Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lee is serving sentences totaling 100 years’ imprisonment. A state judge found that Lee and Manley forcibly abducted L.M., struck and raped L.M., and displayed a pistol to make her more cooperative. L.M. escaped and ran naked to a house. Police took pictures of L.M.’s bloody face. Lee, the only defense witness, said that L.M. entered the car voluntarily and that he did not touch her sexually—though before trial Lee said that he and L.M. had consensual oral sex. The state judge found that L.M.’s testimony was “very credible” and that the pictures showing her injuries, and the testimony of the person who opened the door to L.M., negated the defense of consent. Lee’s convictions were affirmed on direct and collateral review. Lee’s federal petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts that before trial his lawyer received five affidavits that corroborated Lee’s story or provided exculpatory details, but that counsel did not interview the affiants. In Lee’s post-conviction proceedings the state judiciary did not hold an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the affidavits were not necessarily inconsistent with guilt. The federal district judge held that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit vacated. It is impossible to say that Lee has “failed to develop [in state court] the factual basis of” his claim. The absence of evidence about what the trial would have been like, had the affiants testified, is attributable to the state court's failure to hold a hearing. View "Lee v. Kink" on Justia Law

Mars was the getaway driver to an armed robbery by Snyder and Higgins-Vogt. Days later, Mars’s body was found. While in jail on robbery charges, Higgins-Vogt never met with his appointed attorney but requested to meet with Brown. Brown was employed by a private entity, providing “counseling.” Higgins-Vogt had met Brown while incarcerated as a juvenile. Brown held no licenses in the field of mental health. Higgins-Vogt told Brown that he murdered Mars. Brown promised confidentiality but stated that she wanted the victim’s family to have closure. Higgins-Vogt eventually told Brown that he wanted to meet with Detective Patton about the weapon. After Higgins-Vogt waived his right to have his attorney present, the parties (including Brown and the State's Attorney) moved into an interview room so the questioning could be recorded. Higgins-Vogt provided the gun's location but claimed the information came from Snyder. Brown did not contradict Higgins-Vogt or state that he had confessed but elicited incriminating admissions. Police recovered the gun. Later, Higgins-Vogt told a Correctional Officer that he wanted to confess to a murder. On an inmate request form, Higgins-Vogt wrote: “I want to confess to the Paige Mars murder.” He told Brown that the confession was triggered by a conversation with his girlfriend. During a second interview with Detective Patton, Higgins-Vogt confirmed that he knew his rights and confessed to killing Mars. Higgins-Vogt later unsuccessfully moved to suppress the statements, arguing that Brown pressured him to confess. Brown denied any role in assisting law enforcement. Higgins-Vogt pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed while expressing its “strong disapproval” of Brown’s role at the jail. Higgins-Vogt, separate and apart from his interactions with Brown, voluntarily chose to confess to the murder. View "United States v. Higgins-Vogt" on Justia Law

Schmidt admitted to murdering his wife but argued the Wisconsin-law defense of “adequate provocation” to mitigate the crime from first- to second-degree homicide. A state judge held a pretrial hearing on that substantive issue, allowing Schmidt’s counsel to attend but not to speak or participate. The judge questioned Schmidt directly and ruled that Schmidt could not present the adequate provocation defense at trial. A jury convicted Schmidt of first-degree intentional homicide. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not violate Schmidt’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Seventh Circuit initially granted habeas corpus relief, but, acting en banc, reversed itself and upheld the conviction. A state‐court decision can be a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent even if it is an incorrect application, if the result is clearly erroneous, and if the petitioner presents “a strong case for relief.” While emphasizing that it did not endorse the constitutionality of the trial court’s “unusual ex parte, in camera examination” without counsel’s active participation, the court noted that the Supreme Court has “never addressed” a case like this. Even assuming this case involves a critical stage, Schmidt cannot establish that he was so deprived of counsel as to mandate the presumption of prejudice. A fair‐minded jurist could conclude that these facts were not “so likely to prejudice the accused” as to warrant the presumption of prejudice. View "Schmidt v. Foster" on Justia Law

