Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jones spent more than 10 years in prison before the Seventh Circuit granted his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, finding that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. After Jones was freed, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Madison County, Indiana deputy prosecutors Koester and Kopp, in their individual capacities, arguing that they maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his due process rights when they filed an untimely amendment to his charges and secured a conviction. He also alleged that Madison County Prosecutor Cummings, an elected official, adopted and followed an official policy of flouting state-law limitations on amendments to charges. He requested $50 million in general damages for his confinement, compensatory damages for past and future physical and emotional injuries, and attorneys’ fees.The district court dismissed the action, finding that Cummings was a state official, so the suit against him was in substance one against the state. The state is not a “person” that can be sued under section 1983. Jones’s suit against the prosecutors failed because of the absolute immunity prosecutors enjoy when they are acting as advocates. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Jones was undoubtedly injured by his wrongful imprisonment but that does not mean that he has a remedy against any particular actor. View "Jones v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 1982, Thompson was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary for his role in the home invasion and killing of the Hilborns. After a remand for resentencing, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his sentence of two consecutive 60-year terms for the murders and a consecutive 30-year term for the conspiracy to commit burglary. Thompson filed a post-conviction petition that languished until 2015; the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief.Thompson filed a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress Thompson’s request for a lawyer and his post-request statements, failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument remarks referencing Thompson’s request for a lawyer, and failing to present the prosecutor’s remarks in Thompson’s direct appeal. Following a remand, the district court dismissed the petition.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not “substantially” likely that the result of Thompson’s trial or appeal would have been different but for his counsel’s actions. The physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were consistent with testimony by his co-conspirator, Dillon, implicating Thompson, including blood on Thompson’s jeans and gloves that law enforcement recovered from his closet shortly after the murders; the hunting knife found in Thompson’s trunk, freshly cleaned and oiled; Thompson’s presence with Dillon at a laundromat just after the murders; and the forensic pathologist’s testimony about the Hillborns's stab wounds. The evidence against Thompson was “overwhelming.” View "Thompson v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In 2006, Reyes was convicted of several federal crimes stemming from the armed robbery of a credit union, including brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), He was sentenced as a career offender based on his prior convictions for burglary, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted murder under Illinois state law. After Reyes was convicted, the Supreme Court issued decisions interpreting statutory definitions of “crime of violence,” holding that “residual clauses” in several statutes are unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Reyes brought a second collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting that this emerging case law rendered his conviction and sentence unconstitutional. The district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability concerning the conviction for brandishing a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury was properly instructed. The instruction did not treat Reyes’ conspiracy conviction as a predicate for his colleagues’ brandishing of the firearm. That the brandishing (and robbery) occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Reyes’ conviction under section 924(c). The instruction explained that the government still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes’ colleague brandished the gun in furtherance of a crime of violence--the robbery. View "Reyes v. United States" on Justia Law

Hodkiewicz’s pregnant wife, S.P., reported that Hodkiewicz was abusing her. Hodkiewicz filed for divorce. For the next three years, S.P. endured vandalism, ominous notes. and assaults that resulted in emergency room visits. Hodkiewicz denied involvement and little evidence implicated him other than S.P.’s word. S.P. received 146 calls and harassing text messages. She testified to recognizing Hodkiewicz’s voice. The phone number used to activate the TracFone from which the calls originated belonged to Hodkiewicz's employer. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement. In 2013, Hodkiewicz was charged with stalking, placed on probation, and told to have no contact with S.P. S.P. later walked into her bathroom and was suddenly choked from behind and lost consciousness. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement.A jury convicted Hodkiewicz, who was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. A Wisconsin trial court denied his post-conviction motions, finding that Hodkiewicz failed to prove that his trial attorney was ineffective. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed his convictions for unlawful use of a telephone and disorderly conduct “because his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to hearsay testimony that S.P. received a particular call on her work phone but affirmed his remaining convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, agreeing that Hodkiewicz could not show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome. The jury heard 35 witnesses and had ample evidence to assess S.P.’s credibility. View "Hodkiewicz v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

In 2012, Grzegorczyk hired two men to kill his ex-wife and others whom he deemed responsible for his divorce and the loss of custody of his son. The men he hired were undercover law enforcement officers. During a final meeting, Grzegorczyk gave the undercover officers $3,000 in cash, and showed them pictures, $45,000 in cash that he intended to pay upon completion of the murders, a semi-automatic handgun, and ammunition. Grzegorczyk was arrested.In 2014, Grzegorczyk pled guilty to murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)., Grzegorczyk waived the right to “all appellate issues that might have been available if he had exercised his right to trial”; he could only appeal the validity of his guilty plea and the sentence imposed. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 151 months, with consecutive 60 months for the firearm offense, which was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court then invalidated the definition of a “violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (Johnson decision), later extending the holding to section 924(c)'s residual clause definition of “crime of violence.”Grzegorczyk sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 from his 924(c) conviction. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Grzegorczyk has long unconditionally waived his right to contest the validity of his plea agreement and the legal sufficiency of the 924(c) charge. View "Grzegorczyk v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Guenther was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the penalty for that offense to a 15-year minimum and a maximum of life in prison if the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” Guenther’s PSR identified two convictions for first-degree burglary (1990 and 1992), second-degree burglary (1986), and kidnapping (1990), all under Minnesota law. The judge applied ACCA and sentenced him to 327 months. His Eighth Circuit direct appeal failed as did his petition for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2017, incarcerated in Wisconsin, Guenther sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that his Minnesota burglary convictions are not “violent felonies”The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief. A section 2255 motion in the sentencing court is normally the exclusive method to collaterally attack a federal sentence, but the “saving clause,” 2255(e) provides a limited exception, allowing a prisoner to seek section 2241 relief in the district of confinement if “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit applies the exception when the prisoner relies on an intervening statutory decision announcing a new, retroactive rule that could not have been invoked in his first section 2255 motion and the error is serious enough to amount to a miscarriage of justice. Guenther’s Minnesota burglary convictions are not ACCA predicates under Seventh Circuit law. View "Guenther v. Marske" on Justia Law

