Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a 2009 drug purchase, Rabe and his dealer, Powell, got into a fight. Powell jumped into his truck and sped away, running over Rabe. Ryckman, who had been waiting in Rabe’s car, dialed 911. Powell returned. Ryckman and Powell struggled over the phone; the phone was broken in half. Powell returned to his truck and sped away. When police arrived, they found a knife on the ground. Rabe had several serious injuries and was bleeding from a deep gash on his neck. He survived. At trial, Powell argued that the entire incident was an accident and that Rabe attacked him first. Powell was convicted of first‐degree reckless injury but acquitted of attempted first-degree murder.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Powell’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting an argument that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in approving a supplemental jury instruction about the reckless injury charge. There is no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state appellate court’s conclusion that the instruction was an accurate response to a question from the jury about the definition of “utter disregard for human life.” Powell’s trial counsel had reasonable and strategic reasons for not objecting; by focusing on the injury-producing conduct, he hoped to minimize the chance that the jury would convict Powell based on the severity of Rabe’s injuries. View "Powell v. Fuchs" on Justia Law

Logan, an African American man, was a Chicago Aviation Security Officer. In 2015, he applied for a promotion. He was not selected but was placed on a “Pre-Qualified Candidates” list for future vacancies. Two sergeant positions became available. Logan was second on the list. The city informed him that a city policy made internal candidates ineligible for promotion if they had been suspended for more than seven days in the previous 12 months. Logan had been suspended for more than seven days in the previous year.Logan alleges that he was wrongfully singled out for discipline. After his suspension, Logan complained about being bullied at work and about “discrimination against black officers.” After he filed a grievance, an arbitrator concluded that while Logan committed misconduct sufficient to warrant discipline, the length of his suspension was excessive. The arbitrator ordered Logan's promotion with back pay and benefits.Logan then filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of his race and gender and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Other than the fact that Logan is a member of a protected class, there is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that his race caused him to be disciplined. Logan failed to show that his belief that he was opposing an unlawful employment practice was objectively reasonable. View "Logan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2013-2016, law enforcement investigated a large methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, installing three cameras on utility poles on public property that viewed Tuggle’s home and a shed owned by Tuggle’s coconspirator, Vaultonburg. The cameras recorded around the clock. Rudimentary lighting technology improved the quality of overnight footage; agents could remotely zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras and review the camera footage in real-time or later. Officers tallied over 100 instances of what they suspected were deliveries of methamphetamine to Tuggle’s residence. After these alleged “drops,” different individuals would arrive, enter the home, and purportedly buy methamphetamine. Several witnesses corroborated these activities. Relying heavily on the video evidence, officers secured and executed search warrants on several locations, including Tuggle’s house.After the denial of his motions to suppress, Tuggle pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) to conspiring to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of methamphetamine and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, and 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) for maintaining a drug-involved premises. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government used commonplace technology, located where officers were lawfully entitled to be, and captured events observable to any ordinary passerby; it did not invade an expectation of privacy that society would be prepared to accept as reasonable. The prolonged, uninterrupted use of pole cameras did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. View "United States v. Tuggle" on Justia Law

Gaetjens bred cats in her Loves Park home.. Her doctor told her to go to the hospital because of high blood pressure. Later that day, the doctor couldn’t locate Gaetjens and phoned Eads, Gaetjens’s neighbor. Eads could not locate Gaetjens. The next day, Gaetjens was still missing. Eads called the police, stating that Gaetjens might be experiencing a medical emergency. Officers went to Gaetjens’s home but could not see anyone inside. They saw packages on the porch, untended garbage, and a full mailbox. . Eads provided a key. The police went into the home but immediately left because of intense odors, "urine, feces, and maybe a decomposing body." The police called the Fire Department to enter with breathing devices. The Fire Chief temporarily condemned the home as not fit for habitation. Firefighters went inside to look for Gaetjens but found 37 cats. They summoned Animal Services to round up the cats because Gaetjens was not allowed inside the condemned house. The cats were impounded for nine days. Four cats died.Gaetjens, who had been in the hospital, sued under section 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits such conduct without a warrant but emergencies breed exceptions. The defendants had reason to believe that Gaetjens was experiencing a medical emergency and found her home so noxious that it posed a public safety risk. View "Gaetjens v. Winnebago County" on Justia Law