Dockery was arrested after a domestic dispute at his girlfriend’s Joliet, Illinois apartment. Sergeant Blackburn and Officer Higgins took him to the police station for booking on charges of trespass and criminal damage to property. He grew confrontational while being fingerprinted. The officers stated that he would be handcuffed to a bench for the rest of the booking process. Dockery pulled away, fell over, and kicked wildly at the officers. Before the officers handcuffed him, Blackburn used her Taser four times. A security camera recorded the incident. Dockery sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity based on the incontrovertible facts captured on the recording. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of the motion. An excessive-force claim requires assessment of whether the officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances; based on the irrefutable facts preserved on the video, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The video shows that Blackburn deployed the Taser when Dockery was flailing and kicking and actively resisting being handcuffed; she used it three more times to subdue and gain control over Dockery as he kicked, attempted to stand up, and resisted commands to submit to authority. No case clearly establishes that an officer may not use a Taser under these circumstances. View "Dockery v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

Ofem, age 18, was arrested for a misdemeanor and taken to Chicago lockup. During rounds, officers asked him screening questions. Ofem displayed no signs of pain, injury, or infection; he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol or showing signs of withdrawal; he did not seem to be despondent or irrational, and was not carrying medication. Ofem refused food in lockup. At 1:10 p.m., on Ofem’s second day in lockup, a guard glanced at the video monitor and saw Ofem hanging from a horizontal bar in his cell. Guards immediately went to the cell, approximately 15 feet away, where Ofem had used his jeans to hang himself. Ofem was transported to a hospital where he died the following day. His mother sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for failing to prevent her son’s death. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city, noting the lack of evidence that the city was deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide for detainees held in lockups or that the city’s policies and practices were the cause of Ofem’s death. Illinois Lockup Standards were in effect at the time of Ofem’s death. Ofem’s estate focused on the narrow circumstances of Ofem’s death rather than on official policies or unofficial but wide-spread practices or customs. View "Lapre v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Horshaw was beaten by other inmates at Menard Correctional Center. Horshaw still suffers from pain and brain trauma. Before the attack Horshaw received an anonymous letter stating that he would be “eradicated” for disrespecting the gang’s leader. In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, Horshaw claimed that he gave Casper, a guard, a letter describing the threat, that Casper promised to investigate yet did nothing, and that he sent a note to then-warden Atchison, asking for protection. Both Casper and Atchison deny receiving the documents or having any reason to think that Horshaw was in danger. The district court found Casper not liable because, whether or not he received the letter, it did not establish a specific or substantial threat and found Atchison not liable because he did not receive Horshaw’s note. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Casper does not contend that he deemed the threat false or that Horshaw had lost his credibility; Atchison testified that, if he had received the letter or Horshaw’s note, he would have put Horshaw in protective custody immediately. Horshaw testified that he wrote a note to Atchison, put Atchison’s name on the envelope, and saw a guard collect the note. Placing the note in the prison mail system supports an inference of receipt. The factual disputes may be hard to resolve given the lapse of time and Horshaw’s brain injury, but if his facts are accurate, neither Casper nor Atchison is entitled to immunity. View "Horshaw v. Casper" on Justia Law

Sinn was incarcerated within the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), 2011-2015. In 2014, at Putnamville Correctional Facility, he suffered injuries from two separate assaults by other inmates. Sinn filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against various prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Putnamville was designed for 1,650 inmates, but it had a recorded average daily population of 2,490 state prisoners in 2013; the facility was unable to fill vacancies in a timely manner. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings as to Putnamville Sergeant Rodgers and Correctional Officer Hoskins; summary judgment as to former Putnamville Unit Manager Brush, former Putnamville Superintendent Knight, and former IDOC Commissioner Lemmon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed except as to Brush. Sinn did not refute Rodgers’s and Hoskins’s entitlement to qualified immunity. While Knight and Lemmon may not have known about Sinn’s individual circumstances, Sinn alleged that Brush had knowledge, the basis of deliberate indifference. Brush had an in‐person conversation with Sinn about the first attack and, per Brush’s instructions,, Sinn wrote Brush a letter the next day to further de‐cribe his concerns and relocation request; it is reasonable to infer that Brush received the letter with enough time before the second attack to read and respond to it. View "Sinn v. Lemmon" on Justia Law

