Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Olvera’s conviction stems from the 2000, death of Stropes during a gang-related drive-by shooting in East Moline. Olvera’s codefendant, Delgado, fired the shot. Olvera was the driver of the vehicle and did not fire any shots that evening. Delgado pleaded guilty to murder. At Olvera’s trial, his girlfriend and others testified that the shooting arose out of an incident at a party. Olvera unsuccessfully sought state court post-conviction review, claiming that his trial counsel had failed to “contact or call” several witnesses “whose testimony would have been of significant benefit to him.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Olvera’s petition for federal habeas relief. The state court’s articulation of the Strickland standard was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established law. The state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it concluded that affidavits submitted by the potential witnesses identified by Olvera failed to demonstrate prejudice or failed to demonstrate deficient performance. The court noted the overwhelming evidence supporting the state’s accountability theory and precluding Olvera’s claim of self-defense that was “left untouched.” View "Olvera v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In 1984, Kidd stabbed four people to death in a Chicago apartment. The building was then set on fire. Officers arrested Kidd and Kidd’s half-brother, Orange. Kidd made statements that implicated himself and identified Orange as the primary perpetrator and led the police to a knife stained with a victim’s blood. At Orange’s trial, Kidd voluntarily testified that he alone committed the murders. Months later, Kidd pled guilty to the murders. He testified at his sentencing hearing that he stabbed all four victims.On remand in 1992, Kidd moved to suppress his statements from the night of the murders as an unlawfully coerced confession, claiming various acts of torture by the police, that he was under the influence of drugs when he made the statement .and that the police refused to let him contact a lawyer. At a hearing, Kidd did not testify, but the officers denied Kidd’s allegations. The court denied his motion. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Kidd filed an unsuccessful state postconviction petition alleging that he was abused by the police, including former Chicago Officer Burge, who was found in other cases to have abused many people around the time of Kidd’s arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kidd’s federal habeas petition. Even if the allegedly coerced confession was improperly admitted at Kidd’s trial, the admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. View "Kidd v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Leal used an online dating application to contact a user who was an undercover FBI agent, posing as a teenage boy. Despite learning that the user was underage, Leal engaged in sexually explicit conversations and solicited oral sex. The agent provided Leal an address. Under surveillance, Leal arrived at the house. When a surveillance officer drove an unmarked vehicle up the alley, Leal sped off. Leal was quickly pulled over. Three officers were present, wearing clothes that identified them as officers. Leal was told that he was not under arrest and agreed to speak with other agents in the house. Leal consented to a pat-down and surrendered his cell phone and his car keys. The recorded interview proceeded with the door closed. The agents neither handcuffed nor restrained Leal. Leal quickly confessed and confirmed he had sent the messages. After the 18-minute interview, the FBI arrested Leal for knowingly attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of Leal’s motion to suppress his statements. The agents did not conduct a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Fifth Amendment rights. The custody inquiry is not whether the defendant was under a subjective belief that his movements were restricted, but whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that he was free to leave. That Leal believed he was in a precarious position says nothing about the officers' behavior or whether a reasonable person would have felt bound to stay. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Frazier, age 45, reported to the jail to begin a sentence for felony theft. Frazier informed the intake officer that she was epileptic, had blackouts and high blood pressure, and had used heroin the night before; that year she had experienced a stroke. Frazier got a “medical designation,” which meant that an officer would check on Frazier at least every 15 minutes. At health evaluations, hours later, she did not report pain or withdrawal symptoms. At 2:30 a.m., Frazier began groaning. Correctional officers responded several times, but Frazier did not describe her problem. Around 9:00 a.m., a nurse spoke with Frazier, who did not voice any complaints nor display signs of distress. Around 11:00 a.m., Frazier was evaluated as having “mild withdrawal.” A doctor prescribed heroin withdrawal medications. At 3:23 p.m., security footage shows Frazier removing (Advil or Aleve) pills from her toiletry bag and placing them in her mouth. Minutes later, Frazier had a seizure. An officer found Frazier unresponsive at 5:11 p.m. and called emergency personnel. Frazier was pronounced dead. A coroner determined that Frazier died of “diphenhydramine toxicity.” Frazier had smuggled the medication into the jail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. There is no evidence that corrections officers were aware of the risk of substantial harm that Frazier ultimately suffered— death from diphenhydramine toxicity. No reasonable jury could conclude that they were deliberately indifferent to Frazier’s heroin withdrawal. View "Jones v. Mathews" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's state criminal charge for animal cruelty was dismissed, plaintiff and his wife filed suit against the City and the Police Department under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for wrongful arrest and excessive force, as well as various state law claims. The jury returned a verdict for defendants on all counts. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a mistrial during the trial and later denied a post-trial motion for a new trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial based on its response to a potential juror's de minimis conduct. In this case, the district court properly dispatched its voir dire duties by probing whether the excused potential juror had made any additional statements which could have prejudiced plaintiff and by considering and rejecting the argument that brief departing comments in this instance required the empanelment of a new venire. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance and properly exercised its discretion by limiting plaintiff's testimony to issues relevant to the substantive issues in the case being tried. The court further concluded that the district court did not err by allowing defendants to argue that the entire requested $975,000 damages award would come from Officer Horan personally. In any event, to the extent that these statements created confusion because of the temporal proximity between the accurate statements of the law and the references to the full amount requested, the district court allowed plaintiff's counsel on rebuttal to explain the issue. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's challenges to the district court's handling of the jury instructions. View "Farnik v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cook County inmate Bowers filed a federal civil rights lawsuit after other inmates attacked him in 2012, alleging the defendants failed to protect him, instituted an observation policy that caused the attack, and later discriminated against him because of a resulting disability. Bowers remains in a wheelchair. The jail is short on ADA‐ compliant cells, however, and, save for one month, Bowers has lived in cells without accessible showers or toilets. The district court dismissed most of Bowers’s claims before trial. A jury returned a verdict in the Sheriff’s favor on the remaining claims,The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bowers, before filing suit, did not exhaust his failure‐ to‐protect claims as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Bowers prison grievances did not assert the same claims as his complaint; his “Monell” claim was untimely. A reasonable jury could find that Bowers is not a qualified individual with a disability--someone who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities,” has “a record of such an impairment,” or is “being regarded as having such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). The jury had sufficient evidence to find that Bowers lied about needing a wheelchair. View "Bowers v. Dart" on Justia Law

