Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wells was sentenced for two drug offenses: two years’ imprisonment for the first and one year for the second, to run consecutively, with credit for pretrial detention: 255 days for the first sentence and 97 days for the second. Wells calculated his term as 734 days: three years (1095 days) less 255 days less 97 days. The Department of Corrections calculated 1095 less 255, disregarding the 97-day credit because it believed that, after his arrest for the second offense (which occurred while he was on bail) Wells had been in custody on both charges simultaneously. Wells filed grievances but was held until the expiration of the 840-day term (less good-time credits). Wells filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. After a trial to determine whether the prison’s records supervisor (Caudill) acted with the mental state required to violate the Eighth Amendment, the court ruled in Caudill’s favor.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument based on Wells’ pro se status. Wells did not seek legal assistance. The district judge did not make a clearly erroneous finding when concluding that Wells had not shown that Caudill acted with the necessary state of mind. The court also noted that Wells received a sentence calculation early in his term. He protested within the prison hierarchy but did not ask a state court to determine the proper release date. View "Wells v. Caudill" on Justia Law

In 2013, LeVan was elected to the office of Milton Township Assessor, displacing his political rival, Earl. Shortly after he took office, LeVan discharged a group of Deputy Assessors who had publicly supported Earl in his run for reelection. The dismissed employees sued LeVan under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Deputy Assessor position is not one for which political affiliation is a valid job requirement, as the position did not authorize the employees to have meaningful input in policy decisions.The district court concluded that LeVan is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Unless political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, the First Amendment forbids government officials from discharging employees based on their political affiliation. Taking as true the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations about the characteristics of the Deputy Assessor position, a reasonable actor in LeVan’s position would have known that dismissing the deputies based on their political affiliation violated their constitutional rights. View "Hanson v. LeVan" on Justia Law

Manuel's disabled cellmate requested a change of rooms and became hostile toward Manuel. Manuel reported this but no action was taken. The cellmate beat Manuel into unconsciousness. Officer Nalley investigated. Manuel submitted a grievance to Counselor Miller. Manuel later filed additional grievances and requested status updates. Miller failed to respond. Manuel filed a civil complaint. Later, an inmate informed prison personnel that Manuel asked him and another inmate to file fraudulent paperwork regarding the attack. The prison filed an incident report and shakedown slip.Two weeks later, Manuel again sought a status update The conversation ended when Miller asked Manuel if he was going to file a grievance against her; he responded “maybe.” Minutes later, Nalley searched Manuel’s cell following the shakedown slip and confiscated a note describing trading and trafficking, forged letters describing the cellmate incident, letters addressed to the court, and a contraband cassette tape. The prison committee found Manuel guilty of forging documents and possessing contraband.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, his 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Miller and Nalley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Manuel needed to furnish evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that his protected speech was at least a motivating factor for Nalley’s response. The suspicious timing of the shakedown shortly after the conversation with Miller is not enough to prove that Nalley was motivated by the protected activity and the shakedown was retaliation. View "Manuel v. Nalley" on Justia Law

While in a hospital, Mintner entered a coma and seemed on the brink of death. Her blood and urine contained vastly more thallium than the natural concentration. Her fiancé, Fayemi had been providing some of her food, including in the hospital. Seven of Minter’s friends who occasionally ate with her also suffered from thallium poisoning. Her dog died of thallium poisoning after it ate table scraps. Fayemi had purchased enough thallium sulfate to kill about 50 people. Fayemi told the supplier that he needed the substance for research but later asserted that he and Minter wanted it to kill mice, a forbidden use, and that Minter had been careless with the poison. Fayemi often ate at Minter’s house without showing any traces of thallium poisoning. Thallium was found in a salt shaker in Fayemi’s kitchen. Fayemi had threatened to kill Minter if she left him. The jury convicted Fayemi of attempting to murder Minter plus seven counts of aggravated battery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal; a state court rejected a collateral attack.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Fayemi claimed that his lawyer was ineffective by telling the jurors, in his opening statement, that Fayemi would testify that Minter asked Fayemi to get the thallium for her. After the judge decided that some of his prior convictions, plus evidence that he had annotated a book about poisoning people, could come in on cross-examination, counsel persuaded Fayemi not to testify. Fayemi waived that right in open court. The state’s appellate judges reasonably concluded that there was no possibility of prejudice. View "Fayemi v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Police arrested Pulera on suspicion of bail jumping and took him to the Kenosha Pre-Trial Facility. About 48 hours later, Pulera attempted to hang himself in his cell. Correctional officers swiftly cut him down and called for an ambulance that saved his life. While at the facility, Pulera never told any official that he was contemplating suicide. Pulera did submit three requests for his prescription medications--clonazepam, apparently prescribed for anxiety, and tramadol, an opioid pain-reliever for his chronic pain from a back injury. He reported physical symptoms relating to not having those drugs and was seen by a nurse, who recorded that he had normal vital signs. Pulera was not given the pills because several of his pills were missing and the doctor inferred that Pulera could have already taken them. Pulera alleges that he had previously been on suicide watch at the facility and that his brother and his mother had recently committed suicide.The district court rejected Pulera’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given Pulera’s express statement that he was not considering suicide and the absence of more significant indirect signs, no rational jury could find that Pulera was unreasonably placed in the general population. A jury could not infer that depriving Pulera of his medications might be deadly from the mere fact that a physician had prescribed them. View "Pulera v. Sarzant" on Justia Law

