Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
by
McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances. View "McMullen v. Dalton" on Justia Law

by
In 2003, Salem received a license to practice law in New York. He applied for but was denied a license to practice in Illinois, where he resides, but maintained an Illinois practice, from 2004-2019, by obtaining permission to appear pro hac vice. The Illinois Attorney Disciplinary and Registration Commission (IARDC) charged him with falsely representing that he was licensed in Illinois and successfully requested that the Illinois Supreme Court prohibit Illinois courts from allowing him to appear pro hac vice for 90 days. Salem filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Salem’s suit and ordered him to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court first rejected Salem’s argument that every Illinois district judge should be disqualified and the case transferred to Michigan. The court then held that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court cannot be collaterally attacked in civil litigation. The court noted that the defendant, the IARDC, did not deprive Salem of liberty or property and that there was a rational basis for the Supreme Court’s decision. The court described the litigation as frivolous and noted Salem’s history of “preposterous” behavior in federal court. View "Salem v. Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipinary Commission" on Justia Law

by
Biggs served as interim principal of Burke Elementary School on an at-will basis. Under the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) Transportation Policy, no CPS school employee may drive a student in a personal vehicle without written consent from the school’s principal and the student’s legal guardian. The principal must retain copies of the driver's license and insurance documentation. An investigation revealed that for many years, Biggs had directed her subordinates to mark late students as tardy, rather than absent, regardless of how many instructional minutes they received in a day, which likely skewed Burke’s attendance data. Biggs admitted that she had ordered Burke employees to pick up students in personal vehicles without written parental consent and did not keep copies of the drivers’ licenses or insurance documentation. Biggs was fired and designated Do Not Hire. The designation does not necessarily prevent the employee from being hired at a non-CPS school. It was disclosed at community meetings that Biggs’s firing was “about integrity” and a redacted copy of the report was read aloud.Biggs sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deprivation of her liberty to pursue her occupation without due process, citing "stigmatizing public statements" in connection with her termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit. No reasonable jury could find that Biggs had suffered a tangible loss of employment opportunities within her occupation; she experienced nothing more than the customary difficulties and delays that individuals encounter when looking for a new job, especially after being fired. View "Biggs v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law

by
Conner was convicted in Indiana state court for three counts of felony drug dealing and maintaining a common nuisance. Conner qualified as a habitual offender and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 72 years in prison. He had remained in custody pre-trial, but there was a delay of 1,029 days from the charging date (1,034 days from his arrest). Conner’s attorney never made a Sixth Amendment objection to the pretrial delays and Conner’s own objections were rejected because he was represented by counsel. State courts rejected his post-trial Sixth Amendment and ineffective assistance claims. Conner was advised by his postconviction counsel to postpone filing his federal habeas petition until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the petition for a writ of certiorari filed after his state postconviction proceedings. Conner relied on that advice, to his detriment. The one-year period in which to file the habeas petition continued to run while the certiorari petition was pending.The district court dismissed his subsequent habeas petition as untimely, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the postconviction lawyer’s mistake was particularly grave but holding that Supreme Court and circuit precedent j foreclose equitably tolling the deadline. View "Conner v. Reagle" on Justia Law

by
Gnutek alleged that he was unlawfully terminated from his position as a Gaming Senior Special Agent with the Illinois Gaming Board in violation of Title VII, the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Illinois Ethics Act. His termination followed his arrest after Gnutek assaulted another driver. The district court dismissed the Illinois Ethics Act claims against the Board and individual defendants in their official capacities. Gnutek voluntarily dismissed the claims against two individual defendants. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and three other individuals on the remaining claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Other than the fact that he has previously engaged in prior litigation against the defendants, Gnutek presented no evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that his termination was retaliatory nor did he establish that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals. View "Gnutek v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

by
Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

by
Brown injured his knee when he fell at his former prison. He received medical care and was placed on “special needs,” which included being assigned a lower bunk, a wheelchair, and crutches. Weeks later, Brown was transferred. Over the first few months, he spent time in segregation. Brown repeatedly asked several times for medical care but received none. He was later moved to a shared cell where his cellmate, who was disabled, slept in the lower bunk. While climbing to his top bunk, Brown fell. Afterward, Brown saw a doctor who said that Brown needed surgery but that the prison would not provide it. Brown then asked the prison’s “special needs committee” to provide him “accommodations,” and he “filed an ADA reasonable accommodation request.” He also alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part. Brown alleged a viable failure-to-accommodate claim, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Brown’s complaint did not need to identify any particular legal theory, nor did it need to allege all legal elements of a particular claim. Brown’s alleged knee injury renders him disabled under the ADA and he alleged failure to accommodate his disability. No rule of law required Brown to identify a particular accommodation in his complaint. The ADA “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice” but Brown’s claim is not about allegedly substandard medical care. View "Brown v. Fofana" on Justia Law

by
Cichocki called the police to report that her 15-year-old daughter, G.C., had been sexually assaulted by Garcia days earlier at a resort where the families were vacationing. Cichocki told Detective Posewitz that G.C. had reported that, while G.C. and the other children were in the pool, Garcia purposely touched her breasts and “down there.” Both families stayed at the resort until the next afternoon. Cichocki suggested that G.C. could not remember all the details of the incident and had expressed fear that the video would contradict her report. Posewitz interviewed G.C., who described the incidents. Surveillance footage of the pool area was poor quality and inconclusive. Although the area was crowded, there were apparently no witnesses. ADA Spoentgen drafted a criminal complaint, which ADA Hoffman reviewed. It did not refer to the surveillance footage or Cichoki's statements. The Court Commissioner found probable cause for Garcia’s arrest. The court found probable cause to proceed to trial. After Hoffman’s opening statement, the judge declared a mistrial because Hoffman mentioned that G.C. had a learning disability, which had not been disclosed to the defense.Garcia sued Posewitz, Hoffman, and Spoentgen under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. No reasonable jury could find that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the information omitted from the complaint would have negated probable cause. G.C.’s and Cichocki’s accounts were largely consistent; the defendants lacked any indication that either had a motive to lie. View "Garcia v. Posewitz" on Justia Law

by
Hambrick, a black woman born in 1970, has worked at the Social Security Administration (SSA) for nearly 35 years. In 2016, her supervisor reassigned her. Hambrick remained a manager at the same pay scale and grade. Since her transfer, Hambrick alleges she has endured constant negative treatment from her supervisors and peers, amounting to harassment based on her age and race. Hambrick unsuccessfully applied for other roles. For one position, her supervisor hired a younger, white man, explaining that her collaborative skills needed work and her direct supervisor recommended her “with reservations.” Hambrick also complained of her heavy workload, and the quick rise of younger, non-black SSA employees and that her supervisors did not celebrate her lowering the backlog of cases. Hambrick filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints that were resolved in the SSA’s favor.The district court determined that Hambrick had administratively exhausted the SSA’s failure to promote Hambrick; Hambrick’s lowered performance evaluation; and Hambrick’s non-selection to positions in 2021 as retaliation for her EEO complaints, then concluded that she failed to show unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that the “totality of undisputed facts … consisted of unremarkable workplace disagreements.” Hambrick’s “dissatisfaction with her supervisors, heavy workload, and lack of recognition,” did not create a hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the incidents that Hambrick challenged were severe or pervasive, nor does she show how they relate to the protected characteristics of her race or age. View "Hambrick v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

by
In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law