Inmate Robinson was offered new medication. Unaware of any prescription, he questioned the officer who gave it to him and followed up with the health services manager and others. Despite learning that there was no record of any new prescription for him, Robinson took the medication. Days later, Robinson passed out. A nurse advised him to keep taking the medication. Robinson then was sent to an outside hospital, where doctors surmised that he might be allergic to the medication. The prescription was meant for a different inmate. Robinson sued. The defendants moved for summary judgment; 20 days after his deadline for filing a brief in opposition, Robinson filed a brief to support his own request for summary judgment, supplemented by a proposed statement of facts. He did not respond to the defendants’ statement of facts. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court permissibly applied Eastern District of Wisconsin Local Rule 56(b)(4) to deem the defendants’ facts unopposed, regardless of Robinson’s later filings. Based on those facts, no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference to a serious medical risk. Nor could a jury conclude that the health‐services manager violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene. Robinson’s state‐law negligence claims were barred by Wisconsin’s notice‐of‐claim statute. The defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based only on Robinson's failure to timely respond. View "Robinson v. Waterman" on Justia Law

During heavy snow, Lieutenant McAuly approached a car that was far off the roadway. Lao lowered the driver's window and stated that a tow truck was on its way. According to McAuly, Lao displayed nervousness and was acting as though he wanted McAuly to leave while speaking sharply to his passenger, Chang. Their driver’s licenses revealed extensive recent felony criminal histories. Both were under supervised release for methamphetamine convictions.Both consented to pat-down searches. McAuly discovered that under her shirt Chang was carrying a locked, portable gun safe. Chang denied both ownership of the safe and knowledge of its contents. Through the car windows, McAuly saw a razor blade and a piece of cardboard that he associated with dividing drugs. Wisconsin Act 79 authorizes an officer, without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, to search any property under the control of a person who is under court supervision if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McAuly found the key, opened the gun safe, and found what was determined to be 75.6 grams of methamphetamine and a digital scale. A later search revealed a firearm and ammunition. After receiving Miranda warnings, Chang declared that everything in the safe belonged to her, although she was unable to describe its contents. Both were charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Lao was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of the defendants’ motion to suppress. Although the officer’s hunch alone was not sufficient justification for the seizure, other factors provided the reasonable suspicion necessary. Chang’s statements did not fall within any hearsay exception and could not be admitted if Chang chose to invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. View "United States v. Lao" on Justia Law

Danville Officer Crawley sought a warrant to search Woodfork’s home. Crawley testified under oath, identifying Woodfork as the target of the request, stating that Woodfork had sold crystal methamphetamine in a controlled buy to a confidential source (CS) that day. Officers had searched the SC before and after that buy and surveilled the transaction, which was recorded. Crawley had relied on the CS “multiple times” and found him “reliable.” The officers attempted to set up a second controlled buy, using another reliable CS. Woodfork had insisted that the CS come to Woodfork’s home, which was described by naming an intersection, understood to be 1220 North Franklin Street.The judge issued a search warrant for Woodfork’s North Franklin home. Officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm. Woodfork moved to quash the warrant and or to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was entitled to a "Franks" hearing and suppression because Crawley misled the county judge regarding the identification of his home and by omitting details about the CS's criminal histories.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Woodfork’s motion. Crawley and the judge were not simply relying on the uncorroborated word of the CS; a controlled buy, properly executed, is generally a reliable indicator of the presence of illegal drug activity. The omission of information about the sources’ backgrounds, criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable cause determination. Crawley testified; the court could assess his credibility and ask questions. View "United States v. Woodfork" on Justia Law

Huerta was shot and killed in a parking lot in 2009. Huerta had been drinking with his uncle, Rojas, when a car pulled up, an occupant fired at Huerta, and the car sped away. Officers focused on Villavicencio‐Serna; his girlfriend’s father had reported her missing the morning of Huerta’s murder. The girlfriend eventually stated that she was with Villavicencio‐Serna on that night, that when she woke up, Villavicencio‐Serna stated that he “took care of business,” and that Villavicencio‐Serna had previously stated that he was prepared to shoot Huerta. She later changed her story, claiming that she was in the car with Villavicencio‐Serna’s friends, Daddio and Rogers, when Villavicencio‐Serna leaned out the window and shot Huerta. She later said that Villavicencio‐Serna reached over her to shoot. Daddio recounted that the four drove around the parking lot before Villavicencio‐Serna shouted at Huerta then fired shots. Rogers repeatedly stated that he knew nothing about the shooting, then changed his story, stating that Villavicencio‐Serna shot Huerta. Their stories were somewhat inconsistent.All three recanted at trial, insisting that the officers scared them into implicating Villavicencio‐Serna; the officers’ version of the events was fed to them while the recording equipment was off. Allegedly unprompted, Rojas had identified Daddio’s car, a silver Cadillac, although his original story referred to a dark car.Villavicencio‐Serna was convicted of first‐degree murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal petition for habeas corpus relief while expressing concerns about the “troubling” inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence. View "Villavicencio-Serna v. Jackson" on Justia Law