Henderson joined the VA police department Hines VA Hospital in 1986. Henderson filed an employment discrimination action against the Department of Veteran Affairs. After being denied a promotion in 2013, Henderson, who is African American, alleged race and age discrimination and retaliation claims, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for the VA, following a remand for a determination of whether the VA’s explanations for not selecting Henderson for a criminal investigator position were a pretext for racial discrimination. The district court acted properly with respect to testimony on subjects not disclosed in Henderson’s interrogatory answer. Henderson failed to explain the substance of the testimony he sought to present so it is not possible to conclude that the district court erred in excluding it. The court’s decision that it would not permit evidence of discriminatory action against other African Americans after the award of the criminal investigator job was proper because some of those actions are in litigation; the slight additional value from the cumulative evidence was outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. View "Henderson v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Felders’s conviction as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and his 96-month sentence, rejecting an argument that his statements should have been suppressed because the police did not give him the required “Miranda” warnings. Felders testified that the police had not given him warnings of any kind. Officer Price testified that he had taken from his credential case a card, issued by the state police, with warnings and read Felders the advice on that card. On appeal, Felders no longer denied that Price read him warnings from a card but claimed that the record does not show that the statements read from the card satisfy Miranda. The Seventh Circuit held that Felders had the burden of persuasion and, on a silent record, he cannot show that any error occurred. The district judge could have asked Price to read the card aloud, but the absence of this information cuts against Felders given the plain-error burden. The court stated that it had no “reason to believe that Indiana, or any other state, distributes warning cards that fail to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirements.” View "United States v. Felders" on Justia Law

Officer Francisko, checking hunters’ licenses, approached a van parked on the side of a road. Armed hunters had just emerged from the woods. The driver, Cataline, was acting strangely but handed Francisko his driver’s license. While Francisko was doing a license check, Cataline called 911 and said: “I am in a lot of trouble … I think I am going to be disappearing.” He then hung up. Francisko told Cataline that he was free to go. The 911 operator reached Officer Kuehl’s supervisor, who told him to stop Cataline to check whether he was fit to drive. The officers followed Cataline’s van, pulled it over, and asked Cataline to turn off the engine. He did not comply but stared straight ahead. After ignoring three requests, Cataline put the van into reverse, turned, and pointed the van west in the eastbound lanes of the Interstate. Cataline then made another turn and plowed the van into the side of Kuehl’s car. Kuehl and Francisko say that Kuehl was pinned behind the door. Francisko shot Cataline, who died at the scene. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cataline’s behavior and the odd 911 call would have led an officer to be concerned that he posed a danger to himself and others. Francisko and Kuehl testified that they saw the van cross the white line on the highway several times. The stop was reasonable and compatible with the Fourth Amendment. View "Gysan v. Francisko" on Justia Law

Brown, a detainee at Wisconsin’s Polk County Jail, underwent a physical search of her body cavities. The institution had a written policy authorizing such a search to be conducted by medical personnel when there was reasonable suspicion to believe an inmate was internally hiding contraband. Fellow inmates had reported that Brown was concealing methamphetamine inside her body, which prompted jail staff to invoke the policy. Officers took Brown to a hospital, where a doctor and nurse first conducted an ultrasound, then inspected both her vagina and rectum in a private room without officers present. The search revealed no drugs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had reasonable suspicion that Brown was concealing contraband, their suspicion justified the cavity search, and the ensuing search was reasonable. View "Brown v. Polk County" on Justia Law

Marling was arrested while driving his car. Police took an inventory. The trunk held a locked box. An officer opened the box with a screwdriver and found illegal drugs. Marling was armed, despite felony convictions. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the box's contents, Marling received a 38-year sentence, as a habitual criminal. He filed an unsuccessful state court collateral attack, arguing that his lawyers furnished ineffective assistance by not arguing that opening the box damaged the box, in violation of police policy. The court of appeals found that the record did not establish damage to the box. A federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, ruling that a photograph showed damage to the box.The Seventh Circuit reversed. A factual mistake by a state court does not support collateral relief unless a correction shows that the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties” of the U.S. Not every departure from any policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The policy at issue states an officer “should avoid” opening a container when that would cause “unreasonable potential damage.” The policy is valid: it combines a presumptive rule of opening everything with a discretionary exception. Because the policy is valid, the search is valid. A district judge’s disagreement about whether the officer followed the local policy is not a sufficient ground for collateral relief. View "Marling v. Brown" on Justia Law