Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Thompson's 1982 murder and conspiracy to commit burglary convictions. Thompson filed a state post-conviction petition in 1992. In 1997, the final of several public defenders withdrew. Thompson’s petition languished until 2001 when he requested a copy of the record. The public defender would not represent Thompson because his prior attorneys had “found no meritorious issues.” In 2005, Thompson requested leave to proceed pro se then hired an attorney. Court-ordered DNA tests were completed, but apparently, no hearing was held. The proceedings again fell into limbo. In 2012, Thompson retained a new attorney, who filed another amended petition. The state again raised the defense of laches. The parties stipulated that the delay had prejudiced the state. Thompson argued that the delay was the fault of attorneys who had abandoned him. Indiana courts rejected Thompson’s petition. Thompson sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court dismissed, finding that Thompson’s claims were procedurally defaulted, without addressing the potential distinction between laches based on a prefiling delay and laches based on delays in prosecuting an action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. When the state court dismissed the petition there was not yet a firmly established rule in Indiana that laches applies to delays to an already-filed action; precedents dealt only with delays in filing a post-conviction petition. Thompson’s petition is not barred by an adequate and independent state ground. View "Thompson v. Brown" on Justia Law

Arnold was convicted of repeated sexual assault his son, M.A., who testified that in 2004-2005, when M.A. was 13-14 years old, Arnold engaged in mutual masturbation with him. Arnold had five prior convictions, including for two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child. M.A. (17 at the time of trial) had six prior convictions and/or juvenile adjudications of delinquency. Arnold was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. After the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Arnold’s conviction, M.A. signed a notarized, witnessed affidavit, recanting his testimony. At the time that M.A. reported the assaults, M.A. was under the supervision of a juvenile court and participating in a treatment program, based on adjudications that M.A. himself had sexually assaulted children. M.A. represented that he had falsely accused his father to ensure his successful discharge from the program. Arnold sought a new trial. A federal district court dismissed, as untimely, his habeas corpus petition, filed beyond the one‐year deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1); Arnold alleged that his actual innocence supported an equitable exception. The Seventh Circuit granted relief, rejecting an argument that M.A.’s recantation could not meet the standard for relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence, however credible a factfinder might determine it to be. The court remanded for a hearing at which the credibility of M.A.’s recantation can be assessed with the probable impact that the recantation would have had on reasonable jurors. View "Arnold v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

New arrivals at the jail must surrender their possessions. A class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 charged that the Sheriff did not do enough to prevent guards and other employees from stealing or losing those belongings. Evidence showed that the loss-or-theft rate had been falling as the Sheriff implemented additional controls. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury’s rejection of the suit. The thefts are a crime, a tort, and a Due Process Clause violation (depriving prisoners of property with no process) but the class did not contend that the Sheriff personally stole anything or even tolerated a known thief; no guard is a defendant. Failure to prosecute thieves does not violate the Constitution; a guard’s negligence does not violate the Constitution. The jury concluded that the Sheriff had taken “reasonable measures.” The court upheld a jury instruction that the Sheriff could be found liable for violating the Fourteenth Amendment if there was a widespread custom or practice which allowed plaintiffs’ property to be lost or stolen, that was the moving force behind plaintiffs’ losses, and the defendant was deliberately indifferent to those losses. Another instruction said: “The Office of the Sheriff ... need not have formally approved the conduct so long as Plaintiffs prove that a policy-making official knew of the pattern and allowed it to continue.” The court noted a problem with state remedies, but state remedies are not a constitutional entitlement. View "Elizarri v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

Unbeknownst to Burton, her license was suspended. Zion Officer Meyers spotted her driving, verified that there was an active warrant for her arrest, and activated his emergency lights. Burton saw his lights but claims she was afraid to pull over because, in 2008, Officer Richardt pulled Burton over, and, while she was handcuffed, used a taser on her. The Department sustained Burton's allegations of unnecessary force. Burton sued, obtaining a settlement. Instead of stopping, Burton drove toward her home, following all traffic laws, wanting friendly witnesses. The officers knew that Burton was heading home. Richardt, the officer involved in the 2008 incident, joined the pursuit. Burton stopped near her friend, with his pit bull. Meyers approached Burton’s driver’s side door. Burton exited through the passenger door because, she alleged, the other door was not functioning. Richardt ran and brought Burton to the ground by incorrectly executing a “straight-arm take-down.” The dog bit Richardt's leg but immediately released without causing damage. Sergeant Arrington placed his knee on Burton’s back as he handcuffed her then dragged her away.Burton sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,. The court excluded evidence regarding the 2008 incident. The jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The fact that Burton had been previously subjected to excessive force was not propensity evidence and could not be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404. The court must weigh the probative value against the potential prejudice, considering ways in which prejudice can be mitigated. Excessive force amounts to whether the officers’ force, given the facts and circumstances known to them at the time, was reasonable. View "Burton v. City of Zion" on Justia Law

