Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For 35 years, Terry worked as a teacher and an administrator for the District. After the 2013–2014 school year, the District closed the school where Terry served as the Principal because of declining enrollment and reassigned her as the Assistant Principal at another school. The District picked a male employee (Cain) over Terry for a separate promotion, although Terry had earned the highest ranking of the applicants from the interviewers. Terry filed suit, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983); retaliation under Title VII; and unequal pay, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the District on Terry’s federal claims. Even assuming Terry’s change in position constituted a material adverse action, Terry did not marshal any evidence that the District had a discriminatory purpose. The chronology of events alone is not evidence that the District lied when it said it picked Cain for the promotion because of his experience working at the particular school. Timing, even combined with Terry’s positive employment history, is not enough to create a dispute of material fact as to whether the District retaliated against Terry. The difference in salary between Terry and Cain was based on the salary freeze (and not based on sex). View "Terry v. Gary Community School Corp." on Justia Law

Crutchfield, charged with drug crimes, faced enhanced penalties based on his criminal record. The prosecutor offered a plea deal that would have capped his sentence at 25 years, explaining that Crutchfield would have to serve 85 percent of that term under state law. Crutchfield’s attorney advised him of the offer but did not correct the prosecutor’s mistake: under Illinois law, Crutchfield could have been eligible for release after serving 50 percent of his sentence. Crutchfield rejected the deal, was convicted, and received a 40-year sentence. After a direct appeal and two rounds of post-conviction proceedings, Crutchfield sought federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. 2254 claiming ineffective assistance under the Strickland rule because he would have taken the deal if his attorney had correctly advised him. He had not raised this claim on direct appeal or in his initial state post-conviction proceeding but presented it in a successive petition. Illinois courts refused to hear the claim. The district judge denied relief based on the unexcused procedural default. Crutchfield argued that Illinois prisoners may use the Martinez–Trevino gateway to obtain review of defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. Illinois does not impose the kind of restrictive procedural rules on Strickland claims to warrant application of the Martinez–Trevino exception. Crutchfield procedurally defaulted his Strickland claim and has not shown cause to excuse the default. View "Crutchfield v. Dennison" on Justia Law

Roundtree was sentenced to life in prison for selling heroin that led to a user’s death, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Seven years later the Supreme Court held (Burrage) that a judge must tell a jury that the death-resulting condition is satisfied only if the drug was a but-for cause of the fatality; a contributing cause is not enough. The jury charge at Roundtree’s trial did not satisfy Burrage. He filed collateral attacks on his sentence in the Northern District of Iowa (where his trial occurred), 28 U.S.C. 2255, and the Southern District of Indiana (where he is confined), 28 U.S.C. 2241. Both judges rejected his contentions. The Eighth Circuit held that, because Burrage is retroactive, Roundtree is entitled to use section 2255 to contest his conviction despite the lapse of time, but that his failure to dispute the jury instruction at trial forfeited any benefit from a later Supreme Court decision. The Eighth Circuit recognized that a procedural default may be excused if the accused is innocent but found that Roundtree had not met that requirement. He never argued that a properly instructed jury would have been compelled to acquit him of either selling heroin or the death-results enhancement; Roundtree was not prejudiced by the error, The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Roundtree would have been convicted even under the Burrage instruction and that the Supreme Court is the proper place for review of the Eighth Circuit decision. View "Roundtree v. Caraway" on Justia Law

McCann was severely burned while attempting to commit arson at his mother’s house and spent three weeks in the hospital before being released to police custody. McCann died from a doctor’s over-prescription of methadone while detained and awaiting trial at the Ogle County Correctional Center. His estate brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to McCann’s severe burn wounds and related medical needs. The treating physician and his private employer settled the claims. The district court entered summary judgment for the remaining defendants, concluding that the evidence did not show that any individual defendant acted with deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit subsequently replaced deliberate indifference with a standard requiring a showing of objective reasonableness for a claim challenging the medical care provided to a pretrial detainee like McCann. Measuring the record evidence under this new standard, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the award of summary judgment to the individual defendants and a determination that the record evidence did not support a claim for municipal liability against Ogle County under Monell. View "McCann v. Ogle County" on Justia Law