Coscia used electronic exchanges for futures trading and implemented high-frequency trading programs. High-frequency trading, called “spoofing,” and defined as bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution, became illegal in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5). Coscia was convicted of commodities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, and spoofing, After an unsuccessful appeal, Coscia sought a new trial, citing new evidence that data discovered after trial establishes that there were errors in the data presented to the jury and that subsequent indictments for similar spoofing activities undercut the government’s characterization of Coscia as a trading “outlier.” He also claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, having an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that Coscia’s new evidence could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence, Coscia failed to explain how that evidence or the subsequent indictments seriously called the verdict into question. Coscia has not established that his attorneys learned of relevant and confidential information from its cited unrelated representations. Coscia’s counsel faced “the common situation” where the client stands a better chance of success by admitting the underlying actions and arguing that the actions do not constitute a crime. That the jury did not accept his defense does not render it constitutionally deficient. View "Coscia v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago officers responded to a 911 call and found Jones bleeding from a gunshot wound. Jones stated, “Damon shot me” and that Damon was wearing a “black hoodie.” About 90 seconds later, officers encountered Damon Goodloe, wearing a black hoodie but unarmed. They took Goodloe to the scene, where Jones stated, “he’s the one that shot me.” Jones died at a hospital.The prosecution introduced Jones’s statements to the officers. Goodloe’s hands tested positive for gunshot residue. Lovett testified that she saw Goodloe (whom she knew) and another man, both in black hoodies, heard several gunshots but ducked before she could see who fired a gun, called 911, and identified Goodloe in a line-up. Loggins testified that he was purchasing cocaine from Jones when he observed two men in black hoodies. When the shots were fired, he fled. A jury convicted Goodloe of first-degree murder without finding that he personally discharged a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Goodloe’s habeas petition, first upholding the admission of Jones’s identification of Goodloe. Statements are nontestimonial when made during police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to meet an ongoing emergency. The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that the emergency was ongoing when Goodloe was taken to the ambulance in handcuffs. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses who could have provided an innocent explanation for Goodloe's presence near the shooting; their testimony was unlikely to create a reasonable probability of a different result. View "Goodloe v. Brannon" on Justia Law

In 2012, Demkovich was hired as the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic Church. Demkovich is gay, overweight, and suffers from diabetes and metabolic syndrome. Demkovich claims Reverend Dada subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation and his disabilities. After Demkovich married his partner, Reverend Dada demanded Demkovich’s resignation because his marriage violated Church teachings. Demkovich refused. Reverend Dada fired him. Demkovich filed hostile environment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.The Seventh Circuit initially declined to extend the constitutional "ministerial" exemption to categorically bar all hostile environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees where there is no challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing. On rehearing, the court ordered the dismissal of all of Demkovich’s claims. The First Amendment ministerial exception protects a religious organization’s employment relationship with its ministers, from hiring to firing and the supervising in between. Adjudicating a minister’s hostile work environment claims based on the interaction between ministers would undermine this constitutionally protected relationship. It would also result in civil intrusion upon, and excessive entanglement with, the religious realm. View "Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish," on Justia Law

Thomas moved to a cell at Pontiac Correctional Center. Thomas claimed there were feces, urine, and mold smeared on the walls, sink, and cell door; the mattress was soiled with feces and reeked of urine; there were dead flies on the bunk bed; and the sink emitted only cold, black, oily water. After Thomas complained about his mattress, prison officials got him a new one within two weeks. Thomas used his sheets and blanket to avoid contact with the soiled mattress. Thomas received gloves to remove the dead flies; he had a towel for cleaning and received a disinfectant solution several times during his eight-week stay in the cell. Thomas refused to clean the walls. While awaiting a plumbing repair, officials allowed Thomas three hot showers per week. Pontiac’s water supply underwent regular testing and met all environmental requirements. Thomas sought treatment for dry skin and a rash on his back. A health worker noted “a small clogged pore,” recommended warm moist compresses, and told Thomas to return as needed. Thomas obtained hot water for the compresses from another inmate. Thomas sought no further medical care at Pontiac.Thomas later invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his suit. Had the officials done nothing in response to Thomas’s complaints, they would have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but the prison responded to Thomas’s concerns and medical needs. View "Thomas v. Blackard" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago Police Officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. According to Smith, the officers fabricated a story that, during this stop, he made a “furtive movement” and that the officers found a bullet in the car. Smith was arrested and detained for seven months in the Cook County Jail. Smith was released on bond “on or about” March 29, 2014. While on bond, Smith was required to appear in court once per month and to request permission before leaving Illinois. Smith contends his bond conditions diminished his employment prospects and that he experienced financial stress and emotional anxiety. He was acquitted on July 21, 2016. On July 18, 2018, Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit as untimely under a two-year limitations period, rejecting Smith’s argument that his claim accrued when he was acquitted at trial. A Fourth Amendment claim such as Smith’s accrues when he is released from detention. The court also rejected Smith’s contention that his bond conditions constituted an ongoing Fourth Amendment seizure, so he was not released from custody until he was acquitted. Requirements to appear in court for a hearing and to request permission before leaving the state, taken together or separately, do not amount to Fourth Amendment seizures. View "Smith v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Daza worked as a geologist for INDOT from 1993 until the agency fired him in 2015. In 2017, he sued, citing 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. He alleged that INDOT and its officials had discriminated against him based on race, color, age, and political speech and had retaliated against complaints he made regarding the alleged discrimination.Days after the district court granted INDOT summary judgment in 2018, Daza filed a second action, again alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, age, and political speech, contending that INDOT’s failure to rehire him for the vacancy left after INDOT dismissed him was an independent act of discrimination and retaliation because INDOT filled his position with a young and inexperienced white man. In the first suit, Daza had expressly contended that INDOT’s failure to rehire him and its decision to hire an unqualified replacement proved that INDOT was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit again affirmed summary judgment in favor of INDOT. Claim preclusion barred the second case. View "Daza v. Indiana" on Justia Law