In 2013, while Koger was serving a 300-day sentence in the Cook County Jail, Lyons sent him at least 10 books, plus magazines and newspapers. More than 30 books were seized from Koger’s cell for violation of Jail policy. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Lyons and Koger claimed that limiting inmates to three pieces of reading material violated the First Amendment. The district court rejected the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to Lyons, who lacked standing because Koger received everything she sent, but vacated as to Koger. The court noted that Koger challenged the policy, rather than the particular seizure, and that the policy provides for no pre-deprivation process. View "Lyons v. Dart" on Justia Law

Since entering the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections in 2009, Wilson has sought medical treatment for dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, neck and throat pain, and difficulty breathing and swallowing. He alleged that Oshkosh Correctional Institution's doctors were deliberately indifferent in their treatment of these ailments in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court found that no reasonable jury could find that the doctors were deliberately indifferent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Wilson failed to prove that he actually suffers from Alzheimer’s disease or dementia. None of the testing done at Oshkosh or at the Wisconsin Resource Center provided any evidence that Wilson suffered from a cognitive disorder. These disorders are difficult to identify and diagnose, but without such evidence, Wilson cannot show that he suffered a serious medical condition, let alone indifference in the treatment of that condition. The doctor did investigate Wilson’s mental health condition, referring him to a psychiatrist and a specialty center for extensive observation. The record is replete with evidence of the doctor’s attempts to diagnose the source of Wilson’s pain. He worked with endocrinologists, an otolaryngologist, a speech pathologist, a pulmonologist, a neurosurgeon, and a dentist. View "Wilson v. Adams" on Justia Law

Wexford provides medical care to Illinois inmates. Beard experienced chronic ankle pain. In 2010 he consulted with his prison’s doctors, wanting surgery. The doctors ordered conservative treatment. When Beard’s pain persisted, the doctors considered referring Beard for surgical evaluation, which required Wexford’s approval. Wexford rejected requests for surgical evaluation but authorized Beard to see a podiatrist in 2012 and an orthopedist in 2015. Beard sued Wexford in 2011, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. A jury awarded Beard $10,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The judge concluded that the punitive-damages award violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive or arbitrary punishment and reduced the award to $50,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the Supreme Court has cautioned that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages ... will satisfy due process,” the district court had nine single digits from which to choose and decided that the Seventh Amendment did not require it to offer Beard the option of a new trial before it entered judgment on the reduced award. The decision was arbitrary and constituted a procedural misstep. The court remanded to give Beard the choice between a reduced punitive-damages award and a new trial limited to damages. View "Beard v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Walker, an inmate, brought a civil rights suit against prison officers. Walker asked the court six times to recruit a volunteer lawyer to represent him. The Seventh Circuit held that the court acted within its discretion when it denied his initial motions but abused its discretion when it denied the sixth. A litigant in a civil case has neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to counsel. When the court receives a request to recruit counsel from an indigent plaintiff, it must determine whether the plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his own and whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff is competent to litigate it himself. This case involves the second question. Walker was facing jury trial by videoconference. That substantially increased the difficulty of his case, despite the simplicity of his claims. The basic competence that Walker had demonstrated during the pretrial phase did not necessarily reflect his ability to handle a video trial entirely on his own. Trying a case requires additional skills, and Walker had managed the pretrial phase with the help of a jailhouse lawyer who had since been transferred to another prison. View "Walker v. Price" on Justia Law

Officer Pearson and other Chicago police officers executed a search warrant for “apartment 1.” There was a problem with the warrant. Apartment 1 did not exist. The building contained apartment 1A and apartment 1B. The officers searched apartment 1A but did not find the drugs and related items they were seeking. Pearson nonetheless arrested an occupant, Muhammed. The occupants filed sued Pearson under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful entry and false arrest. The district court granted Pearson summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on narrow grounds. Law enforcement officers who discover that a search warrant does not clearly specify the premises to be searched must ordinarily stop and clear up the ambiguity before they conduct or continue the search. If they do not, they may lose the legal protection the warrant provides for an invasion of privacy and accompanying restraints on liberty. Pearson, however, testified that he did not know there were two apartments and offered undisputed, reliable, and contemporaneous documents confirming his after-the-fact testimony that the address searched was actually the correct target of the search authorized by the ambiguous warrant. Pearson had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff Muhammad for suspected drug trafficking, though Pearson quickly confirmed that Muhammad was not the right suspect and released him within 15 minutes, so summary judgment based on qualified immunity was also correct on that unlawful arrest claim. View "Muhammad v. Pearson" on Justia Law

An Illinois jury convicted McGhee of murder and attempted murder. McGhee’s defense attorney asked the judge to poll the jury after the verdict was read. The judge said, “[a]ll right,” but did not conduct the poll; he simply thanked and dismissed the jurors. An Illinois criminal defendant “has the absolute right to poll the jury after it returns its verdict.” Defense counsel did not object when the judge moved directly to closing remarks, nor did he raise the issue in a post-trial motion. McGhee’s appellate lawyer failed to challenge the error on direct review. McGhee’s conviction was affirmed on appeal and in state collateral review. He sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. McGhee’s "Strickland" claims, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the judge’s jury-polling error and his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the judge’s error on appeal, were waived because he did not present them in his section 2254 petition. McGhee procedurally defaulted his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel’s failure to preserve the polling error. McGhee failed to present the claim through one complete round of state-court review. View "McGhee v. Watson" on Justia Law