Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Waagner was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and of possessing a stolen vehicle that had crossed a state line. The court adopted the PSR finding that Waagner was an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on his prior convictions for “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B): two 1978 convictions for Ohio aggravated burglary and one 1992 conviction for Ohio attempted robbery. Waagner had a sentencing guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment; the statutory minimum was 15 years. While awaiting sentencing, Waagner escaped from custody and, while a fugitive, committed offenses in multiple districts. After his apprehension, he pleaded guilty to escape. The court imposed a 364-month sentence.Waagner filed a second collateral attack on his sentence, challenging his ACCA classification. The district court denied his motion, finding that, although his Ohio aggravated burglary convictions no longer constitute ACCA predicate offenses under the Supreme Court's 2015 "Johnson" decision, invalidating the residual clause, they still qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA's enumerated offenses clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The advent of Johnson permitted Waagner to bring a second motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255; before Johnson, any such challenge would have been futile. Nonetheless, Ohio aggravated burglary and Ohio attempted robbery are violent felonies as that term is defined in the ACCA. View "Waagner v. United States" on Justia Law

After four months of pretrial detention at the Madison County jail in 2007, Pittman attempted suicide by hanging himself with a blanket. The attempt left Pittman in a vegetative state. In his suicide note, he stated that the guards were “f***ing” with him and would not give him access to “crisis [counseling].” Banovz, an inmate housed near Pittman’s cell, substantiated the claim that Pittman had made in his suicide note. In a recorded interview with a county detective, Banovz stated that in the days leading up to Pittman’s suicide attempt, Pittman had asked officers Werner and Eaton to refer him to crisis counseling; neither of them followed through with their promises. On remand, in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court’s exclusion of the Banovz video interview was a reversible error. After a second trial, the jury again returned a verdict for the defendants.The Seventh Circuit again remanded. One of the jury instructions erroneously directed the jury to evaluate Pittman’s Fourteenth Amendment claim according to a subjective rather than objective standard. The jury was told to consider whether the defendants “consciously failed to take reasonable measures to prevent [Pittman] from harming himself.” View "Pittman v. Madison County" on Justia Law

Machicote, a Wisconsin inmate underwent surgery to remove damaged bone, tissue, and cartilage in his ankle after he suffered an injury while playing basketball in the prison yard. After the procedure, the surgeon supplied Machicote with oxycodone and warned that he would be in “extreme pain” when the medication wore off. He was discharged with instructions recommending narcotic-strength painkillers every six hours. At the prison, Dr. Herweijer ordered Tylenol #3, as needed every six hours for three days. Because of Nurse Stecker’s scheduling of the doses, Machicote woke at 3:30 a.m. in “excruciating pain.” Machicote continued to have trouble accessing the medication that had been ordered; the prison’s medication distribution schedule did not match Machicote’s prescription. Concerned about pain during the night, Machicote was told: “That’s how it will go.” Machicote’s medication order ran out completely and he began experiencing agonizing pain around the clock. Nurse Stecker refused to contact a doctor. Five days later, Dr. Hoffman prescribed him another painkiller, Tramadol. Machicote did not receive the medication for two more days, and his medical records show that the pain required management for several more weeks.In Machicote’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the other defendants but vacated in part; a factual issue remains as to the deliberate indifference of Nurse Stecker. View "Machicote v. Roethlisberger" on Justia Law

In July 2010, Fieldman climbed into a truck in a Walmart parking lot and told a hitman that he wanted his ex-wife and her boyfriend killed. The hitman was actually an undercover police officer who videotaped their conversation. Fieldman was convicted in Illinois state court for solicitation of murder for hire. Fieldman contested his intent, a necessary element of the offense, and sought to testify about his interactions with the informant during the weeks before his conversation with the hitman. Fieldman believed this testimony would provide critical contextual information about his state of mind and demonstrate that his meeting with the hitman was a charade. The trial court did not allow the jury to hear this testimony because the court concluded it was irrelevant. Fieldman unsuccessfully appealed his convictions.In his federal habeas petition, Fieldman successfully argued that the court’s exclusion of his testimony deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of the testimony was contrary to clearly established federal law confirming a defendant’s right to testify, on his own behalf, about circumstances bearing directly on his guilt or innocence or the jury’s ascertainment of guilt. The exclusion of material portions of his testimony had a detrimental effect on his interests because it undercut his entire defense and effectively prevented him from challenging the state’s strongest evidence. View "Fieldman v. Brannon" on Justia Law

A certified class claimed that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet guards; the inmates were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder, in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their sanitary protection in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies, clothing, and the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough.The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment theory; a jury returned a defense verdict on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists as to the reasonableness of the strip and body cavity searches. View "Henry v. Hulett" on Justia Law