Triplett pleaded guilty to three charges of human trafficking, pimping and pandering, and possession of a firearm by a felon, in exchange for the dismissal of 17 charges (including attempted first-degree homicide and kidnapping), which were to be “read-in” at sentencing (essentially allowing the judge to consider them as relevant conduct), Triplett’s total sentencing exposure was reduced from 354 years to a maximum of 47.5 years. The judge confirmed with defense counsel that the dismissed charges would be read-in. Defense counsel noted that Triplett did not admit the truth of the charges. In signing his plea agreement, Triplett acknowledged that “although the judge may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, the maximum penalty will not be increased.” The judge ordered Triplett to serve 11 years in prison followed by nine years of supervision.Triplett unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea. Without conducting a hearing, the court determined that even if Triplett was given incorrect advice about the read-charges, Triplett was not prejudiced. The plea questionnaire and waiver of rights warned Triplett that the court could consider those charges. The court also represented that it had not considered the read-in charges at sentencing. Wisconsin's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The Wisconsin court’s rejection of Triplett's ineffectiveness claim rests on an adequate, independent state ground--Triplett’s failure to allege objective facts in support of his claim of prejudice. View "Triplett v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Five South Bend officers were assigned to an area of the city that was considered to be a “hot spot.” One drove a fully marked police vehicle. Two officers patrolled in an unmarked car without sirens or lights; two sat in an unmarked car that had sirens and lights. Around 4:30 am, the patrolling car radioed over the tactical channel that they planned to stop a speeding car. The remaining officers promptly acknowledged the report but did not indicate that the traffic stop was an emergency, nor did they request assistance from other officers.After hearing the exchanges, knowing that no one was requesting assistance, Gorny (two miles away) roared through a residential neighborhood at 78 miles per hour, disregarding the 30 mph speed limit, with infrequent use of lights or sirens. On Western Avenue, he accelerated up to 98 mph and reached the Kaley Avenue intersection with an obstructed view. Disregarding the red light, Gorny sped across and crashed into Flores’s car, killing her.The district court dismissed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive due process action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Flores’s allegations plausibly state claims against Gorny and the city. The law does not provide a shield against constitutional violations for state actors who consciously take extreme, obvious risks. Flores’s complaint plausibly alleges that the city acted with deliberate indifference by failing to address the known recklessness of its officers as a group and Gorny in particular. View "Flores v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

After an allegation that Bush had choked his son, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) began an investigation. Bush’s then-wife, Erika, obtained a court order suspending Bush’s parenting time. Bush filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of himself and his children, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and claiming that DCFS employees’ conduct set off events culminating in a state court order infringing on his and his kids’ right to familial association.The district court dismissed, finding that Bush and his children lacked standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and that the Younger abstention doctrine barred the court from ruling on the remaining constitutional claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.. Bush failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing for his First Amendment claim. Adhering to principles of equity, comity, and federalism, the court concluded that the district court was right to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the remaining claims. View "J.B. v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Juarez Rogers, who lived in Illinois, was arrested for murder in Griffith, Indiana. A confidential informant in that investigation reported to police in nearby Hobart, Indiana, that Juarez’s sons, including Cortez Juarez Rogers, were threatening him. Hobart Officers investigated and found an Illinois State ID photo and associated information for an Illinois resident, Cortez Javan Rogers, who had never been to Indiana. Believing, mistakenly, that Javan was the individual about whom the informant had complained, an officer attested that he had communicated a threat to commit a felony. An Indiana judge issued an arrest warrant that was listed in a database available to law enforcement officers in other states. A Chicago police officer subsequently stopped a car in which Javan was a passenger, consulted a database, and arrested him. An Illinois judge denied bail and remanded Javan pending extradition to Indiana. The following evening Indiana moved to correct the warrant information. Chicago officers immediately released Javan, who sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Hobart officers did not purposefully engage in any activity in Illinois or direct any action in Illinois that would cause them to reasonably anticipate that they would be haled into Illinois courts. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over them would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. None of the supposed Illinois contacts, considered separately or together, constitute the requisite “minimum contacts” among the state, the defendants, and the cause of action necessary to fulfill the requirements of due process. View "Rogers v. City of Hobart" on Justia Law