Lewis, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs, worked as a cook in the Nutrition and Food Service Department in 2008-2009 and again from December 2013 until April 2015. The four‐year gap in employment occurred because Lewis was terminated and then, after a successful Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint, was reinstated to his former position. Lewis alleges that upon reinstatement he faced retaliation from the VA and two supervisors for his EEO activity. The district court granted the Va summary judgment, holding that none of the alleged retaliatory actions constituted a materially adverse action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Some of the actions constituted isolated administrative errors that were subsequently corrected; they represent the kind of minor workplace grievances against which Title VII does not protect against. Other incidents may have resulted in annoyance and frustration, but they did not cause the kind of harm that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. Unfulfilled threats that do not produce harm do not qualify as adverse actions. Lewis also failed to demonstrate a causal link between his protected activity and nearly all of the alleged retaliatory actions; failed to identify any similarly‐situated employee; and failed to demonstrate the VA’s legitimate, non‐discriminatory explanations were pretextual. View "Lewis v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Bogart, a Democrat, worked as the Financial Resources Director of Vermilion County, Illinois. Marron, a Republican, assumed control of the County Board and fired her. She brought claims under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, alleging that Vermilion County and Marron violated her right of political affiliation and engaged in political retaliation. The district court dismissed the equal protection claim as duplicative of the First Amendment claim, and, after finding that the substantial fiscal and budgetary responsibilities of Bogart’s position fit within the exception to political patronage dismissals, granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held (the Elrod-Branti exception) that, while public employers cannot condition employment on an individual’s political affiliation, an employee’s First Amendment right of political association leaves room for employers to dismiss employees in positions where political loyalty is a valid job qualification. Determining whether a particular job fits within the exception requires “focus on the inherent powers of the office as presented in the official job description,” while also looking at “how the description was created and when, and how often, it was updated.” Bogart held a senior position requiring the trust and confidence of the elected Board members, including the County Chairman, and entailing substantial policymaking authority. View "Bogart v. Vermilion County" on Justia Law

In 1988, Huber pleaded guilty to making fraudulent credit card charges of $800. He spent the next 25 years either on probation or in prison for violating his probation, although Wisconsin had no lawful basis for extending his sentence beyond November 1995. It took the state until 2014 to recognize this problem and to vacate his ongoing sentence. Huber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that Huber had failed to bring most claims within six years of their accrual, as required under Wisconsin’s statute of limitations. Some of Huber’s claims were timely, but the court granted the defendants summary judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Huber’s claims were timely and summary judgment was premature on those claims that the district court reached. Huber’s claim did not accrue until the court invalidated his sentence. Huber filed this action in 2016, within Wisconsin’s six-year statute of limitations. He did not sit on his rights under the Heck doctrine, which ensures that civil litigation does not undermine the basis of criminal convictions and sentences. A reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference here. Construing facts and inferences in Huber’s favor, Huber’s Eighth Amendment claims are not suitable for summary judgment. View "Huber v. Anderson" on Justia Law

After Illinois State Senate Minority (Republican) Leader Brady decided to remove McCann from the Illinois Senate Republican Caucus and to deny McCann certain resources, McCann and his constituent sued Brady under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; legislative immunity blocks all of McCann’s theories. Minority Leader Brady’s decisions about who is included within the Caucus, and how to allocate resources to those people, are protected as decisions that fit within the ambit of the “things generally done in a session of the [legislative body] by one of its members in relation to the business before it.” Extra help in the form of staff resources is part of the leader’s toolkit for managing his troops. Brady did not “oust” McCann from the legislature and there is no objective standard for second-guessing the leadership’s judgment about the distribution of resources. McCann would have the federal courts micro-manage exactly which resources, and in what amount, the legislative leaders of the two major political parties dole out to their members. The separation of powers principle reflected in Article II, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution, and inherent in the federal Constitution, requires the courts to accept the final output of the legislature without sitting in judgment about how it was produced. View "McCann v. Brady" on Justia Law

Taylor, a former Lawrenceburg, Indiana police officer, also held positions with the civil-city, parks, and electric departments. Taylor ran for a City Council position and improperly appeared in police uniform at a campaign event and represented on his time sheet that he was on duty during that event. The State Police investigated, resulting in criminal charges for Official Misconduct and Ghost Employment. Taylor won election to the Council. Taylor signed a deferred prosecution agreement admitting to the criminal charges and agreeing to resign from the Council. The next day, he distributed a letter accusing the Board and city officials of corruption and criminal wrongdoing. The Board notified Taylor of its intent to terminate his employment. The Board terminated Taylor’s employment, crediting a prosecutor’s testimony that he would not accept case-related information from a police officer, like Taylor, who had admitted a crime of dishonesty, and rejected Taylor’s contention that Board members were biased and that the termination proceedings were a response to his letter accusing Board members of wrongdoing. Taylor dismissed his state court appeal and filed a First Amendment retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983, with state law defamation and whistleblower claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor. Federal courts must give state administrative fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts, if the agency acted in a judicial capacity and resolved issues that the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. The Board acted in a judicial capacity and Taylor had a fair opportunity to litigate the issues. View "Taylor v. City of Lawrenceburg" on Justia Law

Riley worked for the Kokomo Housing Authority (KHA) for eight years before she was terminated in 2014. During her employment, Riley suffered from seizures, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression, which required her to take leaves of absence. She claims that KHA improperly denied her requests for medical leave and retaliated against her for these requests by disciplining and terminating her, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601; that KHA failed to make reasonable accommodations and discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; and that she was subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in KHA's favor. Five months elapsed between the end of Riley’s FMLA leave and a written warning; although Riley had requested leave for medical appointments and was told that her leave had been exhausted, she was allowed time off for her appointments nonetheless. Riley alleged that she had been terminated because of her disability, but, in her EEOC complaint, she omitted any allegation that KHA had denied her a reasonable accommodation. Rejecting Riley’s retaliation and FHA claims, the court noted that there is no evidence that she called HUD to report a discriminatory housing practice. View "Riley v. City of Kokomo, Indiana, Housing Authority" on Justia Law