Morris worked for nine years as a train conductor for BNSF. The company fired him after he committed two speeding infractions during a single shift on a train carrying hazardous chemicals and failed to follow company rules requiring self-reporting of the violations. Morris, who is African American, invoked Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and sued to challenge his termination, alleging that BNSF punished him more severely than non-black employees who committed similar safety violations. A jury found in his favor. Morris was awarded $531,292 in back pay, $137,450 in front pay, $275,000 in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $370,000The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the viability of Morris’s theory of discrimination, the sufficiency of his evidence, discovery rulings, and remedies. Morris introduced comprehensible and detailed evidence about how other employees were treated after committing safety violations. Although the supervisor responsible for any race-based discrimination did not make the termination decision, that supervisor’s decision to channel Morris down the path of formal discipline was based on race. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order reinstatement. View "Morris v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Dunn County Sergeant Kurtzhals threatened physical violence against one of his fellow officers, Deputy Rhead. The Sheriff’s Office put him on temporary paid administrative leave and ordered him to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Kurtzhals, believing that his supervisors took this action because they knew that Kurtzhals has a history of PTSD stemming from his military service, not because his conduct violated the County’s Workplace Violence Policy and implicated public safety, sued for employment discrimination, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Kurtzhals’s PTSD was the “but for” cause of Dunn County’s action or that it was plainly unreasonable for Kurtzhals’s superiors to believe that a fitness-for-duty examination was warranted, and granted the county summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kurtzhals had no evidence to support his claim of pretext; there is no evidence that his supervisors knew about Kurtzhals’s PTSD. Contrary to Kurtzhals’s argument that he and Rhead acted in a comparable fashion and should have been treated similarly, the record reflects that only Kurtzhals explicitly threatened physical violence. Rhead may have behaved in an intimidating fashion towards Kurtzhals, but their behavior was not identical. View "Kurtzhals v. County of Dunn" on Justia Law

Pierri began working for Medline in 2011. In 2015, Pierri’s grandfather fell ill. Pierri's supervisor, Tyler, allowed Pierri to work 10‐hour shifts four days a week in order to take his grandfather on weekly hospital trips. Six months later, Tyler told Pierri to return to five‐day, eight-hour shifts. Tyler offered to let Pierri work Tuesday through Saturday, but Pierri wanted to attend school on Saturdays. Pierri began using one day per week of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. Tyler harassed him and refused to assign him research and development work, on which Pierri’s bonus depended. Pierri complained to Medline’s HR department; the harassment continued. Citing stress, Pierri started full‐time FMLA leave in March 2016. In September, Medline then approved him for disability leave. In March 2017, Medline contacted Pierri’s attorney to find out whether he planned on returning. Pierri did not respond. Medline terminated his employment.Pierri had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and then filed suit, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(4), for his association with his ailing grandfather, and retaliation 42 U.S.C. 12203. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Medline. Pierri failed to present material facts in dispute that would show that Medline discriminated against him for his association with his grandfather or that he suffered an adverse employment action. Pierri’s failure to respond about returning to work caused his termination, not retaliation for his complaints. View "Pierri v. Medline Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Vaughn, a quadriplegic, has received home‐based care for over 30 years. She requires help with personal care, household maintenance, mobility exercises, transportation, medications, suctioning secretions from her tracheostomy, and use of the ventilator. When nursing shifts cannot be staffed, Vaughn has relied on friends. Indiana funded her care through two federally-reimbursed Medicaid programs: A&D waiver and core Medicaid. Vaughn could select her own caregivers to receive A&D waiver funds but could not personally direct nursing care funded through core Medicaid. In 2016, Vaughn was hospitalized with pneumonia. She was cleared to be discharged but the state could not find nurses to provide round‐the‐clock care at home at Medicaid rates Vaughn was transferred to a nursing home and filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794; and the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8). The court granted Vaughn summary judgment with an injunction requiring the state to “do whatever is necessary to achieve” round‐the‐clock home‐based care, fully paid for by the state.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Vaughn is not entitled to the services she has requested under Indiana’s version of the Medicaid program, as the program was structured before the state adopted a new pilot program. The state is not obligated to reimburse Vaughn’s providers at rates above the approved Medicaid caps, nor must it use funds outside the Medicaid program to comply with a rule about accommodation within the program. View "Vaughn v. Walthall" on Justia Law

In 2009 Allen-Noll, who is African-American, was hired by Madison Area Technical College as a nursing instructor. Beginning in 2010, Allen-Noll was criticized for her teaching methods. Students complained that she was “rude, condescending, and defensive” in class. In 2011 complaints about Allen-Noll resurfaced from students and the tutor assigned to her class, who criticized Allen-Noll for not timely posting grades and making study guides available and for failing too many students. Allen-Noll’s clinical class also complained that she failed to follow the rules on cell phone use and did not complete paperwork. Allen-Noll was assigned a faculty mentor. Allen-Noll filed a complaint with the College, alleging discrimination and harassment based on her skin color, Complaints about Allen-Noll’s teaching continued. Other faculty said she would not participate in team meetings or volunteer for the extra service expected of full-time faculty. When her teaching contract was not renewed, Allen-Noll sued, alleging racial discrimination and harassment. After discovery, the college moved for summary judgment, but Allen-Noll failed to follow the court’s procedures. The record was largely established by the defendants’ submissions, and the college prevailed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the appeal frivolous and granting the college’s request to sanction Allen-Noll and her lawyer. View "Allen-Noll v. Madison Area Technical College" on Justia Law