1981), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for WEPCO, noting that the transfer caused no material change in Madlock’s employment and was not an adverse employment action. Madlock cannot show a sufficient causal link between her internal complaint and the alleged adverse actions. View "Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Indianapolis police received a report that Koster was vomiting and having trouble breathing. Koster’s apartment-complex manager gave responders keys to Koster’s apartment in case Koster could not answer the door. Officer Murphy unlocked the door. Koster yelled: “Don’t come in!” and “I will shoot you." Koster was sitting in bed with a gun in his hand, swallowing pills. Murphy tried to convince him to put down the gun. SWAT members arrived. Koster asked to speak with his medical advocate, but the negotiator said that would be too dangerous while Koster held the gun. Koster asked for his brother, an Indianapolis officer. Someone left him a voicemail. Koster declared that he would “fire a warning shot” and pointed his gun at the officers. One officer fired a beanbag round. Officer Gray fired three bullets at Koster’s head; two hit him. Koster died at a trauma center. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the officers raised a qualified-immunity defense, The district judge granted summary judgment to Murphy but not Gray, reasoning that a reasonable officer would have believed that Koster’s immediate detention was necessary in order for him to receive medical attention and assistance, but that Gray used greater force than was reasonable because he did not take cover or wait for the less-lethal option. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Gray did not violate Koster’s Fourth Amendment right by defending himself and other officers once Koster pointed a gun. View "Sanzone v. Gray" on Justia Law

IC, the subsidiary of a Canadian corporation, hired plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, age 55, as a management trainee. He completed the program and served in multiple management positions. With a 2011 promotion, plaintiff reported to Clermont, a Canadian citizen. In 2012, Clermont was investigated for abusive workplace behavior. Plaintiff alleged that, because of Clermont’s behavior, he experienced physical symptoms and was taken to the hospital. Plaintiff requested reassignment. Clermont contacted Human Resources about “performance issues” with plaintiff and was told of plaintiff’s complaints. No transfer occurred. Plaintiff filed a complaint, referring to a “hostile work environment” and retaliation. Clermont wrote a letter about plaintiff's unsatisfactory performance. In 2013, as part of a company‐wide reorganization, Clermont was reassigned to Canada. Plaintiff’s position was eliminated. He took a clerical job. For the first time, plaintiff referenced the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–34 (ADEA). Efforts to place plaintiff in management were unsuccessful. Plaintiff complained Clermont’s letter was “retaliatory” and claimed that he applied to 82 management positions and that many of those positions were filled by substantially younger candidates. Plaintiff filed suit, under the ADEA and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IC. Nothing in plaintiff’s complaints about Clermont suggested discrimination based on age or national origin. The evidence indicates the same events would have transpired if plaintiff had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same. View "Skiba v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

IC, the subsidiary of a Canadian corporation, hired plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, age 55, as a management trainee. He completed the program and served in multiple management positions. With a 2011 promotion, plaintiff reported to Clermont, a Canadian citizen. In 2012, Clermont was investigated for abusive workplace behavior. Plaintiff alleged that, because of Clermont’s behavior, he experienced physical symptoms and was taken to the hospital. Plaintiff requested reassignment. Clermont contacted Human Resources about “performance issues” with plaintiff and was told of plaintiff’s complaints. No transfer occurred. Plaintiff filed a complaint, referring to a “hostile work environment” and retaliation. Clermont wrote a letter about plaintiff's unsatisfactory performance. In 2013, as part of a company‐wide reorganization, Clermont was reassigned to Canada. Plaintiff’s position was eliminated. He took a clerical job. For the first time, plaintiff referenced the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–34 (ADEA). Efforts to place plaintiff in management were unsuccessful. Plaintiff complained Clermont’s letter was “retaliatory” and claimed that he applied to 82 management positions and that many of those positions were filled by substantially younger candidates. Plaintiff filed suit, under the ADEA and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IC. Nothing in plaintiff’s complaints about Clermont suggested discrimination based on age or national origin. The evidence indicates the same events would have transpired if plaintiff had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same. View "Skiba v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law