For 35 years, Terry worked as a teacher and an administrator for the District. After the 2013–2014 school year, the District closed the school where Terry served as the Principal because of declining enrollment and reassigned her as the Assistant Principal at another school. The District picked a male employee (Cain) over Terry for a separate promotion, although Terry had earned the highest ranking of the applicants from the interviewers. Terry filed suit, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983); retaliation under Title VII; and unequal pay, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the District on Terry’s federal claims. Even assuming Terry’s change in position constituted a material adverse action, Terry did not marshal any evidence that the District had a discriminatory purpose. The chronology of events alone is not evidence that the District lied when it said it picked Cain for the promotion because of his experience working at the particular school. Timing, even combined with Terry’s positive employment history, is not enough to create a dispute of material fact as to whether the District retaliated against Terry. The difference in salary between Terry and Cain was based on the salary freeze (and not based on sex). View "Terry v. Gary Community School Corp." on Justia Law

Crutchfield, charged with drug crimes, faced enhanced penalties based on his criminal record. The prosecutor offered a plea deal that would have capped his sentence at 25 years, explaining that Crutchfield would have to serve 85 percent of that term under state law. Crutchfield’s attorney advised him of the offer but did not correct the prosecutor’s mistake: under Illinois law, Crutchfield could have been eligible for release after serving 50 percent of his sentence. Crutchfield rejected the deal, was convicted, and received a 40-year sentence. After a direct appeal and two rounds of post-conviction proceedings, Crutchfield sought federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. 2254 claiming ineffective assistance under the Strickland rule because he would have taken the deal if his attorney had correctly advised him. He had not raised this claim on direct appeal or in his initial state post-conviction proceeding but presented it in a successive petition. Illinois courts refused to hear the claim. The district judge denied relief based on the unexcused procedural default. Crutchfield argued that Illinois prisoners may use the Martinez–Trevino gateway to obtain review of defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. Illinois does not impose the kind of restrictive procedural rules on Strickland claims to warrant application of the Martinez–Trevino exception. Crutchfield procedurally defaulted his Strickland claim and has not shown cause to excuse the default. View "Crutchfield v. Dennison" on Justia Law

Roundtree was sentenced to life in prison for selling heroin that led to a user’s death, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Seven years later the Supreme Court held (Burrage) that a judge must tell a jury that the death-resulting condition is satisfied only if the drug was a but-for cause of the fatality; a contributing cause is not enough. The jury charge at Roundtree’s trial did not satisfy Burrage. He filed collateral attacks on his sentence in the Northern District of Iowa (where his trial occurred), 28 U.S.C. 2255, and the Southern District of Indiana (where he is confined), 28 U.S.C. 2241. Both judges rejected his contentions. The Eighth Circuit held that, because Burrage is retroactive, Roundtree is entitled to use section 2255 to contest his conviction despite the lapse of time, but that his failure to dispute the jury instruction at trial forfeited any benefit from a later Supreme Court decision. The Eighth Circuit recognized that a procedural default may be excused if the accused is innocent but found that Roundtree had not met that requirement. He never argued that a properly instructed jury would have been compelled to acquit him of either selling heroin or the death-results enhancement; Roundtree was not prejudiced by the error, The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Roundtree would have been convicted even under the Burrage instruction and that the Supreme Court is the proper place for review of the Eighth Circuit decision. View "Roundtree v. Caraway" on Justia Law